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ABSTRACT 
2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly 
referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It 
can be classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the 
overthrow of standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states 
that have not experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia 
have all experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni 
Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have 
experienced uprisings that have not resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally, 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have experienced none of the instability observed in 2011 
within the same time period.  
In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly 
developing coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate 
Model. As later explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods 
argument. The theory states that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs 
he can provide to his selectorate and public goods  provided to the general population. The once 
secular despots are either gone or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak, 
Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently 
embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are being replaced or have already been removed by governments 
that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore, newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account 
the role of religion in their calculus for political survival in a way that they did not before.  This begs 
the question: what about the regimes in my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such 
governments have a legitimacy that is derived from implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This 
strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted for beyond the standard Selectorate 
Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I provide a revised Selectorate Model 
explanation that accounts for the role of religion. 
 I conclude that the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not 
account for the role of religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I 
developed a revised Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard 
private payoffs – public goods argument.  The role of religion is expressed by the presence of 
religious stakeholders in the agent based model such as clerics, shura councils or Islamic parties 
present in all selectorates in MENA. I tracked the selectorates through a series of predictions made 
throughout the course of 2011 using the Senturion agent based model. It serves as a powerful 
alternative to standard historical analysis and wisdom. I provide an explanation of why certain 
regimes fell while others remained relatively stable and why some governments experiencing similar 
instability remain using agent based modeling (ABM) in application to Selectorate Theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction and Overview…………………………………………………………………………………………1 
 
II. Problem Statement……………………………………………………………………………………………...…….5 
  
III. Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………….………………………….…8 
 
IV. Method and Organization………………………………………………………………………………………….20 
 
V. The Case of Egypt……………………………………………………………………………..…………………….…23 
 
VI. The Case of Libya……………………………………………………………………………………………………….32 
 
VII. The Case of Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………………………………………………40 
 
VIII. The Case of Iran…………………………………………………………………………………………………………45 
 
IX. The Case of Syria……………………………………………………………………………………………………….52 
 
X. The Case of Bahrain…………………………………………………………………………………………………..62 
 
XI. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….………………………………………..67 
 
Appendix 
1. Complete Predictions on Egypt……………………………………………………………………………….……....82 
 
2. Complete Predictions on Iran……………………………………………………………………………….………….103 
 
3. Complete Predictions on Libya…………………………………………………………………………..……………117 
 
4. Complete Predictions on Syria………………………………………………………………………………..……….141 
 
5. Complete Predictions on Yemen………………………………………………………………………………………163 
 
6. Complete Predictions on Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………………………………..172 
 
7. Complete Predictions on Bahrain………………………………………………………………………………….…180 
 
8. Stakeholder Inputs and Data……………………………………………………………………………………….….185 
 
9. Works Cited………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page Intentionally Left Blank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
I. Introduction and Overview 
2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly 
referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It can be 
classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of 
standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states that have not 
experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia have all experienced 
uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have experienced uprisings that have not 
resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have 
experienced none of the instability observed in 2011 within the same time period.  
In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly developing 
coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate Model. As later 
explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods argument. The theory states 
that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs he can provide to his selectorate 
and public goods  provided to the general population (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). The proportion 
of private versus public goods determines the type of government the leader will have. However, with 
the rise of Islamist Parties, leaders in MENA must take into account preferences that are not driven only 
by financial benefits, but also social and religious preferences.  The once secular despots are either gone 
or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam 
Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are 
being replaced or have already been removed by governments that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore, 
newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account the role of religion in their calculus for 
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political survival in a way that they did not before.  This begs the question: what about the regimes in 
my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are 
highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such governments have a legitimacy that is derived from 
implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted 
for beyond the standard Selectorate Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I 
provide a revised Selectorate Model explanation that accounts for the role of religion. 
This dissertation evaluates the Selectorate Model in application to the Middle East. I conclude that 
the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not account for the role of 
religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I developed a revised 
Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard private payoffs – public 
goods argument.  The role of religion is expressed by the presence of religious stakeholders in the agent 
based model such as clerics, shura councils or Islamic parties present in all selectorates in MENA. I 
tracked the selectorates through a series of predictions made throughout the course of 2011 using the 
Senturion agent based model. It serves as a powerful alternative to standard historical analysis and 
wisdom. I provide an explanation of why certain regimes fell while others remained relatively stable and 
why some governments experiencing similar instability remain using agent based modeling (ABM) in 
application to Selectorate Theory. The predictions are organized as case studies tracking the rebellions 
or lack thereof and the political dynamics of several states in the Middle East and North Africa. The 
states included in the dissertation consist of Egypt, Syria, Bahrain,  Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. 
This is an empirical test of Selectorate Theory using  agent based modeling  in predicting the 
outcome of events taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  The predicted outcomes 
serve as a tool for examining the Selectorate Model by identifying the evolution of coalitions.  A test in 
predicting real-world events taking place serves as a strong validation of my revised selectorate model 
as well as the agent based model itself. Indeed not all the predictions have been accurate; however, the 
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majority of predictions have proven to be valid with moderate to detailed specificity. The ultimate 
explanatory power of a model is how well the prediction matches reality.  This dissertation is an attempt 
at not just predicting the future as an end in itself.  Instead we test the validity of the predictions for the 
purpose of finding generalizable explanations on why regimes fall while others faced with similar 
centripetal forces remain in the context of the selectorates.  
In an age of continued political punditry much of the policy making world is bombarded by subject 
matter experts who provide a valuable illustration of the historical and present environment. However, 
such experts are unable to provide reliable predictions on future political outcomes. Although not a 
perfect model or a silver bullet by any means, the Senturion agent based model harnesses the 
knowledge of subject matter experts using computing technology to make predictions that are much 
more accurate than the seat of the pants analysis which mainly relies on intuitive historical trends. This 
particular agent based model uses game theory logic such as expected utility. It encapsulates over half a 
century’s work in economics, political psychology, and computing technology. 
The common mode of decision-making by policymakers is to first receive detailed analysis and 
narratives about any particular dilemma. For example, the on-set of the Arab Spring, similar to any other 
particular crises, set into motion a flood of analysis to policy-makers consisting of detailed descriptions 
of the various factors leading up to the wave of instability facing the region.1 Analyses ranged anywhere 
from cultural and historical perspectives of the uprisings to conceptual explanations common among 
political scientists and historians.2 Explanations such as economic disparities, dissatisfaction among the 
masses, and social injustices causing such dissatisfaction serve as such examples. These cases are at best 
the culmination of wisdom that can account for events only after they have occurred. Unfortunately the 
current policy world more often than not succumbs to analyses that are rarely more than journalism 
                                                          
1
 Defense Whiz to Pentagon: Your Predictions are Destined to Fail 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/danzig-military-predictions/ 
 
2
 Ibid. 
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sprinkled with opinions that are shot from the hip. Indeed, objective journalism and reporting of the 
news provide the necessary foundation for analyses. However, journalism coupled with unfounded 
analysis serves merely as an opinion or editorial commentary grounded in ideological advocacy of beliefs 
that are difficult to prove or disprove.   
The extreme opposite approach to the journalistic narrative is the excessively esoteric research 
written by academics for academics. As advances in computing technology improve, so too do the 
quantitative methods in analyzing complex policy dilemmas or puzzles. As political scientists we often 
focus more on the methodology and theoretical constructs of a problem rather than solving the puzzle 
in a manner that can be actionable for policymakers. In short we often end up having a conversation 
with ourselves rather than providing decision makers alternatives to the status quo ante. The answer 
lays somewhere in-between describing the crises and making scientific conclusions using proven 
methodologies (Feder 1995). 
The concept of game theory based ABMs have an elegant practicality. It posits that stakeholders, 
domestic and international policymakers, are self-interested rational individuals who seek to maximize 
the benefits to each decision they make after weighing the costs and risks associated with any action. 
The application of expected utility with ABMs calculates the anticipated costs and benefits of any 
particular decision in order to predict the actions of stakeholders in regard to any particular issue. But 
before making any calculation, analysts must identify who the stakeholders are, how influential they are, 
what their position is on any an issue, and the level of importance they place on the issue. In fact, most 
rational policymakers already think in this fashion intuitively. Assume a person enters a negotiation 
table. He or she will naturally want to know some fundamental questions. Who are the people at the 
negotiating table? How powerful are they in regard to achieving their goal? How important do they hold 
the issue being negotiated? Which groups or organizations do they belong do? Any particular negotiator 
or policymaker will wonder how others may react based his or her action. Therefore, a rational 
5 
 
negotiator will then take a position on an issue based on his or her perception of how others will react. 
In spite of the fact that strategic negotiators already think and act based on these questions, the human 
mind has limitations on tracking how everyone will react based on all the interactions of different moves 
by the various stakeholders.  
 
II. Problem Statement: 
 The wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has posed a high level of 
uncertainty for global policymakers, regional leaders, and the various populations affected by this 
instability. In this dissertation I will evaluate whether Selectorate Theory is an adequate explanation for 
the events unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2011. I will test and evaluate this 
by applying agent based modeling in order to capture the coalition distributions and the evolution of the 
various selectorates. I will argue that the role of religion should be accounted for in the scope of 
Selectorate Theory due to the rise of Islamic parties in the MENA  by democratic means. The Selectorate 
Model states that government types are determined by two primary elements:  the size of the 
selectorate, meaning the group of actors who have a say in policy outcomes, and the winning coalition 
necessary in keeping the leadership in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). The theory is driven by an 
incentive argument indicating that a leader’s survival is based on a mix of private payoffs and public 
services (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). In application to MENA I propose an expanded 
Selectorate Model that will include not only pressure by the population for governments to shift away 
from maximizing private benefits for supporters to maximizing the public good of the expanding 
selectorate, but will do so by concurrently considering financial gains with religious preferences. I will 
evaluate whether adding the role of religion in Selectorate Theory provides a clearer picture of the 
evolution of the Arab Spring, particularly with the rise of Islamic parties by democratic means.  
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I will use agent based modeling to empirically test the validity of Selectorate Theory (Abdollahian, 
Kugler, Feng, 2000).  In my dissertation I will conduct an empirical test of Selectorate Thoery using the 
Senturion agent based model in an attempt to determine the validity and accuracy of the crises facing 
the Middle East and North Africa in terms of coalitional distributions. Indeed, under longer time 
horizons Selectorate Theory has shown to be accurate. My agent based analysis on the Arab Spring and 
Iran indicates that in the transition period following a revolution the size of the selectorate and winning 
coalition is not a determining factor on the extent of democratization.  More simply, the preferences of 
the stakeholders, many of them Islamist, within the selectorate determine the form of government 
during the transition period. In fact there are also historical instances where the respective size of the 
selectorate and coalition increased but the society became even more authoritarian, i.e. Iran 1979.  The 
countries I have made predictions on are consisting of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia.    
The Middle East and North Africa has experienced a wave of revolutions and uprisings. The 
predicted states in the region can be classified in three broad categories: 
1. Countries with uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of standing regimes: This category 
includes Egypt and Libya. They have experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Hosni 
Mubarak and Muamar Gaddafi. 
2. Countries with revolts that have failed to overthrow standing regimes: Syria and Bahrain serve as such 
examples. 
3. Countries that have not experienced popular revolts: Saudi Arabia and Iran have had none of the 
internal instability observed in the first two categories. 
 Motivated by the Selectorate Model, this paper outlines the series of predictions made 
throughout the course of 2011 on the Arab Spring and Iran by applying agent based modeling. Having 
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proven to be accurate, my analysis documents the evolution of events taking place in the selected 
countries. 
Hypotheses:  
H1: The further away the winning coalition is from the median stakeholder, the greater the conditions 
for a political crisis or uprising. (Black 1958) 
 The median stakeholders were weighted based on each particular stakeholder’s level of 
influence. For example, in the case of Syria, Bashar Al Assad has the greatest influence. Therefore, he 
garners the greatest weight. We captured the domestic median preferences on the issue of governance 
and compared it to the current or deposed leader’s position. We also compared the domestic median 
with the global median.  The global median account  for all the stakeholders, domestically and 
internationally while the domestic median only captures the actors within the country being analyzed. 
H2: Political survival of leaders in MENA is determined by religious preferences in conjunction with 
the public-private goods argument posited by the Selectorate Model 
 Prior to analyzing the results we can observe that almost all the remaining governments in 
MENA have a religious party within their polity. The most stable governments have either developed a 
coalition with the religious stakeholders or are a non-secular government in entirety. The governments 
which have been toppled during the Arab Spring were secular and are being replaced with less secular 
leaders. Based on these observations we posit that political survival is linked to religious preferences, a 
dimension that is not accounted for in the standard Selectorate Model.  
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III. Literature Review  
 
The Selectorate Perspective 
  The work by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003) on Selectorate Theory 
posits that within every populace of a given state there is a subgroup of actors who have influence on 
policy outcomes. Within this selectorate there is a winning coalition consisting of the subset of 
stakeholders who select the leadership and aid him or her to maintain power. Figure 1 illustrates that 
the size of the selectorate and the size of the winning coalition in proportion to the overall population 
determine the type of government a state will have. For example, a monarchy has a small selectorate 
comprised of the nobility within which a winning coalition comprised of members of the ruling family 
select and support a king as the leader. On the opposite side of the spectrum, a democracy consists of a 
large selectorate made up of all citizens who can vote and require a relatively large winning coalition, 
summarily a majority of those who cast their vote for the winning leadership. As the size of the 
selectorate increases, the extent of authoritarianism decreases (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). 
  There are two circumstances that result into the leader being deposed: a constructive vote of 
no confidence or simple deposition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, et. al., 2003). In the cast of no 
confidence, the challenger must draw enough support away from the incumbent in order for the 
incumbent to lose backing from his winning coalition within the selectorate. If no particular leader 
maintains support of a winning coalition, the incumbent remains the leader by default.  In the case of 
the Arab Spring, one such example is the lingering rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen.  In April of 2011 
Saleh agreed to step down within 30 days and after surpassing the initial time period was befallen with a 
failed assassination attempt that seriously injured him. In spite of the major loss of confidence by the 
majority of the tribes within Yemen represented as members of the winning coalition, Saleh continues 
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to remain in Yemen due to the absence of an alternative ruler who can gain dominant support from his 
previous coalition.  
 In the case of simple deposition, the challenger has to merely gain an adequate number of 
supporters from the incumbent’s coalition. If the challenger gains more members of the coalition than 
the incumbent, the ruling leader is then removed as the challenger takes his place. In the case of the 
Arab Spring, the removal of Muamar Gaddafi of Libya served as a prime example illustrating how former 
members of his coalition defected to the Libyan Transitional Council. As evident by my case study 
analysis of Libya, the scales tipped in favor of the Libyan Transitional Council when Shokri Ghanem of the 
Libyan Oil Corporation defected in support of the opposition.   
 The number of people comprising the winning coalition also has an impact on an incumbent’s 
prospects for political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow 2006). According to 
Selectorate Theory if either the size of selectorate grows or the winning coalition shrinks, defecting 
becomes riskier (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). It is this risk of exclusion from the winning 
coalition that drives loyalty for the current leader, a major advantage for whoever holds the status quo. 
It is for this reason in which political systems with small winning coalitions and large selectorates tend to 
be most stable. In such a case, the members of the winning coalition can easily be substituted out with a 
large pool of candidates from the large selectorate. Because of the ease of substitution, members within 
the winning coalition are driven by a norm of loyalty where each member within the coalition attempts 
to out due others in proving loyalty to the leader. In the case of the Arab Spring, such a system is 
exhibited by Syria’s political system. In such a case the Assad regime has maintained control of Syria by 
developing a small winning coalition with a large selectorate consisting of the Baath Party. My agent 
based model indicates that Assad has a system where many of the actors within his coalition tend to me 
more adamantly in support of the status quo than Assad himself. In effect, the analysis indicates that 
Assad’s followers are extremely loyal and they depend on him for survival which according to 
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Selectorate Theory is driven by the dynamic that they can easily be replaced by a vast array of 
candidates with the Baath Party. This is one of the reasons why the Assad Regime has continued to 
survive in spite of an international campaign opposing his rule with what is mounting into a civil war.  
 Choosing a political leader according to Selectorate Theory is driven by one primary factor: the 
need for the leader to provide payoffs to the winning coalition in order to be selected and survive over 
time (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). The mix of private and public goods leaders choose for the 
purpose of maintaining power depends on the size of the selectorate. In a dictatorship, the leader can 
survive by partitioning most of the state’s resources through private payoffs while devoting less of the 
resources to be delivered as public goods. The small selectorate and winning coalition allows the leader 
to buy off support without the need to gain public approval. Therefore, so long as the leader satisfies his 
or her coalition, he or she maintains power.  Because the vast majority of the dictator’s populous are 
outside of the selectorate, he or she can limit public services while maintaining hefty private payoffs to 
his winning coalition. Dictators can disregard and disenfranchise the vast majority outside the inner-
circle since they have little or no say on the choice of ruling authority. 
Figure 1: Visual Conceptualization of Selectorate Model 
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 Selectorate Theory logic results into several core predictions on the behavior of political leaders 
based on the size of the selectorate (S) and the winning coalition (W). In the first prediction, the larger 
the ratio of W/S reduces the leader’s proclivity to stealing from the public coffers. As the size of the 
winning coalition grows, leaders are more prone to commit revenues to public goods that benefit 
broader society instead of private stakeholders. (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al (2003). Based on this logic, 
the we reach the second prediction:  The welfare of the members of the winning coalition decrease with 
the rise of W ; however, there is a threshold where the coalition’s welfare eventually increases after a 
turning point based on factors such as stability and extent of democratization.  The winning coalition’s 
welfare initially decreases because public wealth is being redistributed where if it would otherwise be 
concentrated in the hands of the elite. The third core prediction is that total expenditures increases as 
the size of W increases. The logic behind this is simple as well: A proportionally large winning coalition 
requires more private payoffs and as a result increases expenditures. The fourth prediction is that tax 
rates decrease as W increases and S decreases (Bueno de Mesquita, et al, 2003). This is so because the 
larger winning coalition results into greater private benefits, two of which are black market transactions 
and less return back to the public good, taxation being a direct tool for redistribution.  
 Selectorate Theory posits that political survival for leaders and institutions is determined by 
their ability to provide resources through based on a mix of public goods and private payoffs. Examples 
of public goods consist of primarily services such as education, healthcare, public roads and 
transportation, police and public safety, and potable water. Private payoffs can exist in the form of 
direct bribes or more sophisticated methods such as tax breaks, contract preferences, or generally any 
form of benefit that is exclusively reserved for the winning coalition in an unfair and illegitimate manner.  
The Role of Islam in Politics  
 The political elements of Islam, similar to Christianity and Judaism, are derived from the 
religion’s holy book known as the Quran. In addition to the Quran, political practices are also derived 
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from the sayings and living record of the Prophet Muhammad referred to as the Sunna.  Political 
leadership is legitimized in Islam if one is accepted as a descendent of Muhammad. In Sunni Islam a 
successor of the Muhammad is referred to as a Caliph while in the Shia religion he is called an Imamate. 
The duty of the religious leader in Islamic is to follow and impose Islamic law, also synonymous with 
Sharia Law. For several centuries, the descendent argument was the source of political legitimacy in the 
Islamic world until the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan’s loss of authority over Mecca to the Saud family in 
1925. Following World War I, the Middle East and North Africa experienced a series of attempts to catch 
up with the West, most notably Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s secularization and modernization of the post-
Ottoman Turkey. Similar trends toward secularism continued with Pahlavi Era Iran, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s Egypt and the rise of pan-Arabism.  
 However, in 1979 the secular government of the Pahlavi regime ended with an Islamic 
revolution and fast-forward to 2011, the Arab Spring has resulted in the ousting of the once aspiring 
secular despots seeking regional and global influence. One argument is that the primary motive for a 
return to Islamization is the resistance to colonialism and control of the Islamic world by outsiders (Roy, 
2004). Another common argument is historian Bernard Lewis’ argument that Islamic world’s failure to 
modernize is rooted in the absence of widespread reform movements experience by Christianity and 
Judaism (Lewis, 1995, 1997). In historical comparison, Lewis contends that Christianity’s experience with 
the reformation and renaissance served as a precursor to the French and American revolutions. This in 
turn was part of a gradual separation of church and state. However, Islam has not experienced such a 
separation. As a result, the role of politics and governance remains a fundamental element of the state 
in the Muslim world. In short, Lewis contends that Islam, democracy and modernity are difficult to 
reconcile. 
 A differing view point is Nasr’s contention that the rise of the middle class in Muslim countries is 
reconcilable with modernity and Islam (Nasr, 2009). What Nasr observes in such cases is middle class 
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that is highly religious but still motivated by economic incentive. A prime example he sites is the case of 
Turkey, a growing economy coupled with the rise of Islamic parties. In spite of the rise of a business 
minded middle class throughout various Islamic countries, Nasr also argues that the rift within Islam 
between the Shiite and the still dominant Sunnis will be a major source for instability and conflict in the 
21st century (Nasr, 2006). In short, Nasr expresses the dominant argument within the field of political 
Islam – that religion and democracy are reconcilable as evident by Muslim majority countries such as 
Maldives, Malaysia, and Turkey. In spite of the historical examples expressing the possibility of a 
democratic Islamic world, the consensus remains that the religious differences within Islam make peace 
unstable. The Arab Spring test the validity of both these notions.  
Tracking and Forecasting Selectorates and Winning Coalitions 
 With the application of agent based modeling, I  captured the elements of the selectorate and 
the winning coalition along with other domestic and international stakeholders playing a role in the 
outcome of events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). My data illustrates those countries 
following the deposition of the ruler move toward a projected path closer to Democracy. In the case of 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen the selectorate and the winning coalition initiate a transition phase toward a 
less autocratic government; however, the extent of democratization varies significantly. The selectorate 
size and winning coalition size increase because of the emergence of more stakeholders engaging in 
policy outcomes. However, standard Selectorate Theory is driven by a single dimension: the lessening of 
private payoffs versus public goods as the size of the selectorate and the winning coalition increases.  
The Selectorate Model proves useful on the private-public goods dimensions but the religious dimension 
of countries with Muslim majorities is appropriate in capturing the preferences of the winning coalition 
or the larger selectorate.   
 Throughout the course of 2011 I forecasted and validated the evolution of events taking place in 
the Arab Spring and Iran by applying the Senturion Agent Based Model. The validated forecasts indicate 
14 
 
that once an uprising has begun, the form of government will be determined by the winning coalition or 
the position closest to the median stakeholder. The scales we use incorporate authoritarian-democratic 
choice. By incorporating into agent based modeling this dimension we harness the power of computer 
simulations in predicting what decision makers should expect based on their present positions on 
governance. Senturion generates a picture of the current and projected political landscape by utilizing 
agent based modeling with game theory logic such as expected utility (Abdollahian and Kugler et al 
2000). Previous publications have tested and documented the validity of such models (Feder 1995, 
Abdollahian and Kugler et al 2000). The first round is merely a feedback of the model inputs. It then 
animates the political landscape as described by the issue continuum into a dynamic simulation of how 
political interests will likely evolve into the future. Each round is considered an evolution or change in 
negotiated outcomes between the various groups and stakeholders. The round or negotiation phase 
comes to an end when the cost of negotiating exceeds any benefit gained by continuing the negotiation. 
The position with the most weighted influence results into the winning outcome, notwithstanding the 
threat of veto-players. The perceptual model allows researchers and policymakers to determine which 
deals are feasible based on the formation of coalitions in support of any particular policy position. 
Understanding the intricacies of the Middle East and North Africa because of our specialization in the 
region improved our ability to better interpret simulated outcomes.  
Agent Based Models 
 
The origins of agent based models (ABM) ability to predict future outcomes are rooted in Bernoulli’s 
(1738) definition of expected satisfaction, referred to initially as moral expectations. With the rise of 
economics as a science in the 20th century rational behavior models such as the expected utility theory 
began taking shape as a vessel for predicting behavior. The Von Neuman Morgenstern (VNM) Utility 
Theorem (1947) established the platform for future debate over development of expected utility logic. 
Now referred to as VNM rationality, the theorem posits four axioms: (1) Completeness of preferences, 
15 
 
(2) Transitivity of such preferences, (3) Continuity of preference between a probability of 0 to 1, and (4) 
the holding of preferences independently from the possibility of another outcome. In applying the 
expected utility model we loosen theoretical rigidities associated with full rationality and substitute it 
with bounded rationality. Individuals have a bounded rationality because they are not capable of looking 
into an unbounded time horizon, but rather see only a move ahead of their current choice. (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1997).  
Agent Based Modeling with the application of game theory and expected utility took shape in the 
application of international politics with the publication of the War Trap (Bueno de Mesquita 1981).  The 
War Trap applied Black’s (1958) median voter theorem along with the Bank’s monotonicity principle to 
predict dispute outcomes between states resulting in competition, confrontation, cooperation or 
negotiation. In the “War Trap Revisited”, Bueno de Mesquita extended the predictive capability of his 
expected utility model by a risk function in accounting for stakeholders preferential risk behavior (risk 
neutral, risk averse, or risk taking). 3 Although Bueno de Mesquita identified the range of expected 
behavior between dyads, Lalman (1988) extended the precision of the predicted dispute outcomes by 
calculating the direction and intensity as vectors. Bennett and Stam (2000) conducted a cross validation 
of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s international interactions game by including all possible dyads in 
the international system from 1816 to 1984 instead of just analyzing European dyads. Although the 
relationship was less clear among all interstate dyads their universal test provided a critical validation 
that the model can be applied across different regions.   
Figure 2 depicts the effects of perceptions on the escalation of conflict. If both players perceive a 
positive expected utility from challenging or fighting, then the outcome will be conflict, as depicted by 
the first quadrant. In opposite fashion, if both player perceive a negative expected utility by challenging 
eachother, then neither will fight. The perceived losses from both side is depicted by quadrant four, 
                                                          
3
 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979) "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk", 
Econometrica, XLVII (1979), 263-291. 
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making it a condition for deterrence. Quandrants 2b and 2a depict the condition for under which one of 
the challengers will resist while seeking better terms through fighting. Quadrants 3b and 3a will depict 
the situation where one side, perceiving it cannot gain from fighting, will yield or acquiesce to the 
challenger instead of fighting. 
Figure 2:  Expected Utility: The Effects of Perceptions on the Escalation of Conflict 
4 
The practicality of agent based modeling in world politics developed further with the likes of 
numerous publications such as Negotiating Peace in Kosovo (Efird, Abdollahian, et al). Such practical 
applications incorporated dyadic relations with augmentation of coalitions to better predict political 
outcomes and evolutions prior to the outcome at the onset of a crisis or conflict situation. In both 
theoretical and empirical terms, it is determined that the application of game theoretic ABMs is not as 
effective in predicting the onset of a crisis as it is in predicting its outcome once the beginning step has 
been initiated (Bueno de Mesquita, 1985; Lalman, 1990, Abdollahian, et. al., 2000). 
                                                          
4
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The War Trap Revisited,” The American Political Science Review, Volume 79, Issue 1 
(Mar., 1985), 156-177  
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Assumptions:  
•      Decision makers are trying to maximize their expected utility with regard to both policy and 
personal security satisfaction.  
•      Each player’s actions are informed by what that player expects to see happen in the next round of 
play and by what happened in the round immediately preceding.  
•      Players are operating with “bounded rationality”. Players calculate the perceptions of other players’ 
expected utility on an issue with a given level of uncertainty.  
•      In the game, each player knows three factors:  
 The potential influence of each actor on each issue examined.  
 The current stated policy position of each actor on each issue examined.  
 The salience each actor associates with those issues. 
 The model assumes that the costs of bargaining rises at an increasing rate as the simulation continues 
through successive rounds. 
 As the number of rounds increase, the costs of negotiating will reach a point where it does not make any 
more sense to continue 
 The predicted final policy outcome is equal to the position of the median voter in the last round of 
simulation if there are no veto players (Black 1958) 
 If there are veto players, then the predicted outcome is the policy, if any, that those actors agree to in 
the final round.  
 When the costs of bargaining exceed a given threshold then the bargaining will end without agreement. 
 Issues  are single-dimensional with single peaked preferences 
 Issues are monotonic, meaning decision-makers expected gains from a dispute increase, so too does the 
decision maker’s willingness to use force in pursuit of such gains (Banks 1990) 
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 Empirical Validation:  
  As stated in the introduction, this dissertation is an empirical application of agent based 
modeling coupled with the use of computing technology in validating the predictive capabilities of the 
model. But more importantly is powerful tool showing the evolution of coalitions through the lens of a 
Selectorate Theory explanation.  The ABM is applied and tested using the Senturion software.  
 The seminal publication indicating the empirical validity of agent based models is Feder’s 
declassified publication tracking the accuracy of predictions of ABM using Policon and Factions software 
platforms compared to the predictions made by CIA analysts.5  Policon is a first generation ABM 
software incorporating the use of computers for analyst at the CIA seeking to make political predictions. 
It was used by the CIA from 1982 through 1986.6 Factions was developed internally as a platform similar 
to Policon by the Directorate of Science and Technology’s Office of Research and Development.7 The 
declassified publication provides comparative empirical results testing predictions on issues concerning 
stability in over 30 countries.  Feder’s declassified publication cited that Policon and traditional methods 
were both found to be accurate about 90% of the time. However, Policon and Factions were more 
detailed in their predictions, managing to hit the bull’s-eye twice as often.  This dissertation serves a 
similar purpose to Feder’s publication as an attempt to further validate the application of ABMs as a 
powerful alternative to traditional methods of analyses, particularly for the unclassified world of 
policymakers and stakeholders.   
Connecting Selectorate Theory and Agent Based Modeling 
 Agent Based Modeling in application with game theory and expected utility cannot predict the 
onset of a conflict or crisis. However, once the crisis has been initiated it can predict whether the regime 
will remain or fall by identifying the winning coalition and the distance with the median stakeholder 
                                                          
5
 Stanley A. Feder, “Factions and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,” Studies in Intelligence vol. 31, no.1 (Spring 
1987), pp. 41-57. Originally Classified “Secret” and “Noform.”  
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
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(Black 1958). By this logic, if the leader can maintain a coalition that is dominant or close to the median 
stakeholder, he will survive. If his coalition begins to disintegrate, he is expected to eventually fall. The 
leading authority can also interchangeably be called the veto-player. The further the veto-player’s 
influence is degraded, the more likely he will to cease his influence to veto or prevent his own downfall. 
An expected utility explanation for why regimes fall is simple: After the onset of an uprising, once the 
net utility of success in overthrowing the regime surpasses the net utility of failing to overthrow it, the 
regime will fall (Abdollahian, Efird 2000). This simple agent based model in application to expected 
utility and game theory allows us to predict the outcome of an uprising or crisis. In this dissertation, I 
incorporate the work by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003, 2010) on Selectorate 
Theory in further answering the question of why regimes either survive or transition.  Having identified 
religious actors and their formation of coalitions, I will propose that the role of religion must be 
accounted beyond the standard Selectorate Model if we are to under the true logic of political survival 
in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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IV. Method and Organization 
 
 This dissertation is less focused on the method and theoretical construct of the agent based 
applications and is more concentrated on the empirically practical application of the model in predicting 
political outcomes of the Arab Spring and Iran.  I have made a series of predictions over the course of 
the year tracking the evolution of events taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The 
sample set of countries consist of Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.  
 In this dissertation I will predict, analyze, and evaluate the validity of the ABM while also 
evaluating the public-private goods argument of Selectorate Theory. This is conducted by obtaining the 
inputs, running the inputs through Senturion computer simulation, interpreting the outputs, and 
tracking the validity of the forecasts by comparing the predictions with the actual outcomes using open 
source news sources (i.e. Reuters, Associated Press, BBC). The analysis will be conducted through six 
steps (Efird, Abdollahian, et al 2000): 
1. Frame the Issue: Asking the correct question is arguably the most pertinent step to getting the best 
predictive answer to any problem.  
a. Identify the issue: The issue must be monotonic. 
b. Develop a continuum by defining the range of possible outcome pertaining to the issue. 
2. Input the data: The data on stakeholders are obtained by either interviewing subject matter experts 
obtaining information through open source media reports combined with academic knowledge.  
a. Identify the individual stakeholders and the groups they belong to.  
b. Identify the level of group influence. Define their level of individual influence, individual salience in 
regards to the issue, and their individual position on the issue continuum.   
Policy Position: This is the stakeholders’ preferred or stated position based on the defined range of 
positions on the issue continuum. 
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Power: The most powerful group and individual within the group are indexed at 100. Each stakeholder is 
attributed a value relative to the most powerful stakeholder. For example, two stakeholders with 
influence score of 45 and 55 combining their power will be equal to the most powerful player at a score 
of 100. 
Salience: This captures how important the issue is to each stakeholder. It is a measurement of the 
stakeholder’s willingness to achieve his or her stated policy position. This is measured on a scale of 0 to 
100 as follows: 
90 - 100: This is the most important issue. The stakeholder will drop anything he or she is doing at any 
moment to address the particular issue. 
70 - 80: This is important to the stakeholder. It is one of the most important issues, but not a life or 
death level. 
50 – 60: This is one of several important issues. Other issues are certainly more important. 
30 – 40: The stakeholder cares about this issue, but it is not that important compared to all the issues he 
or she has to deal with. 
10 – 20: This is a minor issue for the stakeholder and he or she rarely pays attention to it. 
 0– 10: The stakeholder does not care about the issue. 
3.  Run the data and Receive Simulated Output: By incorporating agent based modeling with expected 
utility and game theory logic described in the literature review along with the stakeholder’s risk 
propensity, the computer simulation predicts what the decision makers should expect if their stated 
positions are sincere in present time. Senturion generates a picture of the current political landscape. 
The first round is merely a feedback of the model inputs. It then animates the political landscape as 
described by the issue continuum into a dynamic simulation of how political interests will likely evolve 
into the future.  
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Each round is considered an evolution or change in negotiated outcomes between the various groups 
and stakeholders. The round or negotiation comes to an end when the cost of negotiating exceeds any 
benefit gained by continuing the negotiation. 
4. Interpreting the Outputs: The position with the most weighted influence results into the winning 
outcome, notwithstanding the threat of veto-players. The perceptual model allows the policymaker to 
determine which deals are feasible based on the formation of coalitions in support of any particular 
policy position. Understanding the intricacies of the Middle East and North Africa because of my 
specialization in the region improved my ability to better interpret simulated outcomes.   
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V. The Case of Egypt 
 On February 6th of 2012, Egypt’s democratic Parliament gathered, only three weeks after the 
newly elected legislature held its first inaugural session.  When given a chance to speak one of the 
members from its Islamist bloc began praying out-loud in the middle of the session. The speaker of the 
new Parliament, Mohammed Saad al-Katani of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, 
immediately ordered the member’s microphone be cut-off and shouted, “this is a house of debate, not a 
Mosque. If you want to pray, go to a mosque but remember that I am just as much of a Muslim as you 
are.”8 This incident is just one example of the political turmoil taking place in Egypt’s newly elected 
legislature, a fierce debate between the secular platform of the Freedom and Justice Party as the 
majority and the minority Islamist bloc. In spite of the threat of extremists within the democratically 
elected legislature, this instance confirms the notion that Egypt’s government is led by secular rules in 
which all religious and non-religious parties are governed by.  
  Almost exactly one year ago on February 7th 2011 I correctly forecasted that if Hosni Mubarak 
departs Egypt, the prospects for a democratic transition would be likely.9 My simulation indicated that if 
Mubarak departed early, a coalition leaning toward a Liberal Democracy would emerge with the various 
political parties advocating for a multiparty system versus the military and intelligence apparatus 
advocating for a one party system.  The combined trade-off between military rule in the interim and the 
emergence of an election process indicated a trend toward democratic transition. In November of 2011 I 
updated the initial forecast, further strengthening the initial claim that Egypt will have Democratic 
                                                          
8
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iI-u8_8hwj4&feature=youtu.be 
This is footage from an outburst in the Egyptian Parliament between an Islamist member and the speaker on 
February 7 2012. 
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reforms by allowing for election of national leaders. I noted that the military would undermine some of 
the democratic processes as a tradeoff for maintaining order and stability in the transition phase.   
 Democracies are created from negotiations resulting in pacts.  The prospect of Democracy in 
Egypt relies on the political parties’ ability to maintain their pacts by keeping their commitments. The 
initial solidarity between the political parties served as an indication that they will remain civil until they 
have some guaranteed form of governance that secures their positions in Egypt’s new government.   In 
February of 2011, I along with Dr. Ashraf Singer correctly predicted that the Egyptian military’s role as 
the interim custodian in the transition period  is appearing less like Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 and 
similar to the Turkish Coup D’état of 1980 (Bagherpour and Singer, 2011). Fast-forward to almost one 
year later. My updated forecast in November of 2011 as illustrated by Figure 4 shows the bifurcation 
between Egypt’s military and the elected legislature. This is bifurcation indicates the emergence of a 
shadow government represented by a military acting independently from a future elected legislature. 
Although parties such as the Islamist Al Nour party have aspirations, the center-of-gravity in the Egypt’s 
revolution was rooted in a populist demand for reforms.  This had less to do with religious ideology and 
more to do with high unemployment and economic inequality.  In comparison, the Turkish coup in 1980 
was far more violent compared to Egypt’s current revolution. However, the conditions and outcomes 
are astonishingly alike. In September of 1980 the Turkish military deposed the civilian government and 
abolished the Parliament along with a suspension of the Constitution. These are the same actions taken 
by the Egypt’s military in the interregna. But the transition from a Turkish military regime in 1980 to a 
newly formed Democracy began three years after the coup with a one party election in 1983, whereas 
Egypt’s security forces are claiming a much shorter hand-over of power. By analyzing the playbook from 
Turkey we can conclude that Egypt too must undergo its series of evolutionary transitions from current 
military rule to repetitive fair elections in which only then we can label the end-state as Democratic.   
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 The initial and updated simulations depicted in Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the various 
undeveloped political groups in Egypt form a united but unstable coalition for sake of solidarity 
following the early days of Mubarak’s departure.  As the political parties began taking form for the 
election season, their positions on democratic governance became less consolidated. In spite of the 
analysis indicating Egypt’s engagement in democratic transition, my ABM application illustrates the 
emergence of stakeholders and groups pushing for a less secular Egypt. This corresponds with my 
hypothesis positing that the role of religious preferences plays just as much of a part in political survival 
of leaders as does the role of private payoffs and public services.  As Egypt becomes more democratic, it 
is becoming less secular than the previous Mubarak regime. If Egypt continues its democratization 
process, the country will continue to be less secular while at the same time shifting toward a greater 
desire for public goods and services for the population.    
Figure 3: Projected Forecast on the Prospect for Democracy in Egypt on February 7th 2011 
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Figure 4: Projected Forecast Update of Egypt’s Prospects for Democracy in Egypt on 15 November 
2011 
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   My analysis illustrates in Figure 5 and 6 that the median stakeholder in Egypt is positioned in the 
range between a multi-party and single-party system. This is a far distance from Mubarak’s authoritarian 
government previous to the uprising. The gap between the median stakeholder and Hosni Mubarak 
during the uprising depicts the dissatisfaction between the status quo and a shifting influence calling for 
Mubarak’s departure.   The move toward democracy is evident by the emergence of multiple parties 
and recent elections concluding with the Freedom and Justice Party winning the majority of seats in the 
Parliament and a minority Islamist bloc gaining one-third of the seats.10 Although it is difficult to predict 
if Democracy will last for the long-term, the forecast based on the median stakeholder provides early 
evidence that Egypt is engaging in a democratic transition.  In spite of religious elements within the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, the platform set forth by the majority of the elected 
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 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/final-results-confirms-islamists-winners-in-egypts-
elections/2012/01/21/gIQAXpwbGQ_story.html 
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polity have thus far been secular, particularly the need for improved public services and economic 
opportunity.   
 My  revised  Selectorate Model requiring the role of religion to be accounted for, holds as a valid 
explanation for democratic transition in Egypt. This is so because the platforms for reform continue to 
be driven by the need for public services as a solution for an economically deprived population. 
However, as the level of democracy increases, the role of religion in politics has also increased more 
significantly than the preceding non-democratic government under Mubarak.   Extended private 
benefits for the ruling military class in addition to many newly elected leaders are surely present in an 
imperfect democratic process, but nonetheless, the recognition of Islamic  principles remain a significant 
concern.  Figures 5 and 6 illustrate that the median stakeholder position moved closer to a multi-party 
democracy while during the same period the influence of Islamic parties such as the ultraconservative 
Nour Party strengthened.  
Figure 5: Projected Median Position for Egypt’s Governance following Mubarak Departure on Feb 7 
2011 
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Figure 6: Projected Median Position on Egypt’s Governance on November 15th 2011 
 
There were a total of 16 predictions made during the course of 2011 on Egypt. The first analysis on 
February 7th 2011 consisted of 6 overall predictions. Of these six predictions, five of them occurred while 
one of them was a counterfactual scenario based prediction. Of the five predictions all of them were 
accurate. From these pertinent predictions 40% of them were detailed, 40% were moderately specific, 
and 20% were general. The validity of the remaining 10 predictions has been undetermined at the time 
of this dissertation given the results and effects of the proposed elections were too early to be 
determined. This transition led by the military’s role as custodian of the Egypt is period of discontinuity. 
In this regard time will judge tell the validity of predicting the future form of government in Egypt.  Fully 
detailed forecasts on Egypt can be found in the appendix. 
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VI. The Case of Libya 
 Throughout the course of 2011 I correctly forecasted the evolution of the uprising against 
Muamar Gaddafi.11 To summarize the forecasts, I predicted that Gaddafi would fight to the end against a 
highly factionalized opposition that could only prevail with a NATO intervention. I also accurately 
simulated the evolution of the conflict’s phases described as an initial stalemate, a transition phase 
where the opposition gained the upper hand, the endgame for Gaddafi and a post-Gaddafi democratic 
transition.   In the issue of governance, on October 20th 2011 I forecasted that Libya will transition to a 
hybrid between a tribal system and multiparty democratic system. The national government is expected 
to have a selection process based on predetermined representation by tribal affiliation. In accordance 
with the Selectorate Model the country will be less authoritarian because of the emergence of a larger 
selectorate represented by the various tribes and emerging political parties.  
  In terms of religion, we are observing the rise of Islamic Parties in Libya. Two of the leading 
parties in Libya, the National Gathering for Freedom, Justice and Development (FJD) and Party of Reform 
and Development (PRD), have publicly stated their support for Sharia Law.  While stating their religious 
platform these parties also continue to push for free-market nationalist agendas.12  One of the other 
leading political parties is Al Haq. Although there is a strong Islamic strain running through its agenda as 
well,  Al Haq has  prioritized its platform as a promise to deliver public goods and services through oil 
revenue. Al Haq’s campaign platform promises to the Libyan people  free electricity, free education, free 
healthcare, cheaper food prices, free land to build on, a free car ever 11 years, free phone and internet, 
a free house, and social security payments for the unemployed.13 Although these may be inflated 
promises, the point is clear: there is an emergence of a movement that is driven by a desire for public 
services intertwined with Islamic principles.   
                                                          
11
 For further details on the forecast go to www.sentiagroup.com 
12
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/us-libya-parties-idUSTRE8120ZX20120203 
13
 http://www.youtube.com/user/AlhaqpartyLibya 
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My revised explanation for Selectorate Theory posits that religious identification will be a key 
determinant for political survival.  In such case the standard Selectorate Model explanation will not be 
sufficient in determining the behavior of the leadership based on the private-public goods argument. In 
opposite fashion, the priority for the emerging leaders is projected as to an economic reform agenda. 
Figures 10 and 11 depict the projected median of the selectorate nearing the threshold for a multi-party 
democracy.  
Based on this simulation depicted in Figures 7, 8 and 9, I predicted that Libya will attempt a 
democratic transition that will be highly unstable. This transition will be expressed through an election 
process.  However, it will fall short because of the intertwining of tribal and religious politics with 
elections. This is projected to hinder the long-term stability of any democratic movement. For example, 
the fairly large Gaddafia tribe is expected to resist the new order based on its previous commitment to 
Muamar Gaddafi and the privileges that came with it. This does not mean they can stop the transition 
process completely, but they can certainly hinder it. The emergence of more than thirty parties 
competing in the Libya’s anticipated elections in 2012 provides yet another signal that democratic 
preferences remain unclear, while tribal or religious preferences appear more viable.   
 Thus far I have described Islamic democracies in which Selectorate Theory sufficiently describes 
the public-private goods motive for political survival. To recap, such examples are Turkey, Malaysia, 
Maldives and what is projected to be Egypt. I have also described Islamist states that are not democratic 
but have semi-democratic tendencies, Iran serving as the prime case. The projected form of government 
in Libya serves as a unique case where the government is anticipated to have a multi-party democratic 
election process while religion remains a priority just as much of a push for public services. An example 
that is similar is the case of Lebanon.  Lebanon’s government is described as a confessionalist 
parliamentary system where the election of the legislature must be proportional to the religious 
demographics of the country. To guarantee that the various religions be represented in the government, 
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by law the President must be Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the 
Parliament a Shiite Muslim.  This serves as a unique example of a democratic country on the upper 
bound, a predicament where the country’s public-private goods motive does not hold as the primary 
driver for political survival. I posit that upper bound semi-democratic societies such as Lebanon and to 
lesser democratic extent with Libya remain unstable because of the religious or tribal differences driving 
political survival instead of private payoffs or public goods. By having democratic elections under the 
proposed Sharia Law, Libya will either emerge into a theocratic state led by an autocrat or highly 
unstable government driven by tribal and religious competition. 
Figure 7: Projected Forecast on the Prospect for Democracy in Libya on March 24th 2011 
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Figure 8: Projected Forecast on Prospect for Democracy on Post Gaddafi Libya on September 5th 2011 
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Figure 9: Projected Median Stakeholder Position on March 24 2011 While Gaddafi Remain 
 
Figure 10: Projected Post-Gaddafi Median Stakeholder Position on November 15th 2011 
 
 There were a total of 14 prediction made on Libya throughout the course of 2011. Four of the 
predictions are too early to validate. These are predictions on the future governance of Libya. In regard 
to the predictions I was able to track and validate, nine out ten were accurate ranging from highly 
detailed to moderate specificity. Based on the median stakeholder simulations on Figures 10 and 11 we 
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can see that Libya is engaging in a transition phase where the size of the selectorate is expanding, 
making it less authoritarian in the interregna. However, we can also observe the trend where Libya is 
also becoming less secular. This was readily apparent when the Libyan Transitional Council announced in 
October of 2011 that Sharia Law will become the main source of legislation in Libya.14 Following any 
popular revolt, the size of the selectorate will increase in the interim period.  This is so because majority 
of the disenfranchised seek to be included into the decision making process to gain access to benefit 
once kept from them (Goldstone, 1995). In the case of Libya, we can see this trend with the emergence 
of dozens of political parties and inflated promises to the general population.  However, my predictions 
indicate a trend in Libya where the selectorate size will stabilize to a point where it will remain larger 
than the previous Gaddafi regime but will not meet a stable threshold for a lasting democracy. The 
interaction between religion and democratization is clearly apparent with the implementation of Sharia 
Law. This is an indication that the public-private goods argument described in the standard Selectorate 
Model needs to account for the role of religion in order to accurately describe the calculus for political 
survival within Libya. Fully detailed forecasts on Libya can be found in the appendix. 
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 “Sharia law to be main source of Leigslation in Libya” by Kim Gamel, Associated Press and Christian Science 
Monitor, October 25 2011. http://ww.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1025/Sharia-law-to-be-
main-source-of-legislation-in-Libya 
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VII. The Case of Saudi Arabia 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is by definition a dictatorship. On October 27th 2011 I forecasted 
that Saudi Arabia’s government structure is stable and not prone to change in the short to medium time 
horizon. I concluded that the status quo governance structure in Saudi Arabia will remain unchanged 
with little or no reform. Even if the single ruler structure under the House of Saud is weakened by 50%, 
there will be little or no change to the power structure according to my ABM simulation in Figure 13. A 
challenge to Saudi rule will marginally strengthen the coalition in support of the royal family. This will 
occur when Turkey moves closer in support of the status quo if they view a weakening of the royal 
family’s power. The United States along with the great powers will not change their position even with a 
dramatic waning of influence unless the Saudi Royal family nears inevitable collapse. The projected 
forecast in Figure 12 depicts a system where the selectorate and the winning coalition are situated 
firmly in support of a single ruler under the House of Saud. There is no credible challenge to the Saudi 
rule. The youth, the female population, and Shiite minorities are the primary groups preferring 
democratic reforms; however, they remain disenfranchised and irrelevant to the stability of the ruling 
authority.  Figure 14 shows that the median stakeholder position does not change, suggesting a stable 
undemocratic Saudi Arabia that is not prone to reform.  A challenge to the leadership in Saudi Arabia 
will not pose a threat to the governance structure of the country. Any challenge will most likely derive 
from an internal power struggle within the Saudi royal family. Therefore, a change in personality which 
can occur from the death of King Abdullah who is very old will not necessitate change in governance.. 
This simulation further indicates the stability of the Saudi regime.  
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the least democratic and most religious country in the Islamic 
world. They use their massive oil wealth to provide private payoffs to their ruling family members and 
tribal leaders in the form of disproportionate allowances. They also provide large government subsidies 
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to Saudi citizens in the form of land, allowances, and other material goods.  After observing the toppling 
of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, the Saudi King Abdullah reacted by increased benefits for his citizens by 
providing additional funds for housing, studying abroad and social security.15  
In spite of such use of private payoffs and public goods in Saudi Arabia as described by 
Selectorate Theory, the agent based simulation illustrates that a major part of the selectorate in Saudi 
Arabia is the highly conservative Shura Council. Without support from the Islamic Shura, the Saudi Royal 
family would lose all legitimacy based on their proclaimed role as protectors of the religious shrine in 
Mecca.  Therefore, the Saudi royal family relies implicitly on their support in order to survive. The Shura 
Council dictates a strict interpretation of Islamic Law known as Wahhabism, named after the Muslim 
theologian Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. This makes Sharia law paramount to any economic 
initiative. The case of Saudi Arabia shows that the King Abdullah’s calculus for political survival is based 
on the acquiescence of the Islamic clergy, a dimension that has little to do with public-private benefits 
and more to do with religious ideology. Figures 14 and 15 depict simulations showing the direction of 
the median stakeholder in Saudi Arabia. The distance between the median and the winning coalition is 
miniscule. They are both situated above the threshold for a 1 ruler system and I observe no change in 
positions. In short, Saudi Arabia is stable in the short to medium term time horizon so long as they 
continue to receive revenue from their oil profits along with implicit support on their rule from the 
Muslim Ulama.  
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 “Saudi king offers benefits as he returns from treatment.” by BBC staff. BCC News. 23 February 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12550326 
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Figure 11: Projected Form of Government in Saudi Arabia Forecasted on October 27th 2011 
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Figure 12: Projected Form of Government with 50% Loss of Power by Saudi Royal Family 
 
 
Figure 13: Median Stakeholder Position on Saudi Governance forecasted in October 2011 
 
 
Figure 14: Median Stakeholder Position on Saudi Governance forecasted in December 2011 
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There were 3 major predictions made on the issue of governance and stability in Saudi Arabia. 
One of these predictions is a counter-factual scenario that has not occurred. In the two predictions that 
could be tested, both turned out to be accurate with moderately specificity. In summary there is no 
prospect for democratic reform in Saudi Arabia. The highly authoritarian and religious government is 
expected to remain in power. The fully detailed forecast can be found in the appendix. The inclusion of 
religion into the Selectorate Model  indicates  that Saudi Arabia is both highly authoritarian and 
religious. The Saudi royal family’s cohesion between private payoffs and Islamic legitimacy by the Ulama 
has created stability for them in the short to medium time horizon.  This supports the argument for 
revising the Selectorate Model to accounting role of religion as a fundamental element in the political 
survival of leaders in MENA. A fully detailed forecast can be found in the appendix. 
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VIII. The Case of Iran 
 There is more conflict taking place within the Iranian regime than anytime following the death 
the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988. This does not necessarily mean the Islamic Republic of Iran is going to 
collapse or that the country’s leaders will follow the fate of Mubarak and Ben Ali in the short-term. The 
tension observed in Iran can be distinguished in two forms: conflict between the government and the 
disenfranchised citizenry and conflict within the government. In the first case, the various opposition 
groups such as the student movement or minority factions whether violent or peaceful are perceived by 
the Iranian government primarily as nuisances rather than existential threats. The latter, tension within 
the government, is primarily a conflict over resources or power and not a debate over fundamental 
changes necessary for improving the lives of the citizenry. In short, there is no indication that Iran will 
make reforms that move it closer to a liberal democracy.  Much of the fight over power and distribution 
of wealth within the state apparatus is driven by the question of succession following the death of 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. It is reported that the Supreme Leader is ill with his death is in the 
near horizon. This certainly plays a part in the calculations of all the senior stakeholders in Iran’s 
government. Thus there is competition taking place between the various power brokers in order to 
secure their future in Iran upon the death of Khamenei.  
However, there continues to be international pressure mounting regarding Iran’s nuclear program 
and their adversarial positions toward the United States and Israel. The analysis indicates that Iran will 
experience substantive change in governance only with the passing of the Supreme Leader. When 
Khamenei passes, Iran will develop a new ruling structure consisting of a hybrid between the Supreme 
Leader structure and the 3 Leader Structure.  This will result in substantive change in the distribution of 
power, but will not result into a Democratic Iran. 
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The current question however remains: Why did Iran not experience an uprising in 2011 while many 
of its regional neighbors such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain did? As predicted the debate 
within Iran has been primarily over distribution of resources within the power apparatus. Khamenei has 
maintained a coalition that has gained support following the rise and fall of President Ahmadinejad. So 
long as he continues to maintain this coalition through rewarding his followers while coercing the 
opposition, Khamenei will keep his grip on power. In 2011 we saw no development of new coalitions 
powerful enough to oppose Khamenei or make substantive calls for reform.  
In October of 2011 Khamenei expressed the option of eliminating the office of the President in Iran, a 
clear signal of continuing the inward consolidation of power.16 Furthermore, there are few signs of a 
splintering within the military or collapse within the hardline conservatives leading the Parliament.  In 
conclusion, the idea that Iran will experience domestic reform toward democracy remains dim, justice 
from within a distant notion. 
 In regard to Selectorate Theory, figures 16 and 17 illustrate that the selectorate is situated in the 
range between the status quo and a harsh military autocracy. The domestic opposition groups are 
projected to remain marginalized and the same applies to the exiled groups. Iran maintains a relatively 
large selectorate, but is still an authoritarian state. It serves as an example of a stable authoritarian 
regime because the winning coalition is small and can pull from a large selectorate. As a result of this 
arrangement, members within Khamenei’s winning circle are substitutable because of the large pool of 
candidates waiting to replace them.  This drives a norm for loyalty as the actors within the large 
selectorate jockey for access to the leader by acts displaying their commitment (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2010).  
 The public-private payoffs argument once again is not sufficient in describing the Khamenei’s 
calculus for political survival. Therefore, as we have explained in the other cases described earlier, we 
                                                          
16
 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/16/will-ayatollah-khamenei-eliminate-the-iranian-
presidency/ 
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must include the role of religion into the equation. The Supreme Leader’s power is derived from 
religious legitimacy under the Islamic Constitution granting him divine authority. Under such authority 
he can practice dictatorial power.  His logic for political survival is just as much based on religious 
legitimacy under an Islamic law as is the private benefits he provides to his inner circle.. The country is 
less authoritarian than Saudi Arabia because of the large selectorate, but the role of religion plays just as 
much of part in the long-term political survival of its leadership.   
 Despite Supreme Leader Khamenei’s overwhelming influence by consolidation of a strong 
winning coalition, the simulation tracking the median stakeholder reveals that the international actors 
place a tremendous amount of pressure on the status quo structure. The distance between Khamenei 
and the median position indicates the growing dissatisfaction between the status quo and those seeking 
to change it.  The updated projection in June of 2011 shows a median that is situated right above a 
single party preference. The increasing distance between Khamenei and the median stakeholder are the 
result of international stakeholder pressure. This has little to do with the domestic or the marginalized 
exile groups. Nonetheless the system appears stable compared to Arab Spring countries that are 
undergoing revolutions.   
Figure 15: Iran Regime Type Forecast on March 13th 2011 
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Figure 16: Updated Iran Forecast on June 27th 2011 
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Figure 17: Median Stakeholder Position for Iran Forecasted in March 2011 
 
Figure 18: Median Stakeholder Position for Iran Forecasted in June 2011 
 
There were seven major predictions made on the future governance of Iran. All of these 
predictions were accurate. Of these predictions, five were moderately specific while two were general. 
As predicted in the forecasts the winning coalition to be the status quo structure under Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei. Although there has been fallout between President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah 
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Khamenei with prospects of a tumultuous season in anticipation of the Parliamentary elections in 2012, 
there is little indication of change in the governance structure within the Islamic Republic of Iran while 
the Supreme Leader lives. While continuing to rally his supporters inward he continues undermining the 
institutions that would otherwise be used as the regime’s power base. In October of 2011 Khamenei 
expressed the option of eliminating the office of the President in Iran, a clear signal of continuing the 
inward consolidation of power.17 Furthermore, there are few signs of a splintering of the military or 
collapse within the hardliner conservatives leading the Parliament.  In conclusion, the idea that Iran will 
experience domestic reform toward democracy remains dim, justice from within a distant notion. The 
Selectorate and the winning coalition remain stable so long as Khamenei lives. Having provided a 
scenario for his passing in my forecast conducted in March of 2011, I predict that there will be a change 
in governance following the death of Ayatollah Khamenei. The new governance structure is expected to 
be a hybrid system situated between the current supreme leader system and a three leader system with 
more influence weighed from the clerics and military apparatus. Nonetheless, even with the death of 
Khamenei Iran is not expected to remain authoritarian with the role of religion playing the dominant 
role in the legitimacy of the regime. Fully detailed forecasts on Iran can be found in the appendix. 
 
                                                          
17
 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/16/will-ayatollah-khamenei-eliminate-the-iranian-
presidency/ 
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IX. The Case of Syria 
 The evolution of events in Syria for 2011 covering the short to medium time horizon indicates 
that Bashar Al Assad has managed to survive because of his ability to maintain his domestic coalition in 
addition to regional and international support by players such as China, Russia, and Iran. Assad’s relative 
influence began to wane as former supporters, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, turned against him in support 
for the opposition. But he was able to maintain his autocratic rule throughout the course of 2011 
because the distribution of power was in favor of the alliances he had built domestically and 
internationally. In such case Assad has crafted a system in Syria where his winning coalition members 
rely on him as an indispensable element to their own survival. The regime has been able to withstand 
remarkable pressure from the international community along with a defecting military due to the 
structure of the selectorate in Syria. The regime has a single party structure made up the Ba’ath Party. In 
such an instance Assad has a large of pool of candidates from within his Ba’ath Party. This large 
selectorate allows him to pull substitutes as potential replacement for members of his inner circle if 
necessary. Assad’s ability to easily substitute members of his winning coalition drives a norm of loyalty 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Such a dynamic creates a system where members compete to 
show their loyalty in fear of being ousted from the inner circle. For this reason, Assad’s government 
withstood a tremendous amount pressure where other regimes faced with similar circumstances may 
have folded much sooner.   
  Assad’s ability to resist and maintain power is apparent by the continued killing of thousands of 
Syrian citizens. But coalitions continue to shift against him. Following months of a brutal onslaught by 
the Assad regime, the international community expressed the situation in Syria as a human rights crisis. 
Many who were once Assad’s allies have turned against him.  Turkey for example has recognized the 
Syrian opposition as a legitimate alternative to Assad and has gone as far as providing sanctuary to the 
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opposition leaders now situated in Ankara. Although much of the international community has turned 
against him in support of aiding the Syrian opposition, Bashar Al Assad still has support from Iran, 
Russia, and China.  
 The international coalition opposing him is stronger compared to Assad’s alliance; however, 
China and Russia continue to act as guardians of the regime at the United Nations while Iran’s presence 
as a regional power makes Turkey and Saudi Arabia reluctant to acting more aggressively vis-à-vis 
military action.  Although not as powerful, Iran and Russia in particular have positioned themselves in 
such a manner so as to prevent action from being taken against Syria. In short, they are acting as veto 
players.  In November of 2011 my forecast update for Syria anticipated the escalation of conflict from a 
brutal suppression to a civil war.  In spite of the degradation of Assad’s power, he still remains resilient 
and is not expected to depart Syria unless there is a foreign intervention.  
 Assad’s Syria has many similarities reflecting Hussein-era Iraq.  As an Alawite, Assad is a minority 
ruling a country that has Sunni majority much in the same fashion that Saddam Hussein ruled a Shiite 
majority Iraq as a Sunni minority. Syria is a country that is highly authoritarian and does not include 
religion in major organs of government. The public-private payoffs argument holds true under the Assad 
regime as the primary motive for his survival, a typical example of an autocrat who has provides few 
benefits to the disenfranchised while providing major concessions to his winning coalition. However, 
without the role of religious leaders within his winning, Syria has become highly unstable.   
 My initial forecast in May of 2011 indicated that Assad will react to the protests in Syria by 
providing additional concessions to his inner circle with the intent of making his coalition more stable in 
the wake of widespread opposition.    Similar to many autocrats in MENA, he has used the threat of 
Islamic extremism as an argument for his secular rule. Bashar al Assad’s marginalization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the violent suppression by his father Hafez reveals the significance they place on such 
a threat.  
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 My forecasts depicted in Figures 20 and 21 indicate that as the opposition begins to form a 
coalition advocating a democratic alternative, the role of religion comes into play.  Although there are 
secular elements within the Syrian National Transitional Council, a major force driving the opposition is 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).18  In similar trend to Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is already promising 
Islamic Sharia as a major source for future legislation if elected to power with the prospect of a post-
Assad Syria.19 If this becomes the case, a revised Selectorate Model that accounts for the role of religion 
should be considered.   If Syria begins a democratic transition, the role of religion is expected play into 
the calculus of political leaders just as much if not more than the role of private-public goods. This is 
evident by projected role of Islamic stakeholders in the opposition movement such as the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 Figures 22 and 23 depict the projected median stakeholders using the Senturion agent based 
model. In the first projection from May of 2011, we can see that the distance between the median 
stakeholder and Bashar Al Assad is miniscule, indicating the lack of international and domestic influence 
opposing his rule. In November of 2011 the distance between the median stakeholder and Assad remain 
miniscule.   The Assad regime becomes more isolated internationally but the distance with median only 
grows significantly only when accounting for international stakeholders.  The median surpasses the 
threshold past a single party semi-democratic preference while Assad holds on to power if international 
pressure continues to mount.   If this gap continues Assad’s rule will be become less tenable.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 “A ‘Cosmic wager’ on the Muslim Brotherhood.” by David Ignatius. Washington Post. February 15
th
 2012.   
19
 Ibid. 
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Figure 19: Syria Regime Type Forecast on May 15th 2011 (Assad’s initial reactions and suppression of 
the uprising) 
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Figure 20: Syria Regime Type Forecast on November 9th 2011 *(escalation to civil war and eventual 
stalemate) 
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Figure 21: Projected Median Stakeholder Position on Syria’s Governance in May 2011 
 
Figure 22: Projected Median Stakeholder on Syria’s Governance in November 2011 
 
 Of the 16 major predictions made throughout the course of the Syrian crisis, 3 have no answer 
because the short-term outcomes have not been resolved. Of the 13 predictions that could be tested, 10 
of them were valid at a 77% accuracy rate. Half of those predictions were detailed while the other half 
were moderately specific.  This is a rather remarkable achievement given the relative unreliability of 
expert data on Syria. The overall predictions on Syria have been remarkably accurate. I have identified 
the evolution of the uprising in Syria by several phases. In the first phase I accurately projected a short-
term pacification by Bashar Al-Assad where there was little competition from the resistance. In the 
second phase, I projected a consolidation of support from the international community. In the third 
phase, I am projecting an escalation to civil war with an inevitable stalemate. At such time, 
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notwithstanding an assassination, the Assad regime can only come to an end with direct international 
intervention in the form NATO action observed in Libya. Otherwise, the stalemate in Syria is expected to 
be prolonged. In regards to Selectorate Theory, Assad was able to maintain rule through private payoffs 
to his coalition with very little benefits going to his disenfranchised citizenry. Yet the emergence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and their calls for Sharia Law in a post-Assad Syria is yet another example on why 
the role of religion should be incorporated into a revised Selectorate Model for application to MENA.  
More detailed forecasts on Syria can be found in the appendix of this dissertation.  
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X. The Case of Bahrain 
 Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout history it has served as a strategically significant island providing 
port access and a transit point for travel and trade. Although the country is a relatively wealthy country 
due to the discovery of oil in 20th century, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains strategically important for 
the same historical reasons: an island that provides access to Persian Gulf shipping lanes. For example, 
the United States 5th Fleet uses Bahrain as its major port and staging area for Naval operations in the 
Persian Gulf.  The 2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa Family presented a major dilemma for the United 
States and its Arab allies on how to respond to the crisis. Realizing the rising Iranian influence of a Shiite 
led majority in Bahrain, the United States and its Arab allies under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
effectively provided support to the Sunni minority Al Khalifa Royal Family to quell the uprising.  
However, this is not an unusual occurrence in the history of Bahrain. The Al Khalifa Family has ruled the 
Kingdom of Bahrain for over 200 years because of its willingness to concede to whichever power that 
could guarantee its security and stability. They have switched alliances repeatedly ranging from 
declaration of loyalty to Nasseredin Shah of Iran from British rule in 1860 all the way to the recent 2011 
supplication to Saudi Arabia.  
 My forecast in November of 2011 concluded that Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa Family is 
stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and the United States as their security guarantors, the Al 
Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in Bahrain. Shiite led elements such as Al Haq and Al 
Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their initial support from Iran. Gulf Cooperation 
Council members (GCC) such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia will maintain strong support for 
Bahrain’s ruling family in order to counter Iranian led Shiite influence. The opposition element most 
likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa Family will be Shiite led Al Haq. In the final 
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evolution of this uprising I expected the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and even Iran to reduce their 
anti-ruling family activities and inevitably accept Al Khalifa family as the legitimate authority in Bahrain. 
This suggests that the Al Khalifa will continue to make a series of deals or concessions that will 
strengthen its selectorate and reduce tensions from the opposition. In fact, previous to the forecast 
there were already signs of such concessions. In August of 2011 Bahrain’s government provided the 
largest salary increase in the country’s history for state employees and retirees.20  In addition, the 
Khalifa also created a monthly allowance budget that had not existed before.21   
 The concessions provided by the Al Khalifa family match the behavior predicted by the private-
payoffs and public goods argument described by the standard Selectorate Model. Figure 24 shows that 
in the final evolution of the Bahrain uprising, Waad Opposition and Al Wifaq Shia acquiesce in short to 
medium time horizon. Furthermore, the distance between the median stakeholder and Al Khalifa 
Family’s support for the status quo rule are very closely aligned and do not indicate any volatility. In 
short, Al Khalifa rule in Bahrain is stable and not likely to change anytime soon.    
  The standard Selectorate Model does not account for religion. Part of the Al Khalifa’s vale of 
legitimacy is through the role of religion. The King appoints a Shura Council of forty religious scholars to 
advise him on governance. In spite of such attempts for religious legitimacy, the majority of citizens in 
Bahrain are Shia although the Al Khalifa are Sunni.  The Al Khalifa Family remains under the Saudi 
influence and protection because of their Sunni roots, functioning as a defense against Iranian influence 
over the Shia population. Bahrain is not as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia but its mix of Sunni Wahabbism 
within its polity and limited representation by Shias place it in the upper bound of the curve as well.  If 
Bahrain were to become more democratic, it is predicted to become less secular. The permitting of 
parliamentary elections in 2006 displayed the rise of Shia and Sunni Islamists within the elected polity. 
                                                          
20
 “Bahrain Approves Public Sector Salary Increase.” by Mohammad al-Jayousi. AlShorfa.com. http://al-
shorfa.com/cocoon/meii/xhtml/en_GB/features/meii/features/main/2011/08/04/feature-02. 
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 Ibid. 
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The standard selectorate model would suggest that if Bahrain were a democracy, the primary calculus 
for political survival would be a greater proportion of public services given a Democracy’s large 
selectorate. However, an Islamist dominated polity would include religious preferences into their 
calculus just as much as any economic benefits.  
Figure 23: Forecasted Support Al Khalifa Rule on November 11th 2011 
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Figure 24: Projected Median Stakeholder Position for Extent of Support for Al Khalifa Rule in Bahrain 
 
 There were a total of five baseline predictions on Bahrain. Three out of the five predictions were 
accurate. Of these three, one of the predictions was general and two were moderately detailed. The 
remaining two predictions are unverified. In such regard, the pacification of the opposition seems to 
have worked with the increase in allowances to the general Shia population; however, the outcome is 
still unclear and inconclusive for the purpose of verification. The second unverified prediction is due my 
lack of access to granular information. In this case, I predicted that Iranian opposition activities will 
decrease but for the reasons described above I could verify. Nonetheless the overall prediction on 
Bahrain is accurate. The Al Khalifa rule is highly stable with no expected change in governance. The role 
of religion remains an indispensible part of the Al Khalifa family’s survival through the appointment of 
the Shura Council and limited representation of Shiite and Sunni sects in the Parliament. The prospect 
for Democracy in Bahrain is highly unlikely.  A more detailed forecast can be found in the appendix. 
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XI. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Beyond the Private Public Goods Argument: The Role of Religion in Shaping 
Regimes 
 
 The role of religion is not addressed in conjunction with Selectorate Theory’s private and public 
goods maximization principle. If we are to better understand the transitions taking place in the Middle 
East and North Africa we should address this dimension.  In observing the transitions in Egypt and Libya, 
I accurately predicted they are becoming less authoritarian while also becoming less secular. In the case 
of Egypt, Islamic parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood (now called the Freedom  and Justice Party) 
and the ultraconservative Al Nour Party gained over 75 percent of the of Parliament through fair 
elections.22  The election of these parties gaining the majority of the seats in the newly formed Egyptian 
Parliament illustrates the religious dimension that motivates the direction of regime transitions and is 
not accounted for in the standard Selectorate Model.  
In The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, et al., 2003) the authors argue that 
survival of any leader holding office is determined by the mix of private payoffs to his winning coalition 
and public goods to the masses. In the case of the Arab Spring, political survival is also driven by the 
direct acquiescence of the religious officials manifested by Islamic parties, an appointed Shura, or Sharia 
Law principles.  To place in context, the threat of Islamic extremism has been often exaggerated by 
autocrats in the region as an argument for maintaining their rule, thereby preventing democratization. A 
few examples of this notion are Hussein era Iraq, Gaddafi era Libya and Bashar Al Assad’s Syria. On the 
opposite hand, Islamist states imposing Sharia law have underestimated the real threat of Islamic 
radicalization within their ranks. The fact that fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were citizens of the 
ultra-religious Saudi Arabia is not a coincidence in this regard.  This begs the question: is religion and 
                                                          
22
 “Egypt’s Islamists get majority of parliament seats in final tally.” By Jeffrey Fleischman and Amro Hassan. Los 
Angeles Times. January 21, 2012. 
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Democracy reconcilable in MENA? The role of religion in democratic processes runs a wide spectrum. In 
the case of countries with majority Muslim population, it can be divided into several forms in the 
context of governance.  The first form is defined as democratic countries that recognize Islam as a state 
religion (Nasr 2001). Such examples are Malaysia, Maldives, Lebanon, and Turkey. These governments 
allow for the inclusion of other religions in the political process. Although not a Muslim state, Israel is 
also an example of a democratic state in MENA that has an official state religion (Judaism) as well as 
religious parties.  Malaysia has a government based on the Westiminster Parliamentary system, 
Maldives holds true to a Presidential Republic, Turkey as a Parliamentary Republic, and Lebanon as a 
Confessionalist Parliamentary Republic. In spite of the democratic practices, these countries serve as 
examples of political systems where the religious preferences determine the political survival of national 
leaders.    
 The second form of political Islam is even less easily incorporated into the selectorate single 
dimension of public-private goods.  This is defined as an Islamist democracy, a state that holds elections 
but is restricted under comprehensive inclusion of Islamic laws into the affairs of the government 
(Ghadbian, 2003).  Iran is the quintessential example of this evolution where elections while not perfect 
do represent a large portion of the selectorate but the primary motivation for change is religious control 
rather than the provision of public goods. The historical case of Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 displays 
the emergence of an Islamist movement resulting into a theocratic government that became less 
democratic than the previous secular government it overturned. In the months following the Shah’s 
departure, the people of Iran voted through national referendum by an overwhelming majority to 
become an Islamic Republic. By equally overwhelming popular support, Ayotollah Khomeini garnered 
dictatorial power as the religious and political leader of the country (Nasr 2006). By Selectorate Theory 
definitions we cannot distinguish between Iran’s theocratic government and a true democracy.  The size 
of the selectorate thereby grew rapidly when newly enacted voting rights were extended to the majority 
69 
 
of Iranian citizens. The country also developed a relatively large winning coalition represented by an 
elected president and parliamentarians. Yet Iran became a despotic state and remains so today because 
the multi-party system is ultimately subservient to a Supreme Leader that has dictatorial power under a 
perceived divine rule from God.  Finally, there is the usual Islamic form of governance that has 
dominated the region in the past and still remains today. These are purely Islamist authoritarian states 
that hold no minimal semblance for democratic elections (Lewis, 1995). Such an example is the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. This case meets the selectorate definition of a dictatorial state that maintains a small 
selectorate and even a smaller winning coalition. The financial resources of this country are distributed 
disproportionately as private payoffs to the king’s inner-circle with much less of the resources going to 
the public welfare per capita (Beblawi, 1990). But once again, the religious dimension is unaccounted for 
because the Saudi King Abdullah must address preferences his Islamic constituency with issues that have 
more to do with social or religious needs than economic concerns.  
Public-Private Goods and Religion: A New Selectorate Perspective 
 By tracking the evolution of instability in MENA , I depict the interaction between religion, 
private and public goods and Democracy. The proposed Bagherpour – Singer Curve in Figure 25 and 
Figure 26 shows that Selectorate Theory holds true to the lower half of the curve because there is either 
no role of religion within the governance structure of the state apparatus or is represented by Islamic 
political parties that play by the same laws and rules governing secular parties.  The horizontal axis of 
this curve depicts the spectrum of governance beginning with the left side as dictatorial government all 
the way to the right as a liberal democracy with multiple political parties. The vertical axis depicts the 
religious spectrum starting at the bottom with no role of religion in governance all the way to the top 
with Islamic law or Islamist governance structure. The extent of religiosity or secularism in the 
government is expressed by the preference of the stakeholder located at the domestic median 
based on qualitative knowledge on the individual or group’s religious views and positions. 
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The six studies address the Arab Spring across the 2011 time frame. I forecasted the direction of the 
domestic median indicating what type of government will be present in the future or if there is no 
change.  The extent of religiosity or secularism in the government is expressed by the preference of the 
stakeholder located at the domestic median coupled with qualitative knowledge on the individual or 
group’s religious views and positions. 
Egypt 
 Situated at the lower bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve, Egypt’s transition under the 
Freedom and Justice Party majority continues to be driven by secular policies summarily defined as a 
drive for more public goods along with economic growth. There is no imposition of Sharia Law although 
there are religious parties gaining over 70% of the seats in the Parliament. Although religion plays a role, 
it is a secondary concern over governance. In the case of Egypt, the domestic median is located at a 
“multiparty democracy.” The stakeholder closest to the median is the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on 
qualitative assessment coupled with ABM median position, it is clear that Egypt is engaging in a 
democratic transition but is becoming less secular based on Islamic preferences, as expressed publicly 
by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Libya 
 My revised explanation for Selectorate Theory as depicted by the Bagherpour-Singer Curve in 
Figure 25 and Figure 26 posits that if the priority in Libya becomes religious identification then it will be 
in the upper bound of the curve. One of the first actions the Libyan Transitional Council undertook was 
the imposition of Sharia Law, placing Libya in the upperbound of the curve. In such case the standard 
Selectorate Model explanation will not be sufficient in determining the behavior of the leadership based 
on the private-public goods argument because the laws governing all parties are under Islamic Law.  In 
the case of Libya, the median position is at limited multiparty democracy. The stakeholder closest to the 
71 
 
median is Omar Hariri, the head of the Libyan Council and an Islamist. This is a clear indication that Libya 
is becoming more Democratic but less secular. The imposition of Sharia Law indicates that Libya has 
crossed the threshold for an inclusive Democracy, although they have multiple parties running. The 
justice system is tilted in preference of Islamist and creates a restricted hierarchy based on the 
imposition of Sharia Law.  
Saudi Arabia 
 The revised Selectorate Model as illustrated by the Bagherpour-Singer Curve in Figure 25 and 26 
shows that Saudi Arabia is both highly authoritarian and religious. Although the Saudi Government 
provides massive amount of private payoffs and public services through petroleum revenues, it’s 
legitimacy is based on approval from the Shura council and the Sharia laws that govern the state. For 
this reason it is in the upper bound of the curve. In the case of Saudia Arabia, the median position is in 
support of the House of Saud Monarchy. The House of Saud governs with strict Sharia Law. Therefore it 
is highly religious. Because the median position is located at the House of Saud, the government remains 
stable and is not expected to change.  
Syria 
 Syria is situated at the lower bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve as a country that is highly 
authoritarian and does not include the the religious leader in major organs of government. The public-
private payoffs argument holds true under the Assad regime as the primary motive for his survival, a 
typical example of an autocrat who has provides few benefits to the disenfranchised while providing 
major concessions to his winning coalition. In the case of of Syria, the median is located at harsh 
authoritarianism. The person closest to the median is Bashar Al Assad. He is a secular despot, indicating 
that Syria is stable and will remain secular so long as Assad remain in power. Although becoming less 
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relevant, Assad is expected to survive in the short to medium term. However, his loss of influence 
implies that future leadership should account for religious preferences if seeking to remain stable. 
Bahrain 
 Bahrain is situated in the upper-bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve illustrated in Figure 25.  
Bahrain is not as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia but its mix of Sunni Wahabbism within its polity and 
limited representation by Shias place it in the upper bound of the curve as well. In the case of Bahrain, 
the median position is in support of the Khalifa famiy and stable. This means Bahrain will continue to be 
stable.  Bahrain will also continue to be religious government based on the Khalifa’s family partnership 
with Bahrain’s Shura Council. Therefore, Bahrain remains on the upper bound of the Bagherpour-Singer 
Curve as a non-democratic religious government. 
Iran 
  Iran serves as prime example of a country where the size of the selectorate increased but the 
country became more authoritarian because of the imposing of a draconian religious order. It is situated 
in the upper bound of the Bagherpour Singer Curve (Figure 25) because of the Constitutional law that 
gives ultimate authority to the Supreme Leader as the religious and governing authority over all aspects 
of the state. In the case of Iran, the domestic median is located at the status quo government, the 
Supreme Leader structure. The stakeholder located at the domestic median is Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei.  This is a clear indication of that the government in Iran is stable under theocratic rule 
because of the Supreme leader’s religious preferences. 
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Figure 25: Bagherpour – Singer Curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
Figure 26: Interaction between Religion and Democracy in 2011 MENA Case Studies 
 
 
 
 
 I determined that the threshold for where Selectorate Theory is a sufficient explanation for 
governance is based on prioritization of preferences (Zagare, 1990).  Those governments on the lower 
bound hold secular rules of governance as the first priority and consideration for Islamic principles as a 
secondary issue. In contrast those countries on the upper bound reciprocally govern with religious rules 
or principles as the first priority with secular issues as a secondary concern.   Selectorate Theory holds 
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true to the lower half of the curve because there is either no role of religion within the governance 
structure of the state apparatus or if there are Islamic political parties representing the polity, such 
groups play by the same non-religious laws governing secular parties. In short, lower bound countries 
are restrained from imposing religious order on the entire society at large. The priority for the 
leadership in these cases on the lower-bound of the curve remains a mix of private benefits and public 
goods. In the case of Libya, Muamar Gaddafi ruled as a highly secular despot that used private-payoffs 
with little regard for public services to his people. Gaddafi era Libya was situated at the lower left of the 
curve as a highly authoritarian state that relentlessly marginalized the role of religion. The lower bound 
also applies to Mubarak-era Egypt and Bashar Al-Assad’s Syria. The irony of religious suppression in the 
name of secularism was that by keeping these religious groups marginalized, these governments 
catapulted the radicalization of disenfranchised Muslims in their respective societies by forcing them to 
act outside the law.  Such religious groups revolted not only to gain access to public goods but to gain 
access to religious traditions that paradoxically constrain the secular freedoms of the new selectorate. 
 Islam explicitly defined itself as a political movement dictating on how societies ought to govern. 
Perhaps because there has not been a wide scale secular reform movement with Islam, today there is no 
democratically elected state with a majority Muslim population without the presence of Islamic parties 
within their polity. The Bagherpour-Singer revised Selectorate Theory holds true in these cases as well. 
Turkey, Malaysia, Lebanon and Maldives serve as historical examples. In the case of the Arab Spring, our 
analysis indicates that Egypt is projected to become a democracy as evident by the Parliamentary 
elections. Although there are radical Islamist elements within the polity, the moderate Freedom and 
Justice Party has emerged with majority control over the Parliament, a political party formerly known as 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  Situated at the lower bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve, Egypt’s 
transition under the Freedom and Justice Party majority continues to be driven by secular policies 
summarily defined as a drive for more public goods along with economic growth.   
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 My case studies covering the Arab Spring and Iran reinforce a simple idea: Political survival is 
determined by a leader’s ability to maintain his coalition. To recap, the standard Selectorate Theory 
would have us believe that power is maintained or gained merely through the mix of private payoffs to a 
leader’s coalition with a portion of public goods given to the rest of the masses depending on the size of 
the selectorate.  However, the emergence of Islamists within all of the selectorates described in my case 
studies proves differently.  The once secular regional autocrats are all gone with the exception of Bashar 
Al Assad who is on the brink of irrelevance at best and collapse at worst. My ABM forecasts reveal the 
once secular states such as Egypt and Libya are becoming less autocratic while at the same becoming 
more religious with the rise of Islamist parties by democratic means.  Democratic elections in Egypt have 
given rise to the Muslim Brotherhood and more extreme Islamists parties gaining a combined 75% of the 
seat in the Parliament. In similar fashion, Libya has given rise to numerous Islamist parties that never 
existed during Gaddafi’s reign. The Libyan Transitional Council’s first actions upon defeating Gaddafi 
were the imposing of Sharia Law, a further indication of Islamization within a once secular government.   
The countries that have had uprisings are all being led by Islamist oppositions ranging from the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Syria, the Islah Party in Yemen, and the Al Wifaq Party in Bahrain. Those who have 
avoided uprisings (Iran and Saudi Arabia) or successfully quelled them (Bahrain) have done so by the 
implicit cooperation with their Islamic stakeholders being appeased.   
 In every single case the point is clear: religious preferences must take into account the calculus 
for political survival in MENA.  The Bagherpour-Singer Curve (Figure 25) illustrates that as a Muslim 
majority society becomes more democratic, the society becomes more religious.  Iran serves as prime 
example of a country where the size of the selectorate increased but the country became more 
authoritarian because of the imposing of a draconian religious order.  In the other cases observed in the 
Arab Spring, it is too early to determine the medium to long-term time horizon in which we can observe 
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a stabilized selectorate. However, my ABM forecasts show a clear increase in the size of the selectorates 
with Egypt and Libya making attempts at democratization.   
 My simulations validate my two hypotheses clearly. In the first hypothesis, the outcome of the 
conflict is determined by the position closest to the median stakeholder. But more interesting than this 
dynamic is the emergence of Islamists as indispensable elements of the winning coalitions. My forecasts 
also indicate that states which have an increasing distance between the status quo leadership and the 
median stakeholder become highly unstable and susceptible to eventual collapse. In this situation as 
well, we can observe that that the median stakeholder is determined by the weighted influence of 
Islamist actors.  
 In conclusion power is gained and maintained not just from economic benefits but also by 
appeasement of the rising religious preferences within the MENA selectorates. The countries that are 
least prone to collapse are predicted to be those who have religious elements within their winning 
coalitions. Those leaders which have largely ignored the rising religious tides in their countries have 
suffered at their own peril. The irony is that addressing the religious preferences of these newly 
emerging political powers allows for democratization or at least a less autocratic process to take place in 
the transition period. However, having gained access within the selectorate, these Islamist actors 
mitigate the democratic processes which brought them to power in the first place.  
 The threshold for whether a country is in the upper bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve is the 
prioritization between religion and public-private payoffs. The states where the priority for political 
survival is religious considerations are on the upper bound of the curve. In these instances, the public-
private goods argument does not hold because the leadership is driven by ideological preferences that 
have less to do with financial gain and more to do with the acquiescence of Islamic principles.  
 In the case of Iran, the Supreme leader’s authority is mandated by the Islamic clergy. So long as 
the Ayatollah Khamenei has support from the clergy, he can continue to garner control. Indeed, the the 
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role of private payoffs plays a part in the Khamenei’s grip on power, but it. It is estimated that the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a critical part of the Supreme leader’s winning coalition, 
controls more than one-third of the official economy. 
Figure 27: Summary Chart 
 
 
In examining the Arab Spring, political survival goes beyond just the public-private goods mix.  In 
the summary chart depicted by Figure 27, I concluded that stability is a function of public-private goods, 
participation, and religion. Given the sparse data on public expenditures versus private payoffs, I provide 
evidence of a disproportionate level of private payoffs by citing the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
The figure above indicates that the six the case countries in this dissertation are either corrupt or highly 
corrupt, an indication of disproportionate private payoffs. In the case of participation, there is no 
numeric data comparing participation in terms of voting across all countries. Instead, I made a 
qualitative assessment and classified selectorate size as a) expanding with competitive elections, b) no 
change (small W/S) c) no with small W/S with non-competitive election.   
Although the extent of religiosity varies, all the case studies with the exception of Syria have 
some element of religion within their institutions. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain are considered Islamist 
governments and are stable compared to the secular governments overthrown during the Arab Spring.  
The transitional government in Egypt is less secular than the previous one but the rise of Islamic Parties 
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and a push for some Islamization is evident. Libya is on an even greater path toward Islamization based 
on the Libyan Council’s decision to impose Sharia Law. All of the stakeholders closest to the median with 
the exception of Bashar Al Assad have Islamic preferences for governance, an indication that the 
governments will either remain Islamic or transition in the direction if not already. The figure above is 
summary of my findings: that political survival (i.e. stability) best achieved in MENA through the right 
proportion of private-public goods and an element of religiosity that is expressed either by religious 
parties or official partnership with the government at large.  
Policy Implications 
Achieving stability in MENA is just one element within the broad array of American national 
interests for the region.  The policy implications for the United States are clear: Regardless of 
democratization, to achieve stability, the United States and the international community should 
accommodate the religious actors into the political process, so long as they do not collide with their 
interests.  From a policy standpoint, this dissertation is a study on assessing the feasibility of stabilizing 
the Middle East and an evaluation on whether achieving democratic outcomes are achievable. If the 
United States seeks to create a world in its own image, it must do so by realizing the costs and reality of 
achieving the end-state. The secular despots of the Middle East are now gone and are being replaced by 
governments that are more religious than the rulers they overthrew. The one exception is Bashar Al 
Assad’s Syria; however, he too is becoming less relevant as Syria descends into civil war.  
The standard Selectorate Model suggests that enough bribes and private payoffs coupled with 
limited services to the masses can offset dissatisfaction in even the most authoritarian states. However, 
my revised Selectorate Model indicates that such a system can pacify but never satisfy authoritarian 
societies unless the ideological or religious preferences of the various political groups are addressed. 
The case of Iran in the 1979 was a cautionary tale more than thirty years prior to the Arab Spring. Under 
the Shah’s reforms and spiking oil prices of the 1970s, Iran experienced a massive increase in wealth and 
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quality of life. Yet the Shah’s regime was overthrown because many of the ideological and religious 
preferences of groups outside of the political system were not addressed.  This resulted into an Islamist 
movement that delivered much less in wealth than the previous government it overturned with a 
Islamic society that addressed the people’s ideological preferences.   
The United States and the international community should encourage the countries in MENA to 
include religious actors into the political process regardless of whether the state is democratic or not. 
For stability it can turn to Saudi Arabia to see a model that works. The Saudi monarchy includes all the 
elements of a stable regime based on the revised Selectorate Model: a large amount of private-payoffs 
and public services due to their massive oil wealth, coupled with an integration of the ultra conservative 
religious Ulima into the polity. The result of this is a society that is not only stable but reliable so far 
international oil interests are concerned. A similar formula should be applied utilizing the three 
elements of the revised Selectorate Model. Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Iran all have different 
ideological preferences and are in different stages of development. The question should not only 
address if democratization is possible but rather if the ideological preference of the society is being 
addressed by the extent of religiosity. Only these states become stable for the medium to long term 
horizons. 
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Appendix 
Charts Depicting Selectorate and Revised Selectorate Models 
 
Interaction Between Selectorate Size and Government Types 
 
 
Interaction Between Public Goods and Government Type (but the role of religion is not included) 
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1. Complete Predictions on Egypt 
a. The Egyptian Uprising: The Departure of Hosni Mubarak 
 Data Collected: February 3rd 2011 Analysis Completed: February 7th 2011  
 
Background: The massive protests in Tunisia followed by the abdication of its ruler Ben Ali in motivated 
the people of Egypt to follow in a similar path. In doing so, Tunisia and Egypt share a similar story. Both 
countries were making significant headway in initiating reforms that had helped spark economic growth. 
But the crash of the global economy resulted in massive unemployment for both countries while high 
expectations for an improved standard of living still remained. This served as a major factor in elevating 
the level of dissatisfaction amongst the people beyond a level of toleration for corruption, human-rights 
abuses, and absence of political rights with the country. Hence we are now observing a massive uprising 
amongst the Egyptian people who are making a major demand for change within their country.  
Will Mubarak stay? Newly empowered political parties, such as WAFD, Al Ghud and to a lesser degree 
the Muslim Brotherhood, will pressure Mubarak to begin a forced, yet measured transition. Regime 
change will likely be negotiated due to continued support from the Egyptian Army and intelligence 
services for an orderly transition.  
What if something happens to Mubarak? If for some unanticipated reason Mubarak departs quickly, a 
highly fractionalized polity will rapidly evolve where previous military support for a stable transition 
succumbs to popular support represented by El Baradei for faster results. However, the Intelligence 
services will remain adamantly opposed to any change and increased political violence is expected.  
What type of democratic or autocratic regime change is coming? When & how long? If Mubarak 
remains in Egypt during a measured transition, the prospects for a stable democracy remain limited. 
There will be an initial jockeying for position leaning toward a liberalized Democracy as most political 
interest are capitalizing on the current anti-Mubarak situation, but almost all Egyptian political parties, 
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with the exception of Al Ghud, will quickly revert to more autocratic means even more repressive than 
the current regime in order to maintain stability.  
Is Mubarak helping or hindering democracy? If for some unanticipated reason Mubarak departs Egypt 
quickly, current calls for democracy from all the political parties and international groups are likely be 
much more successful. Mubarak’s early departure creates a power vacuum under current conditions 
that El Baradei and other supporters of reform could effectively capitalize on. Under this scenario, 
lasting dramatic democratic reforms are possible and supported by the military and the international 
community. Even the intelligence community will slowly support higher levels of democratic reform 
under these conditions in order to maintain political stability. In short, a democratic future of Egypt’s 
government depends on Hosni Mubarak’s immediate departure. The longer he stays, the lower the 
likelihood for lasting democratic reforms.  
What will be attitudes towards US interests? Short of major unforeseen violence or political terrorism 
attacks, fears of accelerating anti American sentiment are likely to be unfounded. Egyptian bureaucracy, 
political institutions as well as the military will not significantly shift current support toward the US, 
although some US credibility has already eroded since the uprising.  
Overview: I explore the current political events, negotiations and coalition building between various 
internal forces in Egypt as well as the external players such as the United States and other countries. 
Using expert information collected on Feburary 3rd, 2011 and Senturion analysis performed on February 
7th, I offer the following report. In addition to the predicted outcomes of the current positions, I also 
suggest other courses of actions indicating alternative futures of what may happen if the internal players 
within Egypt and various coalition partners change their positions. I evaluate three issues affecting the 
outcome of the Egyptian upheaval.  
1. The extent of support for Hosni Mubarak  
2. Commitment to Democratic Reform  
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3. Disposition towards the United States  
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I conducted SME interviews along with my internal verification of the 
various players seeking to advocate their own positions within the Egyptian uprising. In conducting these 
interviews I measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors and with 
importance they placed on their positions within the issue continuum.  
Current Situation: As the second week of protests continue in Egypt Hosni Mubarak has stated that he 
will not run for President in the following election which is more than seven months away. Major forces 
within Egypt, including the newly emerged Mohamed El-Baradei are siding with popular support for 
Mubarak’s immediate departure. The United States has also indicated its loss of confidence for 
Mubarak, calling for him to step down sooner than later. In reaction to the Egyptian protesters, 
Mubarak has appointed Omar Suleiman (intelligence chief) as Egypt’s first Vice President and Ahmed 
Shafiq (Air Force General) as the Prime Minister. In addition to the changes taking place within the 
government apparatus, political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the WAFD party and Al Ghud 
party are certainly mobilizing to jockey for position as events continue to unfold.  
I. Mubarak’s Departure 
Issue: Support and disposition toward Hosni Mubarak  
Problem: Although disintegration of support for Mubarak within the Arab street in Egypt is evident, 
support within the government apparatus and other political forces are less clear.  
Issue Continuum: The scale of preferences range from zero as “Total Support for Mubarak” all the way 
200 as “Staunch Opposition to Mubarak”. As displayed by the continuum below, 100 is Neutral. For 
example, 0 position of would mean a continued preference for Mubarak remaining in power while 200 
would represent Mubarak’s immediate departure with no pre-conditions or caveats of any type. 
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Scenario: Mubarak’s Prolonged Departure 
 
 
 
Outcome: The simulation suggests that if Mubarak prolongs his stay, he will not be deposed from within 
the government apparatus. His coalition will not splinter and he will leave Egypt from a combination of 
external pressure coupled with pressure from political parties that are not part of the government 
apparatus. Therefore, he has the ability to prolong his stay in Egypt if he desires in the foreseeable 
months. The simulation indicates the positions supporting and deposing Mubarak will not change 
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significantly. The Army, represented by General Tantawi, is the most powerful force thus far because of 
its organizational strength and ability to mobilize. The Army is closely allied with Mubarak and will 
continue to support him in the coming days, but this will wane over time. The Army’s primary goal will 
be assuring a peaceful transition of power while preserving its own interests. Mubarak has strong 
support from the PLO, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel and Saudi Arabia. This support will not 
change. The newly appointed Vice President who is also Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman is still an ally 
support of peacefully transitioning Mubarak. However, the simulation interestingly displays that Iran will 
initially depose Mubarak, but will eventually turn to a position slightly to left of Neutral with limited 
support. The Liberal Party, Ayman Nour of the Al Ghud Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Mohamed El 
Baradei will form a coalition to depose Mubarak indicating that their position will not change. The 
United States will remain opposed to Mubarak following the initial upheaval. 
Scenario: Mubarak’s Early Departure 
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Outcome: The forecast indicates that if Mubarak departs early, the state apparatus will become 
splintered between the Army and the intelligence service. Omar Suleiman, the acting VP and head of the 
intelligence service will hold a position that is more pro-Mubarak; however, the Army leadership will 
defect toward a staunch anti-Mubarak position. Although power will weigh toward an anti-Mubarak 
stance, the outcome will be much more conflicting within the government if Mubarak departs early.  
Strength: My simulations indicate that the U.S. can leverage Omar Suleiman toward an anti-Mubarak 
opposition block. This may reduce conflict within the Egyptian government.  
Weakness: The state’s security forces will remain splintered if Mubarak leaves and the U.S. does not 
intervene.  
Opportunities: The U.S. can leverage Suleiman once Mubarak departs. 
 
Prospects for Democracy 
Issue: Disposition toward Democratic Government.  
Issue Continuum: The scale begins at 0 defined as “Harsh Autocracy.” This would be defined as a step 
back from the current Mobarek regime with a greater concentration of power and repression. The scale 
at 25 is the status quo position represented by the Mubarak regime. The mid-point of the scale is 
defined as a “One Party Democracy,”a system similar to the political structure in Russia. The next point 
is “Democracy Limited,” defined as continuous free elections with the possibility of a two party system 
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and limited procedural reforms. And finally at a 100 I labeled “Democracy Liberal,” a Democracy 
resembling any multitude of developed western European systems. 
 
Scenario: Prospect of Democracy under Prolonged Mubarak Departure 
 
 
 
Outcome: Although there will be an initial jockeying leaning toward a liberalized Democracy, my 
calculations indicate that the final outcome will still be some form of autocracy that does not reach the 
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minimum threshold necessary for a democracy or a one party system. In short there will be some easing 
of restrictions and reforms resulting into an autocracy leaning toward free elections; however, in the 
end the government will still exert repression in order to satisfy coalition needs and tradeoffs between 
chaos and order.  
Strength: There will initially emerge a democratic movement, but it will be temporary.  
Weakness: These forces want to create space through an initial democratic movement to pursue their 
own inevitable autocratic or Islamist aspirations. I observe this with various moves toward liberalized 
Democracy by the WAFD party, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al Ghud Party, and Amr Moussa. This will 
be followed afterwards by General Tantawi’s move to a Democratic preference. However, in the end 
most political parties along with the Army will lean toward an autocratic form of government that will 
provide improved but limited reforms compared to the Mubarak regime. One exception in remaining 
committed to a Democratic system is the Al Ghud Party.  
Opportunities: The United States and allies can use the transitional time for democratic reform to 
advocate their positions toward liberalized reforms. Although the reforms that will most likely take place 
in Egypt will not reach the threshold for a democratic system, there will be improved reforms closer to 
democratic dispositions compared to the status quo ante.  
Threats: The initial democratic movement will eventually stabilize under some form of autocracy. This 
presents the risk of rising non-secular movements. 
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Scenario: Prospect of Democracy with Mubarak’s Early Departure 
 
 
 
Outcome: The earlier Mubarak departs, the higher the prospects for a democratic transition that hold. 
The simulation indicates that if Mubarak departs soon, there will be a coalition leaning toward a Liberal 
Democracy with the various political parties aligned on position and the state apparatus aligned closer 
to a one party system but still surprising the threshold for a democratic state.  
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Strength: If Mubarak leaves soon, a democratic system that holds will emerge.  
Weakness: State security apparatus will remain divided with the political parties on the type of 
democracy. This will present secondary and tertiary levels of uncertainty not captured by this forecast.  
Opportunity: The U.S. and various political parties can leverage the Army and intelligence services to 
move closer to a liberal democracy.  
III. Support for the U.S. 
Issue: Disposition toward Pro or Anti-American Stance if Mubarak draws out departure from Egypt.  
Problem: Egypt is a major power center in the Middle East because of it’s large population and geo-
strategic location. It has served as the primary ally of the United States within the Arab world for over 30 
years. A loss of support will damage American credibility and potentially push other Arab countries in a 
similar direction.  
Current Situation: The military and intelligence apparatus within Egypt have strong relationships with 
the United States and receive $1.3 billion in defense aid annually. Therefore, they have a strong interest 
in remaining friendly to the United States. However, the Arab sentiment in the street and organized 
political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood hold opposite opinions. They will portray the United 
States as an enabler for the Mubarak regime resulting from over 30 years of support. This historic 
relationship between Mubarak and the U.S. will hinder a pro-American disposition from holding sway 
within the various political parties in Egypt.  
Issue Continuum: The scale range from zero labeled as “Staunch Anti-American” to 100 as “Staunch Pro-
American.” A staunch anti-American position would mean that the bedrock of political strength and 
ideology is rooted in anti-western and anti-American opinions. A staunch pro-American position is 
defined as a willing ally of the United States committed to fully aligned interests on a majority of foreign 
policy issues and many domestic issues.  
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Outcome: The disposition toward a pro-American agenda will not change after the various political 
parties take form. The changes that have taken place in regard to a pro-U.S. policy have already 
occurred. The simulation indicates that the current positions will remain the same. The Army will stay 
committed toward a Pro-American disposition and this will not change through the various evolutions of 
the crisis. However, the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Media will elevate anti-U.S. sentiment, but it 
will not be enough to create policy changes that alter American interests in regard to Egypt. 
Scenario: Support for U.S. with Prolonged Mubarak Departure 
 
 
 
93 
 
 
 
Strength: The Army and majority of power will remain staunch supporters of the United States  
Weakness: There will be an elevated level of Anti-Americanism represented by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This may have secondary and tertiary effects not predicted in this model.  
Opportunities: The U.S. can leverage the Army to seek support from the Al-Ghud Party and Mohamed 
El-Baradei in return for reform and some form of power sharing.  
Threats: The rise in the level of Anti-Americanism expressed by the Egyptian media and the Muslim 
Brotherhood can push other political players such as the WAFD party and Al Ghud Party in the same 
direction. 
Scenario: Support for U.S. if Mubarak Departs Early 
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Outcome: Support for the United States or against it will not change significantly based on Mubarak’s 
departure.  
Strength: Egyptian policy with the U.S. will remain stable so far as the government is concerned.  
Weakness: There will still be anti-American sentiment presented by the media. The positions do not 
change; but the extent of anti-Americanism among the media and Muslim brotherhood is 
underdetermined and not completely captured by this simulation.  
Opportunities: My simulation indicates that the Army and intelligence services can leverage the 
Muslim Brotherhood toward a more pro-American stance. 
b. Egypt Forecast Update 
              Date Update: November 7th 2011 Analysis Completed: November 15th 2011 
 
 
What will be the future form of government in Egypt? Egypt will develop two parallel 
governments: a legitimate legislature comprised of elected officials and paradoxically a shadow 
government consisting of military and intelligence apparatus. The shadow government will be less 
autocratic than the previous Mubarak regime, meaning there will be more stakeholders sharing power 
within the authoritarian structure. However, it will not meet the threshold for even a one party semi-
democratic system similar to Russia. 
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How will Prime Minister Netanyahu react to the rising anti-Israeli sentiment? Fearing the rise of 
more anti-Israeli sentiment, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel will support the Egyptian military and 
intelligence apparatus as a partial assurance or hedge against further dissent. Israel will consistently turn 
to the Egyptian military much more so than any of the future elected leaders such as Presidential 
candidates Amr Moussa or Mohamed El Baradei. 
What will happen if the head of Egypt’s military council, General Tantawi, is removed or 
resigns? Egypt’s outcome is not dependent on General Tantawi. If General Tantawi is removed or 
resigns as Chairman of the Egypt’s military council, the intelligence apparatus and military will still 
remain entrenched in Egypt’s governance. The military apparatus will still remain as the dominant force 
governing Egypt. The shadow military regime will still persevere, resulting into only limited or marginal 
gains for the democratic movement. Furthermore, Egypt does not become any more or less pro-
American if Tantawi is removed or resigns. 
What will be the extent of support of the United States? The military will continue to be pro-
American because its reliance on U.S. foreign aid and military assistance. The Muslim Brotherhood along 
with the Freedom and Justice Party will continue their position in the opposite direction by promoting 
anti-American sentiment as their political narrative.  
What will be the future of Egypt’s economy in regard to economic openness? Egypt’s economy 
is driven primarily by tourism; however, it also has a substantial portion of its GDP comprised of 
agriculture and transport sectors. Egypt will have a semi-open economy that is regulated and controlled 
by the government. The economy will consist of a series of public-private partnerships ensuring the 
government its share of profits.  
Overview: We explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Egypt and the international community. Data was collected on November 7th 2011 and analysis was 
completed on November 15th 2011.  
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Current Stakeholder Dispositions: We have incorporated SME incite from academics within the 
United States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews 
we measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the 
issue and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. 
Issue Continuum on Power Structure and Governance: This continuum ranges from “0” as a harsh 
autocracy to “100” defined as a Liberal Democracy. At “25” we defined the government as autocratic. 
Under this structure there are more stakeholders sharing power compared to a harsh autocracy or 
dictatorship; however, selection of leaders are not democratic through any public election process. At 
“50” we defined the government as a “one-party system,” similar to Russia’s elected one-party system. 
At “75” the government is defined as at least a two party system, yet does not meet the threshold for a 
liberal democracy. 
Issue Continuum on the Extent of Support for the United States: The continuum ranges from “0” 
as staunch anti-American policies and rhetoric similar to Iran’s policies. At “50” the extent of support for 
the U.S. is neutral and at “100” the extent of support is strongly pro-American. 
Issue Continuum on the Degree of Economic Openness: This issue continuum ranges from “0” as a 
controlled closed economy to “100” as a completely open economy. At “25” the economy is defined as 
closed to business opportunities, meaning it is still highly controlled with only limited opportunities for 
those within the government. At “50” the economy is defined as regulated but somewhat open under 
strict official and unofficial structures. At “75” the we defined an open economy that is regulated by the 
government. 
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Basecase: Future Form of Government 
 
 
 
Outcome: Egypt will develop two parallel governments: a legitimate legislature comprised of elected 
officials and paradoxically a shadow government consisting of military and intelligence apparatus. The 
shadow government will be less autocratic than the previous Mubarak regime, meaning there will be 
more stakeholders sharing power within the authoritarian structure. However, it will not meet the 
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threshold for even a one party semi-democratic system similar to Russia. There is currently the 
formation of two divided coalition, one centered on a push for democratic elections under a multi-party 
system and the other around military apparatus that maintains authoritarian power. Fearing the rise of 
more anti-Israeli sentiment, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel will support the Egyptian military and 
intelligence apparatus as a partial assurance or hedge against further dissent. Israel will consistently turn 
to the Egyptian military much more so than any of the future elected leaders such as Presidential 
candidates Amr Moussa or Mohamed El Baradei. Iran will also more supportive an authoritarian 
structure under the Egyptian military. Khamenei will prefer the military and intelligence apparatus 
overseeing Egypt for fear of rising Sunni extremist leaders that may arise from popular elections, posing 
a threat to an already waning minority Shiite influence.  In the final evolution of Egypt’s transitional 
Democratic phase, the military will allow for semi-free elections but will still act as custodians of the 
country and true center of power for Egypt in the short to medium term. 
Strengths: Egypt will have Democratic reforms, allowing for election of national leaders. The military will 
act as a safety net against rising anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment. The military and intelligence 
apparatus will act against extremism that may emerge in the democratic process.  
Weakness: The shadow military government will undermine true attempts for democratic reform in the 
short to medium time frame. 
Opportunities: The United States can gain support from future Egyptian elected leaders if it acts as a 
buffer between the Egyptian military and the democratic political candidates. 
Threats: There may emerge even more violence and conflict between the future elected government of 
Egypt and the military apparatus.  
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Scenario: Future Form of Government if General Tantawi Resigns or is Removed 
 
Outcome: At 76 years old, General Tantawi is an aging figure in Egypt’s military.  Tantawi’s departure or 
resignation is a realistic possibility because of this fact.  If General Tantawi is removed or resigns as 
Chairman of the Egypt’s military council, the intelligence apparatus and military will still remain 
entrenched in Egypt’s governance. In order to signal strength and cohesion, the military council will 
remain united. The legitimate political parties and democratic candidates pushing for a multi-party 
system will continue to push for democratic reform.  Perceiving Tantawi’s departure as a loss of strength 
by the military, the Al Ghud Party and Presidential Candidate El Baradei will push for even stronger 
democratic reform toward a more liberal democracy. In the final evolution, the military apparatus will 
still remain as the dominant force governing Egypt. The shadow military regime will still persevere, 
resulting into only limited or marginal gains for the democratic movement. 
Strength: The Al Ghud Party and Presidential Candidate El Baradei will push for even stronger 
democratic reform toward a more liberal democracy. 
Weakness: The shadow military regime will still remain with very marginal gains for the democratic 
movement. 
Opportunity: There can be some concessions made for more democratic reform, but this will be 
marginal. 
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Threat: The bifurcation between those who prefer a military regime and those advocating democratic 
reform will remain. This will continue to hinder Egypt’s quest for a true democratic society. The 
perseverance of a shadow government may present serious security challenges similar to what the 
United States is experiencing in Pakistan between the elected government and Pakistani ISI intelligence 
agency. 
Basecase: Extent of Support for the United States 
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Outcome: The military will continue to be pro-American because its reliance on U.S. foreign aid and 
military assistance. The Muslim Brotherhood along with the Freedom and Justice Party will continue 
their position in the opposite direction by promoting anti-American sentiment as their political 
narrative. 
Strength: The political figures within the government will by in large remain pro-American because of 
their reliance on the United States for foreign aid. 
Weakness: The public media will remain anti-American in their commentary. 
Opportunities: The United States can continue to gain pro-American partnerships within the future 
democratically elected government in Egypt. 
Scenario: Extent of Support for United States if General Tantawi Resigns or is 
Removed 
 
Outcome: If Tantawi is removed or resigns, it will have little or no effect on the extent of support for the 
United States. This indicates that his presence in the Egyptian political landscape is not very significant. 
In short, there are substitutes for his role. 
Strength: Egypt’s outcome is not dependent on General Tantawi. 
Weakness: Egypt does not become any more or less pro-American if he is removed. 
Opportunities: N/A 
Threat: N/A 
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Extent of Economic Openness 
 
 
 
Outcome: Egypt’s economy is driven primarily by tourism; however, it also has a substantial portion of 
its GDP comprised of agriculture and transport sectors. Egypt will have a semi-open economy that is 
regulated and controlled by the government. The economy will consist of a series of public-private 
partnerships ensuring the government its share of profits.  
Strength: Egypt will have a semi-open economy. 
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Weakness: Because Egypt’s economy is driven by tourism, it will continue to face massive deficits in 
spite of attempts to open to open the economy. The positive impact on the degree of economic 
openness will be mitigated because of lack of perceived safety in the country.  
Opportunity: The United States can leverage its foreign aid in compelling Egypt to make economic 
reforms for an open economy. 
Threat: Lack of safety and uncertainty over Egypt’s governance will hinder growth in the economy in the 
future.  
2. Complete Predictions on Iran 
a. The Future of Iran: Governance and Power Structure 
                  Initial Data Collected: March 3
rd
 2011 Analysis Completed: March 11
th
 2011  
 
Background: There is more conflict taking place within the Iranian regime than anytime following the 
death the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988. This does not necessarily mean the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
going to collapse or that the country’s leaders will follow the fate of Mubarak and Ben Ali in the short-
term. The tension observed in Iran can be distinguished in two forms: conflict between the government 
and the citizenry and conflict within the government. In the first case, the various opposition groups 
such as the student movement or minority factions whether violent or peaceful are perceived by the 
Iranian government primarily as nuisances rather than existential threats. The latter, tension within the 
government, is primarily a conflict over resources or power and not a debate over fundamental changes 
necessary for improving the lives of the citizenry.  Much of the fight over power and distribution of 
wealth within the state apparatus is driven by the question of succession following the death of 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. It is reported that the Supreme Leader is very ill with his death is 
in the near horizon.  This certainly plays a part in the calculations of all the senior stakeholders in Iran’s 
government. Thus there is competition taking place between the various power brokers in order to 
secure their future in Iran upon the death of Khamenei. 
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What is the potential of the student movement in causing change?  The student movement has 
very little power under the status quo system in Iran. I predict the students call for reform will not have 
the intended effect for substantive change in the short-term. I also forecast that if the students continue 
to target support for Mousavi and Karroubi, the consolidation of power within the fundamentalist camp 
will be circumvented. In short, the student movement will not lead to reform but it will hurt the IRGC 
and the fundamentalists by keeping them divided. 
What are the changing power dynamics under Khamenei? There is a major push for a transfer of 
power into the hands of the IRGC and security apparatus.  I forecast the longer Khamenei remains, the 
greater the reconciliation of power centered on the supreme leader. There is currently a divergence 
between those who support a military regime versus some such as the Larijanis who wish to retain 
power under the status quo. Khamenei appears to be the buffer between these two camps. I predict 
that Rafsanjani, still a powerful figure who controls a vast financial empire, will continue to be isolated 
and will eventually diverge even closer toward the position of reformists and bazaar merchants. 
What is the Extent of Support for the Supreme Leader? As long as Khamenei lives he will continue 
to garner support from the major power brokers in Iran.  There continues to be a power sharing 
arrangement between the fundamentalist clerics and the IRGC; however, it is still weighted in favor of 
the status quo structure mandated by “Velayat-e-Faqih” (i.e. the Guardianship by divine authority).  The 
university students and reformist such as Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi remain opposed to the 
hardliners, but their calls for change are severely dampened as long as Khamenei lives while retaining 
support from the IRGC. 
What is going to Happen when Khamenei Dies? Once Khamenei passes away there will be a power 
struggle between those who support the status quo under the supreme leader’s “velayat-e-faqih” versus 
a 3 to 5 leader structure with greater oversight from Qom and the Guardian Council. There will be either 
a newly created compromise between “velayat-e-faqih” and the 3 leader structure or a significant 
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splintering between clerics and select members of the IRGC. I predict that in the end, a similar structure 
under the status quo will prevail because of Russia, China, and the majority of domestic hardliners over-
weighing dissenters such as Grand Ayatollah Khorasani and the Larijanis.  
What Can the United States Do While Khamenei Remains? While Khamenei stays in power the 
United States can take two alternative actions in the framework of this forecast. The first action is 
continued support for the student movement which is guided in the direction of support for Mousavi 
and Karroubi. This will not have the intended effect of bringing Democracy, domestic reform, or 
rapprochement; however, it will dampen the Iranian regime from consolidating positions between the 
IRGC and the fundamentalists. The second alternative would require the United States to make a grand 
bargain. 
What Will Happen if United States Makes a Grand Proposal? This second alternative for the 
United States is a substantive proposal directed at Khamenei and Jafari in the form of a grand bargain 
such as a security guarantee and lifting of sanctions. Under this scenario, I forecast that the Iranian 
regime would further diffuse power through a multi institutional autocracy. This will result into a 
massive splintering within the IRGC and within the fundamentalist camps. I show through the simulation 
that such a splintering will further result into a serious power sharing crisis, a necessary but insufficient 
condition for internal conflict. 
Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Iran and internationally. Data collection was completed on March 3rd 2011 and analysis was finished on 
March 11th 2011.  In addition to the predicted outcomes of the current positions, I also suggest other 
courses of actions indicating alternative futures of what may happen if the internal players within Iran or 
the U.S. change their positions. I evaluate two scenarios affecting power structure in Iran. One of the 
most pressing issues in Iran is the issue of succession. There are reports that Ayatollah Khamenei is ill 
with cancer; however, the extent of his illness is unknown. I provided a network analysis in determining 
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the credible pressure causing various actors to move their positions while Khamenei lives. I also 
conducted Monte Carlo analysis to determine those who are susceptible to changing their positions. The 
two scenarios are as follows: 
1. Power structure in Iran if Khamenei remains. 
2. Power structure in Iran when Khamenei dies. 
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United 
States, input from journalists and most importantly the perspective from those who are supporters of 
the regime, some who have recently returned from Iran. And although they too will naturally have 
biases, the fusion of these views provides an analysis that is much closer to reality than any single 
perspective. In conducting these interviews I measured the relative power of the various groups, the 
power of the actors, their positions on the issue and the importance they placed on such issues within 
the continuum. 
Issues:  1. Governance While Khamenei Lives  
              2. Governance when Khamenei Dies 
Problem: There is rising conflict within the state over resources and increasing calls for reform by the 
citizenry. Although the citizenry is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Iran 
ranging from high unemployment and inflation to worsening pollution in the cities, change within Iran 
will most likely occur if there is a splintering within the government. Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi 
Karroubi have created some rifts, but this remains marginal at best. The majority of power brokers in 
Iran remain committed to the status quo, leaving little initiative in the government for the type of 
reform necessary in bringing substantive change to the country. 
Issue Continuum: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as a “Harsh Military Autocracy,” all the 
way to 200 as a “Liberal Democracy.” The continuum displays the entire spectrum, but the credible 
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debate centers around the interpretation of Velayat-e-Faqih, meaning “guardianship” or supreme 
authority over the all elements of society. This is a question of who should rule Iran, particularly when 
Khamenei passes. 
 
Basecase Scenario: Power Structure under 
Khamenei 
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Outcome:  There is a power struggle taking place between the IRGC and the hardliners. We predict 
Rafsanjani’s powerbase will continue to wane. It will transfer into the direction of the IRGC and 
fundamentalist clerics. Yet while Khamenei remains alive, there will be little change in the distribution of 
power amongst the key players within Iran. However, China and Russia will begin shifting support for a 
military regime under the IRGC but as long as Khamenei remains, they will return in support of him.  
Power will continue to be distributed between the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. Mousavi and Karroubi 
will remain marginalized. The university students and Bazaar will not be given significant consideration 
either. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the highest ranking cleric in Shia Islam, will lean towards a multi-
institutional autocracy. Rafsanjani will shift away from an autocratic position and will move closer to 
alignment with the bazaar class, perhaps in support of his business interests because of his waning 
authority under an autocratic structure. 
Strengths: The United States and its allies will remain unified in their positions. The university students 
and the bazaar will also remain fixed on democratic preferences. 
Weakness: Power will remain in the hands of hardliners and the IRGC. It will continue to merge into a 
consolidated position in which power is shared and centered on the supreme leader. China and Russia 
will continue to back the status quo under Ayatollah Khamenei. 
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Description:  My network analysis indicates no pressure being exerted by the United States on changing 
governance in Iran while Khamenei remains alive. Most of the pressure is exerted within the 
fundamentalist or IRGC camps, indicating that change will most likely occur from internal pressures 
among the hardliners. Although the foreign actors are making moves, almost all the moves are being 
waged on other foreign actors. In this case, we can observe that Khamenei is exerting some type of 
pressure in which Ali Larijani, Sadeq Larijani, and Hossein Taeb  are accordingly reacting by moving 
Network Analysis: Moves in reaction to Pressure 
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towards the supreme leader’s position. Jundollah, the MEK, and PJAK seem to be exerting some type of 
credible pressure throughout the various rounds on Russia and China. In the middle rounds, Taeb is 
reacting to pressure exerted by him from Hassan Abbassi, Mojtaba Hashemi, and Ali Ramin.  
Opportunities:  Turkey is waging pressure on Karroubi and Mousavi, but this is limited. There is some 
pressure being waged on regime hardliners by the reformists such as Khatami. 
Threats: There is limited credible pressure being waged on the regime in regards to governance from 
foreign actors. This means that the effectiveness in policy change by foreign actors may be untenable. 
Alternative COA: Iranian Students Continue to Drive Mousavi and Karroubi 
 
Outcome: I predict that if the Iranian students, i.e. the youth, continue to drive Mousavi and Karroubi, 
the fundamentalist clerics and the IRGC will remain splintered within the hardliner camp. This does 
mean the student movement will result in Democracy or even reform; however, the simulation indicates 
that the students continued support for Mousavi and Karroubi will prevent the hardliners from 
consolidated their positions. This is apparent if I compared this COA with the basecase showing a much 
more unified position within the hardliners. 
Strengths: A continued splintering within the hardliner camp prevents Iran from attaining it’s fully 
realized strength. 
Weakness: The student movement does not appear to lead to Democracy or substantive reform 
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Opportunities: A splintering within Iran’s power apparatus would certainly provide more alternatives for 
the United States than a fully unified hardliner regime.
 
Alternative COA: United States Makes a Proposal to Khamenei and Jafari 
 
Outcome: Under this proposal authority will shift from the status quo to a power sharing structure, 
termed “multi institutional autocracy.” Under this scenario power will be diffused between clerics of the 
Expediency Council, the Guardian Council, Office of the President, the military and the Parliament. Iran 
would still remain autocratic, but there would be a fundamental realignment within the government. 
There would be significant resistance from hardliners such as Ahmadinejad, Mesbah Yazdi, G.H. Elham, 
and key players linked to the IRGC. This alternative COA suggests that under such a proposal there 
would be a splintering within the IRGC as Jafari moves to accommodate a power sharing structure while 
other hardliner elements within the security apparatus remain fixed at the status quo. This simulation 
also suggests a realignment taking place internationally as China and Russia move away from supporting 
the regime’s new structure and takes a democratic stance.  
Strengths: Iran re-aligns toward a more significant power sharing structure, becoming less autocratic. 
Opportunities: A splintering takes place within the IRGC and hardliner camp.  
Weakness: Iran still remains autocratic and a good portion of the power brokers remain committed to 
either the status quo or a military regime structure.
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Scenario: Khamenei Dies 
 
 
 
Outcome: Once Khamenei passes, I predict there will be a power struggle between the status quo under 
the supreme leader’s “velayat-e-faqih” versus a 3 to 5 leader structure with greater oversight from Qom 
and the Guardian Council. There will be either a new compromised system between “velayat-e-faqih” 
and the 3 leader structure or a serious splintering between clerics and select members of the IRGC. The 
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simulation suggests that in the end, a similar structure under the status quo will prevail as Russia, China, 
and the majority of actors over-weigh Grand Ayatollah Khorasani and the Larijanis.  
Strengths: The bazaar class, university students and key reformists remain committed to a democratic 
alternative. 
Weakness: Under this power struggle, the strongest actors will not consider a democratic alternative. It 
will remain a struggle for authoritarian control. 
Opportunities: A potential splintering between the hardliner camps can potentially weaken the regime’s 
power.
Alternative COA if Khamenei Dies: United States Makes a Deal with Mesbah Yazdi and Mohsen 
Rezaei 
Outcome: I predict if the United States makes a substantive deal with the Iranian Regime, specifically 
Mesbah Yazdi and Mohsen Rezaei, it will lead to a dramatic splintering within the hardliner camp. Such a 
deal would have to be in the form of something credible and valuable such as a security guarantee.  This 
will result into a division within the IRGC and also divisions within the clerical ranks. It will ultimately 
lead to power crisis between the hardliners. Yazdi and Rezaei will advocate for a multi institutional 
autocracy where power is shared by the bureaucracy. The Larijanis and Khorasani will push for a 3 to 5 
leader council. Elham, Naqdi and Taeb will lean toward the status quo supreme leader structure. 
Ahmadinejad’s clique along with Jafari will push closer to a military regime. 
Strength:  Iran experiences a serious crisis which will significantly weaken their powerbase. 
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Weakness: Iran will remain autocratic with no signs.
Monte Carlo Analysis 
 
Description: We conducted Monte Carlo Analysis 
to simulate derivations and uncertainty taking 
place with the various powerbrokers in Iran. The 
purpose is to determine those who are susceptible 
to shocks and the degree to which player are 
shifting positions.  We set the maximum variations 
at +- 40 points running 30 rounds, using a random 
distribution to conduct the simulations. For 
example, if Ali Khatami prefers a 1 party semi-
democracy (100), the maximum he can fluctuate is 
either to 140 or down to 60 based on the shocks 
simulated by Monte Carlo analysis.  My analysis 
indicates there are many fluctuations taking place 
while Khamenei lives. 
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Khamenei Lives: Through my analysis I predict that while Khamenei lives there are significant shifts 
taking place by multiple actors within Iran. These are anticipatory shifts are occurring with respect to the 
question of governance and succession. In all 30 simulated rounds, there are significant shifts upward 
and downward of at least 25 points and up to 40 points.  This means that the question of governance 
and succession is being debated dramatically while Khamenei lives. 
Who Are most Susceptible While Khamenei Lives? Through Monte Carlo Analysis I have identified a 
pattern that Ali Larijani, Sadeq Larijani, Ali Akbar Velayati, and Ahmad Tavakoli are most susceptible to 
changing their positions in either direction. The simulation indicates that they are consistently prone to 
shifting positions, making them more vulnerable to accepting change. All four of these players are 
shifting preferences between a harsh military autocracy to a 3 – 5 Ruler structure. I conclude that they 
are hedging their risk in anticipating the shifts in power taking place as Khamenei’s death draws near. 
Khamenei Passes Away: There will be significantly less shifting of positions once Khamenei dies. If I 
compare this with the highly volatile scenario while he lives, I can conclude that the moves and debate 
over succession are being resolved while Khamenei lives instead of when he Khamenei dies.  
Who are Most Susceptible When Khamenei Dies? Muhammad Ali Jafari is the most susceptible to 
shifting his position once Khamenei passes.  As head of IRGC, he will most likely be tenable to shifting in 
order to prevent the military from splintering while Iran selects new leadership after Khamenei’s 
passing. The second most susceptible is Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi.  Current reports support this analysis 
given his status as a front runner for the position of supreme leader or one of the leading clerics in the 
alternative 3 to 5 leader structure. 
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b. Update: Power Structure Change While Khamenei Remains 
                  Data Updated and Analyzed: 27 June 2011 
Updated Scenario: Ahmadinejad Loses up to 40% of Power while Larijani 
Ascends 
 
 
 
Outcome:  As predicted by my initial forecast, reconsolidation of power around Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei continues. However, as Ahmadinejad has lost up to 40% of his power, Ali Larijani and Sadeq 
Larijani have ascended in their influence. In reaction to his loss of power and on the brink of political 
117 
 
oblivion, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will continue to attempt regaining favor by Supreme Leader 
Khamenei. In spite of the reconsolidation of power around the Supreme Leader, the ascending coalition 
will be short-lived. Rafsanjani will return from political obscurity now that his opponent Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad has lost significant influence. He will provide support for the Larijanis, bringing them closer 
to parity with Khamenei’s camp under the Supreme Leader structure. In conclusion the competition for 
governance will continue in a fractionalized debate among hardliners with the reconsolidation of power 
under the Supreme Leader continuing to ebb and flow. 
3. Complete Predictions on Libya 
 
a. The Libyan Uprising: Stalemate Phase 
                           Initial Data Collected: March 22
nd
 2011 Initial Analysis Completed: March 28
th
 2011 
 
Background: Libya is a country where civil society and political organizations have remained absent for 
more than thirty years. This was done intentionally by Muamar Gaddafi to prevent dissent by limiting 
the capabilities of those within the regime as well as well broader societal forces.  
 Will there be a cessation of fighting in the near term? I predict that the conflict will continue with no 
reconciliation or cessation between Muamar Gaddafi and opposition forces in the near term unless he 
leaves the country by force.  
When will the tide turn in favor of the opposition? The Gaddafi coalition will become highly unstable 
when his power is degraded by 50%. He will still continue to fight but it will become increasingly 
ineffective past this point.  
What type of government will emerge with the new opposition? I predict a slightly authoritarian 1 
party system emerging. The further Gaddafi’s forces are weakened, the greater the prospect for a 
democratic movement. However, there will be a significant splintering in the debate for governance into 
three camps: those who favor a liberal democracy, those who favor a multi-party non liberal system and 
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those who prefer 1 party system (similar to China or Russia). There will be significant deadlock, but a 1 
party system will still emerge as the winning coalition.  
What will happen to Gaddafi as his power is degraded? Muamar Gaddafi is much more resilient that he 
appears. He will remain committed to fighting even with 50% loss in strength.  
What will be the effect of the No Fly Zone? The conflict will be prolonged and although an American-
European led No Fly Zone will favor the rebels in a more even fight, hostilities will continue with no near 
term solution for a unified Libya.  
How will the international community act as the conflict continues? The United States along with 
France and Britain will remain committed to supporting anti-Gaddafi forces on a limited scale. The 
further degradation of Gaddafi’s power will motivate the effort to continue supporting the rebels with 
the prospect of near endgame. The BRIC countries will remain in support of Gaddafi, but as his power 
wanes, they will enter the debate on issue of governance in support of a 1 party system.  
What will happen if Gaddafi Leaves: If Muamar Gaddafi departs Libya, the newly formed government 
will be highly factionalized. This will lead to prolonged deadlock on determining the form of 
government, but the winning coalition will eventually resemble a slightly authoritarian 1 party system 
similar to Russia or China. Russia and China will then be in support of this winning coalition as they seize 
an effortless opportunity.  
Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Libya and internationally. Data collection was completed on March 22nd 2011 and analysis was finished 
on March 28th 2011. I evaluated two issues where I gauged their power and extent of support for or 
against Muamar Gaddafi along with the prospect for Democracy. I provided a network analysis in 
determining the credible pressure causing various actors to move their positions while Gaddafi remains 
in power. I also conducted Monte Carlo analysis to determine those who are susceptible to changing 
their positions.  
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Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United 
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I 
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue 
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. I predicted the outcome of the 
Libyan Crisis by evaluating two issues:  
1. Extent of Support for Gaddafi  
Issue Continuum 1: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as “Staunch Opposition to Gaddafi,” all 
the way to 200 as a “Strong Support for Gaddafi.” The midpoint constitutes a neutral position.  
2. Prospect for Democracy in Libya  
Issue Continuum 2: The scale of preferences begins at zero as “Liberal Democracy.” This is similar to a 
European Proportional Representation or American Presidential system. I defined 50 as a “multi-party 
system” which is similar to European style but not as liberal. 100 is defined as “1 party system” similar to 
Russia. And finally, 200 is defined as a “harsh autocratic” system under the status quo one ruler 
authority. 
Basecase: Extent of Support for Gaddafi 
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Outcome: The U.S., France and Britain are united initially and pose a significant force with NATO in close 
support. However the internal debate within the U.S. over commitment to the conflict will eventually 
wane as President Obama and his advisors become divided on the extent of U.S. commitment. 
Therefore, as this coalition along with NATO engages in a limited war effort, the American debate may 
decrease their influence in shaping the outcome of the conflict. As the war prolongs Turkey, China,Egypt 
and Iran will shift toward a more neutral position in order to hedge against the unknown outcome. The 
simulation indicates that Shokri Ghanem (Chairman of Libyan Oil Corp) remains neutral to avoid any risk 
to his own position while attempting to mitigate decrease in oil production. As Libya’s largest neighbor, 
Egypt has been affected by the influx of refugees. I predict that Egyptian leadership will be divided on 
issues concerning Gaddafi’s reign as General Tantawi leans toward support for Gaddafi while Prime 
Minister Sharaf shifts toward a neutral position.  
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Strengths: The opposition will continue to fight against Gaddafi in attempt to further secure the east. 
The British, Americans, and French will not diverge significantly from their initial positions, indicating 
their near term commitment to enforcing the No Fly Zone Resolution strongly in favor of anti-Gaddafi 
forces. The Libyan Oil Corporation will continue to remain neutral, suggesting a halt in funding Gaddafi’s 
interests through oil revenue as long as the conflict persists.  
Weakness: Both sides will remain strongly opposed, suggesting prolonged fighting. As long as Gaddafi 
remains in power, very few actors will shift their positions away from their initial stances. Furthermore, 
China, Iran and Turkey will shift toward a neutral position, contributing little in the direction of the 
opposition. 
Opportunities: The American and European coalition can continue to support the opposition groups in 
hope of more pro-Gaddafi forces defecting; however, the top figures such as Saif Gaddafi and Abu Bakr 
Jabr will remain committed to Colonel Gaddafi. 
Extent of Support for Gaddafi with 50% Loss in Capabilities 
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Outcome: If Gaddafi forces get degraded down to 50% of strength as a result of the air campaign, the 
U.S., France and U.K. will remain unified in hope of reaching an endgame to the conflict. The Libyan Oil 
Corporation will still remain neutral. However, as the American and Europeans continue to weaken 
Gaddafi, the BRIC countries will remain unified in support of Gaddafi. The top Gaddafi leadership will 
stay committed, indicating their fate is tied to Gaddafi’s survival as the conflict continues to escalate.  
Strength: As the American and European led effort continues to gain traction, success in degrading 
Gaddafi’s power will keep them committed in hopes of a quicker endgame.  
Weakness: As long as Gaddafi remains committed to fighting, the BRIC countries will still be in favor of 
his regime. The Libyan Oil Corporation will remain neutral as long Gaddafi has some power in spite of his 
50% loss in capabilities.  
Opportunities: The U.S. can make a deal with Turkey to receive more support than currently expected. 
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Extent of Support for Gaddafi with 60% Loss in Capabilities 
 
Outcome: Even with 60% of his forces degraded, the political landscape in favor or against Gaddafi will 
not change. This means that the American and European led effort will not coalesce any of the other 
actors to change positions once the bombing campaign has started. Gaddafi is more resilient than 
commonly expected.  
Strength: The intensified coalition effort will not change the position of its allies in a negative direction 
as the bombing escalates.  
Weakness: Those opposed to Gaddafi will not coalesce.  
Opportunities: As Gaddafi’s capabilities decrease, the coalition against him will continue to remain 
unified. 
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Basecase: Prospect of Democracy While Gaddafi Remains 
 
 
 
Outcome: The Libyan opposition will be significantly divided on the type of government they desire 
while Gaddafi remains in power. The transitional council representing the new Libyan government will 
be divided into three camps: Mahmoud Jebril, Ibrahim Dabashi and Ali Awjali will prefer a more 
liberalized western style Democracy, Mustafa Jalil and Omar Hariri will prefer a multi-party system that 
is not liberal, and Abdul Raham Shalgam will lean toward a 1 party system. The various European and 
125 
 
American leaders will also be divided within their respective camps on the type of Democratic system 
Libya should strive for.  
Strength: The Libyan Oil Corporation will lean in support for a Democratic 1 party system, suggesting 
favor for the opposition in terms of similar preferences on governance but not on individual 
personalities.  
Weakness: Russia, China, and pro-Gaddafi forces will remain fundamentally opposed to any reform. The 
Libyan opposition will be significantly splintered.  
Opportunities: India may break away from BRIC in terms of preferences on Democratic governance. 
Prospect for Democracy when Gaddafi Loses 50% of his Capabilities 
 
 
Outcome: There will be a significant splintering within the Libyan opposition in terms of governance. As 
Gaddafi’s capabilities are degraded by 50%, the foreign actors will be divided between a 1 party 
Democratic system (similar to Russia) and a liberal Democracy. More important, the opposition leaders 
represented by the Libyan Transitional Council will be increasingly divided between a liberal democracy, 
multi-party system and a one party system. I predict that as Gaddafi is weakened, China, Russia, India 
and Brazil will enter in support of a 1 party system, ultimately taking a stake in the future of Libya’s 
governance.  
Strength: Libya will have a Democracy, but this will have a cost and the debate will not be resolved as 
long Gaddafi remains.  
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Weakness: Gaddafi is more resilient than expected. The newly formed Libyan opposition government 
will be tied in a deadlock on the issue of governance.  
Opportunities: The Libyan Oil Corporation will remain neutral when it comes to choosing between the 
opposition debates on governance, but will prefer a democratic form of government instead of an 
authoritarian system. This indicates that if Gaddafi’s forces are degraded, the Libyan Oil Corporation will 
lean in favor of the winning coalition to continue business. 
 
Prospect of Democracy if Gaddafi Leaves or Dies 
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Outcome: If Gaddafi departs Libya, the newly formed opposition will become extremely factionalized 
resulting in potential deadlock. The Libyan Oil Corporation will move in favor of a liberal Democracy, but 
the winning coalition will be a slightly authoritarian structure nearing a 1 party Democracy similar to 
Russia’s system. China and Russia will be part of this winning coalition along with India and Turkey.  
Strength: Libya will be less authoritarian and nearing a Democratic system  
Weakness: China and Russia will benefit and seize the opportunity without having participated in the 
removal of Gaddafi.  
Opportunity: The U.S. can make a deal with the Libyan Oil Corporation in support of a more liberal 
Democracy. 
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Monte Carlo Analysis 
  
 
Outcome: My analysis indicates that the U.S. actors consisting of SECDEF Gates, Secretary of State 
Clinton, and Admiral Mullen fluctuate the most in influence. This suggests that any prolonged U.S. ability 
to influence the other stakeholders with its current anti-Gaddafi position is unstable and vulnerable to 
decreasing. Saif Gaddafi also fluctuates significantly, indicating that his power is unstable under the 
banner of his father’s support. In addition, Abu Bakr Jabr, the Defense Minister and long time Gaddafi 
loyalist is equally susceptible to shocks. These two particular actors are the highest ranking Gaddafi 
loyalists; therefore, the Monte Carlo analysis indicates a power structure that is much more susceptible 
to shocks compared to anti-Gaddafi Libyan opposition.  
Strengths: Muamar Gaddafi’s power structure is more susceptible to collapse or defection. The Monte 
Carlo analysis is supported by the recent continued wave of defection in support of the opposition 
against Gaddafi.  
Weakness: The U.S. ability to influence its interests is also unstable.  
Opportunities: The coalition can exploit the instability within the Gaddafi camp to further splinter and 
isolate Muamar Gaddafi. 
Description: We conducted Monte Carlo analysis to 
simulate derivations and uncertainty taking place 
with the various powerbrokers in the Libyan conflict. 
The analysis allows us to find out how random 
shocks can affect my predictions generated by the 
Monte Carlo algorithm. The purpose is to determine 
those who are susceptible to shocks and the degree 
to which actors are shifting in power. We set the 
maximum variations at +- 30 points running 30 
rounds, using a random distribution to conduct the 
simulations. For example, if Saif Gaddafi’s influence 
is at 60, then it can fluctuate up to 90 and down to 
30. 
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Network Analysis: Moves in Reaction to Pressure 
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Description Round 1: My analysis uncovers that in the initial round of conflict, the opposition 
represented by the newly formed Libyan Transitional National Council are applying credible pressure to 
Russia, China, India and Turkey in attempt to move theme from their positions. The head of the new 
rebel council and spokesman, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, stated that any country who attempts to circumvent 
support for the opposition would be denied Libyan oil along with business opportunities in the future. 
This was a statement aimed at BRIC’s absent support on the No Fly Zone Resolution. Whatever the 
comment, the network analysis indicates that pressure exerted on BRIC is beyond cheap talk. In the first 
round of this conflict, it has caused them to react to such tactics.  
Description Round 2: In the second round of the conflict, I can see that the United States, France and 
Britain are imposing credible pressure on the Middle Eastern countries, perhaps in support of their 
military action. The analysis indicates that these countries reacted to the pressure and ultimately were 
driven in support of the coalition action. This is validated by the Arab League’s support for No Fly Zone 
Resolution authorizing military action.  
Description Round 3: Although in the 3rd round there are less actors moving in reaction to pressure, the 
moves are telling. In this round I indicate pressure being exerted on China from Shokri Ghanem who is 
the head of the Libyan Oil Company. This means that China is going to be affected by the Libyan crisis 
most likely because of their energy concerns that are magnified by their rising economy and massive 
population.  
Description Final Round: In the final round of the conflict, Shokri Ghanem continues to pressure China 
and also Turkey. This is consistent with report of Chinese interest in Libyan oil and Turkey’s desire to 
purchase Libyan petroleum as well. 
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b. Libyan Uprising Update: Shokri Ghanem Defects to Tunisia and Gaddafi Loses 40% of 
Capabilities      Transition from Stalemate to Endgame 
                  Data Updated and Analyzed: 18 May 2011 
 
 What will happen now that Ghanem has defected? After the defection of Shokri Ghanem along with 
degradation of Gaddafi’s power by at least 40%, I predict that the initial stalemate is transitioning into a 
phase where the opposition now has the upper hand. At this point, the Gaddafi government is beyond 
the point of sustaining a stalemate and is susceptible to collapse.  
How can the United States end this conflict decisively? If we can align Shokri Ghanem and the Libyan 
Oil Corporation with Libyan Transitional Council, the coalition becomes much more united resulting into 
an even higher likelihood of collapse by the Gaddafi regime, bringing the conflict closer to an end.  
Situation Update: The head of Libyan Oil Corporation Shokri Ghanem has defected to Tunisia in 
clear sign of opposition to Muamar Gaddafi. An official at the Libyan Transitional Council has asked 
him to join the opposition. In addition, the continued bombing campaign led by the United States, 
France, United Kingdom and NATO has degraded Gaddafi’s power by at least 40%. 
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United 
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I 
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue 
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. I predicted the outcome of the 
Libyan Crisis by evaluating two issues:  
1. Extent of Support for Gaddafi  
Issue Continuum 2: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as “Staunch Opposition to Gaddafi,” all 
the way to 200 as a “Strong Support for Gaddafi.” The midpoint constitutes a neutral position. 
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Shokri Ghanem Defects to Tunisia and Gaddafi Loses up to 40% of Power 
 
 
 
Updated Outcome: After the defection of Shokri Ghanem along with degradation of Gaddafi’s power by 
at least 40%, I predict that the initial stalemate is transitioning into a phase where the opposition now 
has the upper hand. This is resulting from the support of NATO, France, the United States and the U.K. In 
this phase I observe an effort that is more disjointed than the initial stalemate phase. However, supports 
from allied forces along with the defection of Ghanem now provide the upper hand to the rebels. At this 
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point, the Gaddafi government is beyond the point of sustaining a stalemate and is susceptible to 
collapse. 
 
Course of Action for the United States: Allies Align Ghanem with Opposition Forces 
 
 
 
Outcome: If the United States and the Europeans can unite Shokri Ghanem and Libyan Oil Corporation 
with the Libyan Transitional Council, the coalition in support of rebel forces will be aligned resulting into 
overwhelming force over the Gaddafi regime. Although Russia and China will still support Gaddafi 
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forces, the decreased power of Muamar Gaddafi relative to the opposition’s strengthened coalition will 
make his authority highly unstable. Gaddafi’s ability to remain in Libya will be even more untenable and 
closer to collapse. 
c. Libyan Uprising Update: Post Gaddafi Libya 
       Data Updated: 27 August 2011 Analysis Updated: 5 September 2011  
 
What type of government will take Shape in Libya? Post-Gaddafi Libya will transition to a limited 
multiparty tribal system. The national government will have a selection process based on pre-
determined representation by tribal affiliation. This new government may have Democratic elements, 
but it will not meet the threshold for a true Democracy requiring fair and free elections. 
What elements within Libya will resist the new government’s effort for a limited multiparty 
tribal system? The eastern tribes situated in Misrata will pose the greatest reluctance to more 
democratic representation followed by the central tribes and the western tribes. In absence of a strong 
central authority Libya runs the risk of increased tribal conflict. The apprehension by the Eastern tribes 
centered on Misrata will pose the greatest threat to any form of consensus building necessary for a 
limited multiparty tribal representative system. There will also be remnants of the Gaddafia tribe 
continuing to pose the greatest resistance to new forms of governance in Libya. 
Will there be conservative or extremist elements threatening the future of Libya? The newly 
formed Libyan government will not be affected by extreme or conservative Islamic ideology. Quite the 
contrary Libya will be fairly liberal compared to its neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Although Islam is part of Libya’s identity, the future government will be driven more by tribal politics 
rather than religious ideologies. 
What will happen to Libya’s economy? Libya will transform into an open economy with few 
structural barriers to commerce once it becomes stabilized and secure. However, an open economy will 
present limited changes in structure given that Libya’s only significant export will continue to be oil. 
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There will be a much greater desire for foreign direct investment because of the support for an open 
economy.  Resistance to this economic openness with the exception of the Gaddafia tribe will be 
marginal at best. Libya’s potential for open trade, particularly as a significant petroleum exporter with 
access to several ports, will be supported by the international community. This liberalization of the 
economy will allow for a wider distribution of oil resources into the hands of more stakeholders 
compared to the centralization of the Gaddafi regime. 
What will be the role of the international community in shaping post-Gaddafi Libya?  The 
NATO coalition consisting of the United States and European allies will push for a multi-party 
Democracy, but post-Gaddafi Libya will not reach the threshold for becoming a true democracy. The 
coalition along with Arab neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Tunisia will give strength to the 
transitional council. This will be an important step in countering the various tribal desires for more 
authoritarian alternatives to the transitional council’s multi party tribal representation proposal. 
Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Libya and internationally. Data collection was completed on August 27th 2011 and analysis was 
completed on September 5th 2011. Libya is a country where civil society and political organizations have 
remained absent for more than forty years. This was done intentionally by Muamar Gaddafi to prevent 
dissent. As a result, the various positions held by the transitional council and various defectors until 
recently have remained unknown. Using subject matter expertise and media statements from various 
actors within Libya and internationally, I have evaluated the future form of government in Libya, the 
ideological bent of the new government, and extent of economic openness.  
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United 
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I 
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue 
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. 
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Issue Continuum: I developed three issue continuums in predicting the future of post-Gaddafi Libya: 
(1) The future form of government in Libya (2) The ideological spectrum of the Libyan government and 
(3) The Extent of Economic Openness. 
1. The Future form of Government: The continuum for defining the future form of government in Libya 
ranges from “0” as a liberal democracy to “200” as a harsh autocracy similar to the Gaddafi government. 
At “20” I defined a multi party democracy similar to Europe or American Presidential system, but lacking 
some liberal freedoms associated with systems. I set “50” as a limited multiparty system (by tribes). This 
system would have some democratic elements but is still authoritarian because representatives will be 
pre-determined by tribal rank and order. At “100” I defined the point on the spectrum as a tribal 
electorate system, a strictly authoritarian form of government which is selected by tribal representation 
with no democratic processes. At “160” I defined this point as a moderate autocratic government which 
is hierarchical but less authoritarian than the Gaddafi government. 
2. Ideological Spectrum of the Libyan Government: This continuum ranges from “0” as conservative to 
“100” as liberal, with “50” defined as neutral. This spectrum is defined in the context of Islam in the 
Middle East. Therefore, what may be defined as liberal in the West is not the same by definition in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  
3. The Extent of Economic Openness: This continuum ranges from “0” as a closed economy all the way to 
“100” as an open competitive economy. An open competitive economy is defined as a system allowing 
the free flow of goods within Libya and abroad with very limited tariffs or barriers to commerce. 
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Future Form of Government in Libya 
 
 
 
Outcome: Post-Gaddafi Libya will transition to a limited multiparty tribal system. The national 
government will have a selection process based on pre-determined representation by tribal affiliation. 
This new government may have Democratic elements, but it will not meet the threshold for a true 
Democracy requiring fair and free elections. The future of Libya will have a less centralized power-base 
compared to the Gaddafi regime. There will be more actors in the ruling coalition, but it will remain 
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authoritarian. The distribution of power within Libya’s national political landscape will be determined by 
tribal size and influence.  
Furthermore, the Libyan transitional council’s overwhelming influence compared to the individual tribes 
will create a pull toward a position calling for the limited multiparty tribal representation system. The 
eastern tribes situated in Misrata will pose the greatest reluctance to more democratic representation 
followed by the central tribes and the western tribes. 
In spite of such reluctance by the various tribes in meeting the limited multiparty system, Libya’s 
neighbors and regional allies will support the governance structure imposed by the transitional council. 
The regional players that will eventually support a proposal by the transitional council will consist of 
UAE, Saudi, Egypt, and Qatar. The Iranians followed by Russia, China and Algeria will push for a more 
authoritarian system in the form of a tribal selectorate but will have limited effectiveness in achieving 
this.   
The NATO coalition consisting of the United States and European allies will push for a multi-party 
Democracy. The Libyan youth which played a significant role in the war against Gaddafi will also push for 
a democratic system. However, the tribes will resist this approach and weigh-in for a more authoritarian 
system based on local tribal authority. The Libyan Transitional Council will attempt to reconcile these 
differences by providing a tribal representation system with limited Democratic elements. 
Strength: Libya will be less autocratic compared to the Gaddafi regime 
Weakness: Although Libya will be less autocratic, it will not be a Democracy by most standard 
definitions. 
Opportunities: The United States and Western allies can influence the Libyan Transitional Council by 
limited semi-democratic reform. 
Threat: In absence of a strong central authority Libya runs the risk of increased tribal conflict. The 
apprehension by the Eastern tribes centered on Misrata will pose the greatest threat to any form of 
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consensus building required for a limited multiparty tribal representative system. There will also be 
remnants of the Gaddafia tribe continuing to pose the greatest resistance to new forms of governance 
in Libya. 
Ideological Spectrum of Libyan Government 
 
 
 
Outcome: The newly formed Libyan government will not be affected by extreme or conservative Islamic 
ideology. Quite the contrary, Libya will be fairly liberal compared to its neighbors in the Middle East and 
North Africa. The central and western tribes will initially prefer a more conservative ideology, but will 
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eventually shift toward a liberal influence. Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Algeria will support a liberal 
ideology by Middle Eastern standards.  
Strength: Although Islam is part of Libya’s identity, the future government will be driven more by tribal 
political than religious ideologies. 
Weakness: The expatriates along with the Libyan youth will desire a more ideologically liberal 
government but will not achieve their optimal preference based on overwhelming influence by 
Transitional Council. 
Threat: The Eastern tribes centered on Misrata will challenge the transitional council’s more liberal 
ideology. The remnants of the Gaddafi regime will resist in attempt to counter any new dominant 
ideology. 
Economic Openness 
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Outcome: Libya will transform into an open economy with few structural barriers to commerce once it 
becomes stabilized and secure. However, an open economy will present limited changes in structure 
given that Libya’s only significant export will continue to be oil. There will be a much greater desire for 
foreign direct investment because of the support for an open economy.   There will be almost no 
resistance to this economic openness. Libya’s potential for open trade, particularly as a significant 
petroleum exporter with access to several ports, will be supported by the international community. This 
liberalization of the economy will allow for a wider distribution of oil resources into the hands of more 
stakeholders compared to the centralization of the Gaddafi regime. 
Strength: An open economy presents many opportunities for a successful post-Gaddafi Libya 
Weakness: Security will remain an issue until open trade can be achieved. 
Threat: Remnants of the Gaddafi regime will resist
4. Complete Predictions on Syria 
 
a. The Syrian Uprising 
                 Data Collected: May 13
th
 2011 Analysis Completed: May 15
th
 2011 
 
Background: Throughout the course of Bashar Al-Assad’s rule and even preceding him with Hafez Al-
Assad, both father and son have created a system in which their role has been an integrative element of 
stability necessary for the survival of his loyal domestic coalition. This is typical of most other stable 
autocracies; however, Syria is particularly unique in the Middle East because of Bashar Al-Assad’s skillful 
positioning  such that he has support from  Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, all of whom are deeply 
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opposed to each other yet support the Syria’s current ruler. This arrangement has made Bashar Al-
Assad’s resilient in the face of great rebuke from the United States and its European allies. My analysis 
predicts that Assad will continue to prosper as he continues to perfect this unique relationship among 
the various players in the region. This is typical of most other stable autocracies; however, Syria is 
particularly unique in the Middle East because of Bashar Al-Assad’s skillful positioning  such that he has 
support from  Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, all of whom are deeply opposed to each other yet support 
the Syria’s current ruler. This arrangement has made Bashar Al-Assad’s resilient in the face of great 
rebuke from the United States and its European allies. My analysis predicts that Assad will continue to 
prosper as he continues to perfect this unique relationship among the various players in the region. 
To What Extent is Bashar Al-Assad affected by the Current Protests in Syria? The impact of the 
protests will be marginal at best on the ruling authority of Bashar Al-Assad.  He will still remain in power 
with continued support from his coalition. However, his power will slightly wane within the coalition, 
resulting into increased concessions to his supporters. In seeking to mitigate the potential for any loss of 
authority, Assad will provide additional powers to his loyal coalition, thereby making his rule more 
stable. 
How will the limited concessions and diffusion of authority given to his coalition supporters 
affect Bashar Al-Assad’s rule? The concession will strengthen consensus within his domestic 
coalition, making his leadership more stable in the short-term. In effect Assad will augment any 
potential loss of power by rewarding his loyal followers more than he would have prior to the protests. 
Is there any prospect for democratic change or reform in Syria? There is no credible prospect for 
democratic change in Syria. The status quo authoritarian structure in Syria will remain nearly intact as 
Assad’s support from the Ba’ath Party, the Syrian media, and the military remain loyal to the status quo 
structure.  
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Will there be any attempt to make reforms under Assad’s rule? In spite of the prevailing status 
quo structure in Syria, I predict that Vice Presidents Najah al-Attar and Farouk Al-Shara along with the 
Prime Minister Adel Safar will continue to push for limited economic or political reform by slightly less 
autocratic means. This attempt to make reforms will not prevail because the majority of power centers 
within Assad’s camp will continue to advocate no change from the status quo autocratic structure. 
To What Extent Does Syria’s Current Government Structure Depend on Bashar Al-Assad? Even 
if Assad were to depart Syria, the current regime structure would still remain. There would be a push 
from Prime Minister Safar, Vice President Attar and Vice President Shara to make some reforms toward 
a slightly less autocratic structure such as more economic freedom. However, the coalition supporting 
the status quo structure presently would continue to prevail as both the Iranians and the Saudis 
continue backing the Ba’ath Party loyalists and the military leadership that existed under Assad. 
To What Extent Could Bashar Al-Assad survive in Syria if he loses a significant amount of 
power? If Bashar Al-Assad loses even 50% of his power, he will still have a strong enough coalition to 
effectively rule Syria. In fact, my analysis indicates that the ruling coalition will be even stronger given 
that he concedes a limited amount of power.
How effective are the opposition forces in Syria protesting against Assad’s rule? As Assad 
continues to make limited concessions to his loyal supporters, the Muslim Brotherhood along with the 
Kurdish opposition will be weakened in their resolve to oppose him.  Any foreign support will be 
ineffective.  
Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Syria and internationally. Data collection was completed on May 13 2011 and analysis was finished on 
May 16th 2011. In addition I provided alternative scenario of what would occur if Bashar Al-Assad were 
to depart Syria along with alternative courses of action for the United States. I also conducted Monte 
Carlo analysis to determine the players most susceptible to changing their stances or positions.  Finally, I 
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conducted a network analysis of the various actors to determine the extent of leverage and pressure 
imposed on one-another. I predicted the future of Syria by evaluating two issues: 
1. Extent of Support for Bashar Al-Assad 
Issue Continuum 1: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as “Strong Support Support for Assad,” all 
the way to 100 as a “Staunch Opposition to Assad.” The midpoint constitutes a neutral position. 
2. Regime Type Preference in Syria 
Issue Continuum 2: The scale of preferences begins at zero as “Harsh Autocracy.” I then define the 
“status quo” at 20 which is the
Assad government. 50 is defined as a “1 party system” similar to Russia. At 150 I defined “Democracy 
Limited” as a two party government with limited individual liberties. And finally 100 is defined as 
“Liberal Democracy,” a system similar to a European proportional representation or American 
presidential system.  
Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United States 
and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I measured the 
relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue and the 
importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.  
Regime Type Outcome under Bashar Al-Assad 
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Outcome: There is no credible prospect for democratic change in Syria. The status quo authoritarian 
structure in Syria in will remain nearly intact as support from the Ba’ath Party, the Syrian media, and the 
military remain intact. In spite of the prevailing status quo structure in Syria, I predict that Vice 
Presidents Najah al-Attar and Farouk Al-Shara along with the Prime Minister Adel Safar will continue to 
push for limited economic or political reform by slightly less autocratic means.  
This attempt to make reforms will not prevail because the majority of power centers within Assad’s 
camp will continue to advocate unwavering change from the status quo autocratic structure. 
Furthermore the Muslim Brotherhood will realize that democratic reform is an untenable proposition 
and will ultimately advocate change, no matter how ineffective, within the confines of an authoritarian 
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spectrum. In the final round, none of the international advocates for democratic reform will keep true to 
their positions with the exception of Egypt and the United States.  
Turkey and the European will shift their initial position advocating multi-party democracy one 
supporting a slightly less autocratic government than the current system in Syria. The United States will 
also shift in their democratic direction as they move from supporting a multi-party system to anything 
reflecting a one-party system similar to Russia or China. In spite of this current description of the 
changing positions of the international actors, such players are almost irrelevant in the outcome for 
regime type preference in Syria. 
Strength: Syria will not become more autocratic than the status quo. Assad’s close advisors and 
stakeholders such as the Vice Presidents and the Prime Minister will advocate some reform. 
Weakness: Syria will remain autocratic 
Threats: Turkey’s shifting support from democratic reform to slightly autocratic one may strengthen 
Bashar Al-Assad’s coalition within Syria. 
Scenario: Regime Type if Bashar Al-Assad Departs Syria 
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Outcome: If Bashar Al-Assad were to depart Syria, the current regime structure would still remain. There 
would be a push from Prime Minister Safar, Vice President Attar and Vice President Shara to make some 
reforms toward a slightly less autocratic structure such as more economic freedom. However, the 
coalition supporting the status quo structure present would prevail as both Iranians and the Saudis 
continue backing the Ba’ath Party loyalists and the military leadership that existed under Assad. 
Strength: The status quo-structure under Bashar Al-Assad is stable even if he were to depart. The level 
of authoritarian rule will not be worse than the current situation. 
Weakness: The prospect for substantive reform or any notion of democratic change is unlikely 
Opportunities: The United States can provide some type of support or offer toward the Prime Minister 
and the Vice Presidents if it seeks a limited reform platform advocated by these leaders. 
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Extent of Support for Assad 
 
 
Outcome:  After this current wave of protests in Syria, Bashar Al-Assad will still remain in power with 
continued support from his coalition. However, his power will slightly wane within the coalition, 
resulting into increased concessions to his supporters.  In this process Bashar Al-Assad will negotiate the 
extent of additional authority given to the Ba’ath Party along with his two Vice Presidents, the Prime 
Minister and the military. This diffusion of authority within his camp will prevent his coalition from 
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splintering or defecting. In fact this limited diffusion of power will strengthen consensus within the 
domestic coalition, making his leadership more stable in the short-term. Saudi Arabia and Iran will 
continue to support Bashar Al’Assad throughout this diffusion of power within his loyalist camps while 
Israel and Russia will remain neutral toward his rule. In addition I also predict that the Muslim 
Brotherhood along with the Kurdish resistance to Assad will be weakened in their resolve to oppose 
him.   
Strength: Assad will be slightly weakened, forcing him to share more power. The rise of further 
extremism will remain low as long as Assad keeps his coalition intact. 
Weakness: The political resolve of Assad’s coalition will be strengthened.  
Opportunities: The United States can begin dealing with more key leaders within Syria than before. 
Threats:  Iran will continue to support Assad, requiring some quid pro- quo concession from Syria. 
 
Scenario: Bashar Al-Assad Loses 30% of Power 
Outcome: If Bashar Al’Assad loses up to 30% of his power, he will still garner enough support to remain 
the leader of Syria. However, he will be less willing to provide concessions or diffuse authority to his 
supporters if he loses power compared to the current situation in which his power is relatively intact. 
The Saudis and the Iranians will continue to support his domestic coalition. Interestingly enough, the 
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European Union will move in support of Assad perhaps fearing that a weak ruler in Syria is less desirable 
than a strong one.  
Strength: Assad’s leadership is stable suggesting mitigating the risk of a worse alternative or an 
unknown outcome. 
Weakness: Syria will continue to operate under Assad’s authoritarian rule, minimizing the chances for 
any substantive reform. 
Opportunity: None
Support for Bashar Al-Assad Loses 50% of Power 
 
Outcome: If Bashar Al-Assad loses even 50% of his power, he will still have a strong enough coalition to 
effectively rule Syria. In fact, my analysis indicates that the ruling coalition will be even stronger given 
that he concedes a limited amount of power. Therefore, he has established a structure in which his role 
is necessary amongst his domestic and international allies.  
Strength: Assad’s leadership is stable suggesting mitigating the risk of a worse alternative or an 
unknown outcome. 
Weakness: Syria will continue to operate under Assad’s authoritarian rule, minimizing the chances for 
any substantive reform. 
Opportunity: None 
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Monte Carlo Analysis 
 
Outcome: My analysis indicates that none of the actors within Syria are susceptible to shocks that would 
cause them to change their positions in supporting or deposing Assad. This further supports my initial 
findings that the extent of support for Bashar Al-Assad is stable within Syria. I indicate that Israel, Iran 
and United States are most susceptible in shifting their positions toward Assad.  
Strengths: The level of uncertainty in Syrian political order is stable and predictable  
Weakness: The ability to induce a decrease in support for Assad is most likely untenable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description: We conducted Monte Carlo 
analysis to simulate derivations and 
uncertainty taking place with the various 
powerbrokers in support or against Syrian 
leader Bashar Al-Assad. The analysis allows us 
to find out how random shocks can affect my 
predictions generated by the Monte Carlo 
algorithm. The purpose is to determine those 
who are susceptible to shocks and the degree 
to which actors are shifting in position.  We 
set the maximum variations at +- 30 points 
running 30 rounds, using a random 
distribution to conduct the simulations. For 
example, if Ahmadinejad’s position is 30, then 
it can fluctuate up to 60 and down to 0.  
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Network Analysis: Moves in Reaction to Pressure in the Extent of Support for Bashar Al-Assad  
 
 
153 
 
 
Round 1: In the initial I observe that Turkey is pressuring the Muslim Brotherhood. This is in 
accordance with the fact that Turkey supports the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. In addition, 
Turkey also pressures the Kurds in Syria but most likely in a negative manner because their 
historical conflict with these people. Therefore, this analysis indicates that Turkey has a role in 
shaping the direction of the opposition in Syria. I also observe that Iran’s Supreme Leader 
Khamenei effectively applies pressure to Syrian Prime Minister Adel Safar. This is also expected 
given Iran’s influence in cooperating with Syria based on their common interests in Lebanon 
and the Palestinian issue. 
Round 2: The same network dynamics are in play in this round except that I observe Supreme 
Leader Khamenei of Iran exerting pressure on not just Syria Prime Minister but also Vice 
Presidents Attar and Shara. 
Round 3: Once again I observe Supreme Leader Khamenei applying pressure to Syria’s military 
chief of staff General Dawud Raja. More interestingly I see Egypt exerting pressure on Syrian 
media as well Bashar Al-Assad. This is also somewhat apparent due to the current revolution in 
Egypt which played a role in catalyzing the protests in Syria. 
Round 4: In the final round I observe the entire Syrian leadership exerting significant pressure 
back onto Egypt. This may be the result of Bashar Al-Assad’s effective policy in shattering the 
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opposition in Syria, a counter-revolution in support of the status quo and opposite to Egypt’s 
success in removing their leader Hosni Mubarak. 
b. Syrian Uprising Update 
Data and Analysis Updated: 7/21/2011 
 
Extent of Support for Assad al-Bashar  
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Outcome:   Core support for Bashar Al-Assad remains strong with no indication that he is 
planning to leave Syria. The uprising is gaining support from the general population and a wave 
of military defections is reported.  These power shifts are not sufficient to threaten the current 
regime.     
Consistent with the initial forecast and simulations of April 2011” The impact of the protests 
will be marginal at best on the ruling authority of Bashar Al-Assad.  He will still remain in power 
with continued support from his coalition. However, his power will slightly wane within the 
coalition, resulting into increased concessions to his supporters.”   
The update shows that as anticipated Assad is delegating some of his power to subordinates in 
return for a unified effort against the opposition.  The international community remains split. 
The Iranians, Saudis and the Chinese will continue to support Assad.  Russia will join Israel by 
adopting a neutral stance. The United Stated did imposed weak sanctions to counter Assad’s 
violent grip on the country. Turkey’s critical remarks lead to coordination with Europe, the US 
and Egypt. These developments will not martially affect Assad’s position. Current international 
pressure is insufficient to weaken Assad to any substantial degree.  Specifically the regional 
alliances Assad has established will serve his need to further stabilizing the internal situation.  
The Syrian crisis is largely an internal affair. Domestic opposition is weak. The military defectors 
along with the Kurds and the Muslim Brotherhood are the only organized opposition and there 
is some indication of increased coordination among these factions (Figure 1, round 5). Yet, 
compared to the Assad government these opposition groups are weak and will have only a 
marginal effect in the short-term.  This crisis can escalate only if major unexpected events 
prompt large shifts in the military support for Bashar Al-Assad or substantial not organized 
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populations rise unexpectedly.   Therefore,  violence is likely to continue because of the 
entrenched antigovernment stand by the weak opposition, but over time revolutionary activity 
will likely be ineffective and subside.  
c. Syrian Uprising Update: Assad Loses 30% Power, Turkey Shifts Further Away, Iraq Enters and 
Increases Concern 
Data and Analysis Updated: August 13
th
 2011 
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Updated Outcome:  Similar results and conclusions from my initial forecast in May 2011 and update in 
July 2011 stand. Although there have been a wave of military defections along with isolation from the 
international community, Bashar Al-Assad will continue to remain in power with strong support from 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq has increased its salience on the issue and weighed in support of the Assad 
regime. Although I initially observe a staunch opposition from the Kurds, Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
military, the final evolution of events indicates that the opposition moves closer to a neutral position 
while the Muslim Brotherhood remains opposed but with less intensity. In short, the international 
community’s isolation of Assad will have little effect on him departing Syria unless enacted by external 
force. Bashar Al-Assad will continue to remain in power with what appears to be an effective 
pacification enacted by the government’s brutal onslaught of dissenters.  As a result of the government 
crackdown, the level of opposition will decrease by most dissenting groups.  
d. Syria Forecast Update: Escalation into Civil War and Stalemate Phase 
Data Updated: November 9
th
 2011 Analysis Completed: November 20
th
 2011  
Basecase: Extent of Support for Bashar Al Assad 
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Outcome: Syria is now engaged in a civil war. There are members of the Army who have begun to defect 
into what is now called the Syrian Free Army. As a result Bashar al Assad has been weakened, 
particularly with Arab League and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition (Syria National Council). 
Although the Syrian opposition is not as capable as the Assad regime, its lack of strength has been 
augmented by a supporting coalition consisting of the Arab League, the United States, Turkey, and the 
European Union. The Assad regime still has support from China, Russia, and Iran; however, the coalition 
opposing his rule will become stronger and more unified compared to the regime’s current coalition. 
Although Bashar Al Assad has lost international support and is becoming more isolated, he still 
maintains a strong domestic coalition with external support from Iran. Bashar Al Assad will continue to 
fight and remain in power unless removed by external intervention such as a NATO military action 
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similar to Libya’s removal of Gaddafi. Otherwise Bashar Al-Assad will continue to fight and remain in 
power although the international coalition opposing is rule will become stronger.  
Strength: Assad is weakened, resulting into a more even between the opposition and status quo regime. 
The international community continues to turn against Bashar Al Assad 
Weakness: Bashar Al Assad will continue to fight and remain in power unless removed by external 
intervention such as a NATO military action similar to Libya’s removal of Gaddafi. 
Opportunity: The international community brings the civil war to a closer end if there is a foreign 
military intervention 
Threat: There will be a stalemate in the civil war. Bashar Al Assad may end up providing a negotiated 
settlement where he remains in power if not removed by external force.  
Scenario: Sunni Business Community Moves in Support of the Opposition and Assad Loses 
30% of Strength 
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Outcome: If the majority of the business community in Syria takes sides with the Syrian opposition, the 
Assad regime will continue to fight and maintain its domestic coalition. The civil war in Syria will 
intensify. Bashar Al Assad will not relinquish power in this scenario. Under this scenario, the civil war will 
transition from an escalation to a stalemate phase. The only way the conflict will end is if there is foreign 
intervention led by Turkey, the United States, or NATO. 
Strength: There will be a more even fight, providing more strength to the Syrian opposition.  
Weakness: The civil war in Syria will intensify and transition into a stalemate phase. 
Opportunity:  The United States, Turkey, and the Arab League can strengthen their support from the 
Syrian opposition and business community by guaranteeing business opportunities and concessions for 
anyone opposing Bashar Al Assad. 
Threat: If there is no foreign military intervention, the stalemate will continue.  
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Future Form of Government in Syria 
 
 
 
Outcome: Although the Arab League will initially push for democratic elections in Syria, they will 
inevitably prefer a status quo system of governance. This indicates that that the Arab League opposes 
Bashar Al Assad and will prefer to replace Assad with another ruler under a similar autocratic structure. 
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The bifurcation between democratic and autocratic preferences is a further indication that Syria will 
remain engaged in a civil war.  
There will continue be a disagreement on governance between Bashar Al Assad and his brother Maher 
Al Assad.  Maher will seek a position closer to a harsh autocracy while Bashar will want to provide 
concessions or limited reforms, believing that such reforms will strengthen his waning coalition. The 
disagreement will be over type and extent of authority. There will be no debate within the Assad camp 
over democratic reform.  
Strength: There is a legitimate Democratic movement within the Syrian National Council. 
Weakness:  The bifurcation between democratic and autocratic preferences is a further indication that 
Syria will remain engaged in a civil war.  
Opportunities: Syria can have democratic elections if Assad is removed by external force. 
Threat: Any potential change in personality will not necessarily result in a dramatic change in 
governance unless the United States drives the Arab League and provides credible promises and 
concession to the Syrian business community. 
Best COA: U.S. Provides Credible Concession to Syrian Business Community, Arab League and 
Russia 
 
Outcome and Recommended Course of Action: Bashar Al-Assad’s regime is highly susceptible to 
collapse if the United States can build a coalition with support from the Sunni business community, 
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Russia and the Arab League. This is a two-step strategy. First, the United States should allow for the 
situation in Syria to escalate further, thereby allowing for consolidation and unity among the Syrian 
opposition, the Turks and the Arab League. Second, as the civil war reaches the stalemate phase (4th 
round or evolution of the crisis) the United States can then provide credible concessions and guarantees 
to the Sunni business community in Syria. If the United States can follow its credible commitment to the 
Syrian business community with political or economic concessions to the Arab League and Russia, such a 
coalition calling for democratic elections will be strong enough to successfully defeat the Bashar Al 
Assad’s regime.  
Strength: The defeat of Bashar Al Assad with support from the Arab League, the business community 
and Russia will provide opportunity for democratic reform nearing a two party competitive election. 
Iran’s influence will be substantially weakened in the Middle East, thereby losing its foothold in the Arab 
world. 
Weakness: The Assad regime will continue to resist and this cannot happen unless he is removed by 
force. 
Opportunity: Syria will have the opportunity of having elections and Iran will be weakened as well. 
Threat: Democratic elections may present unforeseeable threat of having an equally anti-Israeli 
sentiment. 
5. Complete Predictions on Yemen 
 
a. The Yemeni Uprising: The Future of President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
  Data Collected: April 22
nd
 2011 Analysis Completed: April 29
th
 2011 
 
Can President Saleh remain in Yemen in the midst of defections? I predict Ali Abdullah Saleh can 
remain in Yemen for the next 30 to 60 days.  But his stay in the medium term is untenable because of 
the possible wave of military defections. Although weakened, he still has the ability to negotiate his 
departure because of the limited support from Saudi Arabia. 
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Who will be in power when Saleh departs? The most likely person is General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar.  This 
forecast is based on his support from the opposition and high level of influence from the military. A 
second as yet unidentified candidate from the military may emerge. The next likely candidate is Sheik 
Sadeq Abdullah from the Islah Party based on his level of power and influence largely among non-
military sources. 
How will President Saleh act as he continues to lose power? I predict that as Saleh loses control 
(up to one-third of his current power), the opponents will become less staunchly opposed to him. This 
suggests that he is in a position to create a series of credible deals with key opposition leaders where his 
stay becomes less intolerable than the current situation.  Based on such estimates I forecast that Saleh 
will be allowed for a soft departure rather than a sudden exit. 
Will the level of violence escalate in Yemen? The level of violence will not escalate significantly 
further than the current levels I am observing. As Saleh continues to work out deals with the power-
brokers within Yemen, the intensity of opposition against him will decrease.  
 What can the United States do to mitigate violence? The United States can strike a cooperative 
deal with the military defectors, reducing the risk for further violence. Working with the military 
defectors dampens the strengthened extremist groups such as the Islah Party, Al Qaeda, and various 
other extreme elements. 
Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Yemen and internationally. Data collection was completed on April 22nd 2011 and analysis was finished 
on April 29th 2011. Yemen is a deeply divided country consisting of multiple tribal networks and 
independent provincial leaders who have rarely operate with support or oversight by the central 
government.  This decentralization is in part due to the fact that prior to 1990 Yemen was divided into 
South and North states. After unification, the country has continued to struggle to establish an effective 
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government. Yemen is a poor country with limited resources and stressed by water scarcity that is 
estimated to fall below anticipated requirements within the next 10 to 15 years.  
Following September 11th, Yemen has been recognized as a hotbed for Sunni extremism and allegedly a 
breeding ground for terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda.  
The potential departure of pro West Ali Abdullah Saleh poses policy questions for the United States that 
are still unanswered.  
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United 
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I 
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue 
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.  
To assess the crisis in Yemen I posed the following concern: 
Issue: Specify the extent of support or opposition for President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
Issue Continuum: The scale ranges from  
 0:   “Staunch Opposition to Saleh,”  
 50:  Neutral 
 100  “Strong Support for Saleh.”  
Basecase: Extent of Support for Ali Abdullah Saleh 
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Outcome: Despite the most recent wave of ruling party and military defections, President Saleh is still 
capable of remaining in power in the short term. The tide will turn in favor of the opposition as the 
ruling party defectors along with the military defectors consolidate their positions with the Islah 
Party.President Saleh will not depart easily unless a negotiated exit is carved out. Although he will face 
more pressure, Saleh will still have enough support to remain in Yemen in the short term. In addition, I 
predict that although the ruling party defectors along with members of the military have defected, their 
opposition to Saleh is not adamant enough to initiate a full scale war to depose him.   
At the outset the United States takes a slightly anti-Saleh stance but the American position shifts slightly 
in favor of Saleh. This suggests that as Saleh’s power begins to wane relative to that of the opposition’s 
consolidation, the United States takes a softer approach attempting to ease him out instead of a sudden 
forced exit.  
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 Although the various tribes and political parties play a significant role, the most critical element 
influencing Saleh’s exit will be the military defectors led by General Mohsen al Ahmar and Brigadier 
General Mohammed Mohsen. The situation is very fluid and a large number of opportunities emerge to 
categorize this transition depending on who among many is the first mover. 
Strengths: The military defectors hold the most power in opposition to Saleh. A transition of 
governmental power to this group suggests an alternative that is not as prone to the extremism that 
would be propagated if tribal leaders or rebel groups came to power. 
Opportunities: The United States can strike a cooperative deal with the military defectors, reducing  the 
risk accompanied by strengthened extremist elements within the tribal factions, the Islah Party, Al 
Qaeda, and various other rebel groups.  
Weakness:  The Islah Party, though not as powerful as the military, still holds influence within Yemen’s 
political landscape. It has many extremist elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists.
Scenario: President Saleh Loses 30% of Power 
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Outcome: As President Saleh continues to lose more power, the intensity of those opposing him 
decreases, approaching closer to a neutral position instead of a staunch opposition. This means that 
President Saleh will either be eased out based on a negotiated departure with the unlikely possibility of 
remaining by cutting some type of a deal. Many of the opposing groups who have staunchly opposed 
President Saleh will move toward a slightly opposing him, suggesting that he may be providing a credible 
deal where he is handled in a less unfavorable manner than expected. At a 30% loss in strength 
President Saleh’s position becomes highly unstable, but with Saudi Arabia still supporting him he has the 
capability to remain in Yemen in the short-term (i.e. only 30 to 60 days). 
Strength: The military and ruling party defectors will still hold sway and influence the outcome. This is a 
relatively favorable alternative if Saleh departs because the military is the least extreme of the opposing 
factions within Yemen. 
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Weakness: Extremist elements of the Islah Party will increase their influence by aligning with the 
military defectors. 
Opportunities: The United States is hedging in the middle in its policy toward Saleh. Although the United 
States appears to be divided on the extent of support for Saleh, it can still strike a cooperative deal with 
the military defectors, reducing the risk accompanied with strengthening extremist elements within the 
Yemen.
 
Scenario: United States Takes and Saudi Arabia Take Neutral Position 
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Outcome: If the United States and Saudi Arabia initially take a neutral position, the situation will 
inevitably lead to a more responsible eased exit for President Saleh. In spite of an initially neutral 
position, the leading opposition elements along with the U.S., Saudi, European, Chinese and Russian 
actors will also shift in support of an eased exit. This will assure the departure of Saleh in a more 
responsible and less violent manner.  
Strength: Saleh’s exit is less staunch and more responsible 
Weakness: Aligning slightly to the left of neutral may provide some opportunity for Saleh to remain 
longer if he is adamant about staying. 
Opportunities: The U.S. can establish cooperative relationship with the military defectors and certain 
non-extremist elements within the opposing factions. 
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Network Analysis: 
Moves in Reaction Pressure 
 
 
The network analysis 
illustrates all the actors 
being moved in reaction 
to pressure according to 
the various rounds of 
negotiations. 
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Description: I initially observe that the military defectors led by General al Ahmar, General Alliewa and 
General Mohsen are pressuring the ruling party defectors to move in their direction in opposition to 
President Saleh. This indicates that they are shaping the direction of the opposition action against Saleh. 
While the military is pressuring the ruling party, Ali Mohammad Mujawar (2nd in command to Saleh) is 
pressuring King Abdullah and Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia to support their position. This is perhaps an 
attempt to gain a soft exit that is less harmful than a sudden departure. In every round of the 
negotiations, General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar is the key driver with the ability to pressure numerous key 
players such as the ruling party, the Europeans, the Americans, and especially the Saudis.  
6. Complete Predictions on Saudi Arabia 
 
a. Saudi Arabia Governance and Power Structure 
                  Data Collected: October 26
th
 2011 Analysis Completed: October 27
th
 2011 
 
Background:  
How stable is Saudi Arabia’s government in the midst of the Arab uprising? Saudi Arabia’s government 
structure is stable and not prone to change in the short to medium time horizon. The status quo 
governance structure in Saudi Arabia will remain unchanged with little or no reform. Even if the single 
ruler structure under the House of Saud is weakened by 50%, there will be little or no change to the 
power structure. A challenge to Saudi rule will marginally strengthen the coalition in support of the royal 
family. 
What will be the United States role in the future of Saudi Arabia? The United States along with the 
other great powers support the single ruler structure under the Saudi Royal Family and are not expected 
to change their position.  They will not take any measures that could shake the foundational structure of 
Saudi Arabia. However, the analysis also indicates that the United States and the great powers will only 
support the Saudi Royal Family so long as it remains stable. 
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Are there any prospects for substantial reforms toward Democracy in Saudi Arabia? There is no 
prospect for democratic reform.There are few foreseeable alternatives other than the Saudi regime. 
This limits options for the United States as much as it tries to hedge with any other tribe or faction. 
There is no prospect for democratic reform. 
What is the degree of economic openness in Saudi Arabia? Saudi Arabia has a relatively open economy, 
indicating that the structural problems associated with its petroleum based economy are not rooted in 
open or closed trade. The analysis indicates that the nearly all the governments having substantial 
influence on the Saudi economy will continue to seek an on-going open economy that can transport 
petroleum freely. 
Is the Saudi economic system stable in regards to internal factors? Internally the Saudi economy is 
stable in the short to medium term. The positions on the degree of economic openness with Saudi 
Arabia will be consolidated, making it more stable under the status quo. This mitigates the risk for 
continued petroleum exports to the rest of the world, a vital interest to the United States and the other 
great power. 
Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Saudi Arabia and the international community. Data was collected on October 26th 2011 and analysis 
was completed on October 27th 2011.  
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United 
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I 
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue 
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. 
Issue Continuum on Power Structure and Governance: This continuum ranges from “0” defined as a 
liberal democracy all the way to “100” defined as the 1 ruler status quo structure under Saudi King 
Abdullah. At “75” I identified the next option which is a single tribe autocracy other than the Saudi Royal 
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Family. At “50” I defined a multi-tribal autocracy, an authoritarian system where two or more tribes 
share power. At “25” I defined the governance form as a single party system, similar to China or Russia’s 
government.  
Issue Continuum on the Degree of Economic Openness: This was a simple but effective continuum. At 
“0” I defined the economy as completely closed and at “100” I defined the economy as completely open. 
 
 
 
Basecase: Power Structure and Governance 
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Outcome:  Saudi Arabia’s government structure is stable and not prone to change in the short to 
medium time horizon. The United States along with the other great powers support the single ruler 
structure under the Saudi Royal Family and are not expected to change their position.  They will not take 
any measures that could shake the foundational structure of Saudi Arabia. However, the analysis also 
indicates that the United States and the great powers will only support the Saudi Royal Family so long as 
it remains stable. This can be discerned by the evolution of the various rounds depicted above indicating 
that the United States and the great powers have positioned themselves slightly between a single tribe 
autocratic structure and status quo under Saud, suggesting that they are prepared to hedge their 
support toward any other tribe that could possibly shake the status quo power structure. This means 
that the United States, China, Russia, India, and the European Union will support the House of Saud so 
long as they maintain order. The onset of any internal struggle will result in the great powers taking 
sides with whoever will win. Although Iran, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen prefer a multi-tribal autocratic 
structure, the support for such governance structure is insignificant. The support for any democratic 
system is also marginal at best. In short, the status quo governance structure in Saudi Arabia will remain 
with little reform or change. 
Strength: The Saudi government is stable in the short and medium term. 
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Weakness: There are few foreseeable alternatives other than the Saudi regime. This limits options for 
the United States as much as it tries to hedge with any other tribe or faction. There is no prospect for 
democratic reform. 
Opportunities: There are little or no opportunities. The United States has trades it’s other options for 
stability under the status quo. 
Power Structure Scenario:  Challenge to Saudi King and House of Saud (loss of power by up to 50%) 
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Outcome: A challenge to the leadership in Saudi Arabia will not pose a threat to the governance 
structure of the country. Any challenge will most likely derive from an internal power struggle within the 
Saudi royal family. Therefore, a change in personality which can occur from the death of King Abdullah 
who is very old will not necessitate change in governance. The simulation indicates that even if the 
single ruler structure under the House of Saud is weakened by 50%, there will be little or no change to 
the power structure. A challenge to Saudi rule will marginally strengthen the coalition in support of the 
royal family. This will occur when Turkey moves closer in support of the status quo if they view a 
weakening of the royal family’s power. The United States along with the great powers will not change 
their position even with a dramatic waning of influence unless the Saudi Royal family nears inevitable 
collapse. This simulation further indicates the stability of the Saudi regime.  
Extent of Economic Openness 
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Outcome:  Saudi Arabia has a relatively open economy, indicating that the structural problems 
associated with its petroleum based economy are not rooted in open or closed trade. Other factors such 
as shortage of skilled labor, lack of education, and cultural issues may capture the challenges faced by 
Saudi Arabia much more effectively (not captured in this analysis). The analysis indicates that the nearly 
all the governments having substantial influence on the Saudi economy will continue to seek an on-
going open economy that can transport petroleum freely. These governments will collective restrict the 
prospect of excessive or innovative economic liberalization in order to strengthen adherence to the 
status quo economic structure. 
Strength: The positions on the degree of economic openness with Saudi Arabia will be consolidated, 
making it more stable under the status quo. This mitigates the risk for continued petroleum exports to 
the rest of the world, a vital interest to the United States and the other great power. 
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Weakness: Although the current economic system in Saudi Arabia is stable, there is little prospect for 
opening it up even more. 
Opportunities: N/A 
Threats:  The Shiite in Saudi Arabia and Iran will seek to hinder to the degree of economic openness. 
This is threat is marginal at best. 
Economic Scenario:  Challenge to Saudi King and House of Saud (loss of power by up to 50%) 
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Outcome: If the authority of the Saudi Royal family is challenged, the degree of economic openness will 
not change.  This is a further indication of internal stability of the Saudi regime. 
7. Complete Predictions on Bahrain 
 
a. Forecast on Future Stability of Bahrain 
Data Collected: November 7
th
 2011  Analysis Completed: November 9
th
 2011 
 
Is the Kingdom of Bahrain stable following the uprising in 2011? Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa 
Family is stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and the United States as their security guarantors, 
the Al Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in Bahrain. 
How will the opposition elements react as a result of the violent crackdown? Shiite led elements such 
as Al Haq and Al Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their initial support from Iran. The 
opposition element most likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa Family will be Al 
Haq. In the final evolution of this uprising the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and even Iran will 
reduce their anti-ruling family activities and eventually accept Al Khalifa family as the legitimate 
authority in Bahrain. 
What will the Al- Khalifa Family do in response to the uprising? Opposition elements will be further 
pacified either by force or limited concessions.  Having already conceded as supplicants of Saudi Arabi, 
the Al Khalifa Family will make a series of deals or concessions that will align the opposition parties and 
external influences from Egypt and Iran with the domestic business community.  
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What will happen if the Al-Khalifa is substantially weakened?  If the Al Khalifa family concedes some of 
its authority in order to share it with the other people within their already strong coalition, they will gain 
more stability and support. Therefore, their limited loss of influence will be augmented by a rising 
coalition in support of Al Khalifa rule. Saudi Arabia will remain adamantly in favor of the Al Khalifa 
Family.  
What will Iran do in reaction to the Shiite led uprising in Bahrain?  Iran will decrease their opposition 
activities against the Al Khalifa family after realizing that a successful uprising is untenable. This suggests 
that they will accept some sort of deal or concession in return for ceasing anti-ruling authority 
operations. 
Overview: We explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within 
Bahrain and internationally. Data collection was completed on November 7th 2011 and analysis was 
completed on November 9th 2011. Using subject matter expertise and media statements from various 
actors within Bahrain and internationally, we have evaluated the future stability of Bahrain and the 
extent of support for the Al Khalifa Royal Family. 
Background: Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout history it has served as a strategically significant island 
providing port access and a transit point for travel and trade. Although the country is a relatively 
wealthy country due to the discovery of oil in 20th century, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains strategically 
important for the same historical reasons: an island that provides access to Persian Gulf shipping lanes. 
For example, the United States 5th Fleet uses Bahrain as its major port and staging area for Naval 
operations in the Persian Gulf.  The 2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa Family presented a major 
dilemma for the United States and its Arab allies on how to respond to the crisis. Realizing the rising 
Iranian influence of a Shiite led majority in Bahrain, the United States and its Arab allies under the Gulf 
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Cooperation Council (GCC) effectively provided support to the Sunni minority Al Khalifa Royal Family to 
quell the uprising.  
However, this is not an unusual occurrence in the history of Bahrain. The Al Khalifa Family has ruled the 
Kingdom of Bahrain for over 200 years because of its willingness to concede to whichever power that 
could guarantee its security and stability. They have switched alliances repeatedly ranging from 
declaration of loyalty to Nasseredin Shah of Iran from British rule in 1860 all the way to the recent 2011 
supplication to Saudi Arabia.  
Issue Continuum: We developed an issue continuum in predicting the future stability of Bahrain by 
analyzing the extent of support for the Al Khalifa rule. At “0” we defined the position as staunch 
opposition to Al Khalifa rule, “50” as neutral and “100” as strong support for the royal family. 
Extent of Support for Al Khalifa Family 
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Outcome: Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa Family is stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and 
the United States as their security guarantors, the Al Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in 
Bahrain. Shiite led elements such as Al Haq and Al Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their 
initial support from Iran. Gulf Cooperation Council members (GCC) such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia will maintain strong support for Bahrain’s ruling family in order to counter Iranian led Shiite 
influence. The opposition element most likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa 
Family will be Al Haq. In the final evolution of this uprising the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and 
even Iran will reduce their anti-ruling family activities and eventually accept Al Khalifa family as the 
legitimate authority in Bahrain. This suggests that the Al Khalifa will make a series of deals or 
concessions that will align the opposition parties and external influences from Egypt and Iran with the 
domestic business community. 
Strength: Bahrain remains stable. Opposition elements will be pacified either by force or limited 
concessions 
Weakness: Shiite opposition elements remain mainly through the Al Haq Party 
Opportunity: The Al Khalifa Family can make a strong coalition in favor of any opposing elements 
Threat: There will continue to be marginalized Shiite opposition elements within Bahrain. 
Scenario: Al Khalifa Family Loses 30% of Power and Provides Limited Concessions to Opposition Parties 
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Outcome:  If the Al Khalifa Family loses up to 30% of its influence, it will further augment this loss by 
providing concessions first to its supporters in the business community in addition to the opposition 
parties (most likely in the form of subsidy payments). It will also make reforms in which some authority 
is given to the opposing parties. In this scenario the Al Khalifa Family will relinquish some of its power in 
return for greater support and stability. The coalition in support of the Al Khalifa Family will gain 
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overwhelming support, ultimately trading some of their authority in return for stability.  Iran will also 
decrease their opposition activities against the Al Khalifa family. In short, if the Al Khalifa family 
concedes some of its authority in order to share it with the other people within their already strong 
coalition, they will gain more stability and support. Therefore, their limited loss of influence will be 
augmented by a rising coalition in support of Al Khalifa rule. Saudi Arabia will remain adamantly in favor 
of the Al Khalifa Family.  
Strength: Even the Al Khalifa family loses up to 30% of its power, it will remain stable. It will augment its 
loss of power by provided concession in order to gain a stronger coalition in support of their rule.  
Weakness: The Al Khalifa Family will relinquish some authority in return for stability 
Threat: N/A 
Collected Data and Stakeholder Inputs for ABM 
Inputs on Egypt collected on 2/3/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP Positions  INFLUENCE GROUP IMPORTANCE 
Omar Suleiman --Chief of Intel Egypt 20 65 100 95 
Mohamed El-Baradei Egypt 85 35 100 95 
Ayman Nour -- Al Ghud Party Egypt 70 15 100 95 
Muslim Brotherhood  Egypt 25 40 100 95 
Ahmed Shafiq Prime Minister Egypt 50 10 100 95 
Liberal Party (WAFD) Egypt 80 68 100 95 
Amr Moussa (former head of Arab League) Egypt 75 10 100 95 
 General Tantawi -- Army Chief Egypt 20 100 100 95 
Gamal Mubarak Egypt 20 2 100 95 
Egyptian Media Egypt 85 25 100 95 
Hosni Mubarek --President Egypt 25 10 100 95 
Obama  U.S. 95 100 20 85 
Biden V.P. U.S. 95 75 20 85 
Clinton -- Sec State U.S. 90 80 20 85 
Netanyahu Israel 50 100 10 95 
Khamenei Iran 65 100 5 80 
Ahmadinejad Iran 65 60 5 80 
Medvedev Russia 35 100 3 70 
China China 30 100 3 75 
European Union EU 90 100 4 76 
NATO NATO 90 100 3 80 
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Hamas Hamas 35 100 5 95 
PLO PLO 35 100 4 95 
Turkey Turkey 60 100 3 95 
      
       
Inputs on Egypt Collected on 11/7/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE 
GROUP-
INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Mohamed El-Baradei Egypt 95 10 100 98 
Ayman Nour -- Al Ghud Party Egypt 90 5 100 95 
Muslim Brotherhood  Egypt 75 28 100 95 
Freedom and Justice Party Egypt 78 10 100 90 
Ahmed Shafiq  Egypt 65 3 100 70 
Liberal Party (WAFD) Egypt 85 15 100 92 
Egyptian secular Egypt 85 18 100 90 
Amr Moussa Egypt 75 10 100 80 
General Tantawi -- Army Chief Egypt 20 50 100 90 
Military Council Egypt 40 100 100 95 
Remaining Mubarak Egypt 15 30 100 70 
Copits Egypt 75 20 100 80 
Ali Salmy -vice PM Egypt 40 3 100 70 
Esam Sharaf – PM Egypt 75 10 100 90 
Presidential Candidates Egypt 70 20 100 95 
Judges Egypt 70 5 100 80 
Radical Muslims Egypt 40 5 100 75 
Private Media Egypt 90 30 100 90 
Public Media Egypt 25 15 100 50 
Egypt Youth Egypt 95 25 100 95 
Intellectuals Egypt 80 10 100 90 
Obama  U.S. 80 100 40 75 
Biden V.P. U.S. 60 60 40 60 
Clinton -- Sec State U.S. 70 80 40 70 
CENTCOM U.S. 50 30 40 60 
Netanyahu Israel 40 100 10 85 
Khamenei Iran 30 100 20 60 
Ahmadinejad Iran 30 60 20 55 
Russia Russia 50 100 5 50 
China China 40 100 7 65 
European Union Eu 75 100 25 70 
NATO Nato 70 100 15 60 
Hamas Hamas 60 100 7 80 
PLO Plo 55 100 5 60 
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Turkey Turkey 75 100 20 70 
Saudi Saudi 30 100 5 85 
Sudan Sudan 50 100 10 50 
Libya Libya 60 100 10 80 
 
 
      
Inputs on Iran Collected on 3/3/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS POSTION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
 Khamenei Iran 25 100 100 95 
Rafsanjani Iran 75 50 100 95 
Ahmadinejad Iran 20 75 100 95 
Moj. Khamenei Iran 25 20 100 95 
 Jafari Iran 15 75 100 95 
 Taeb Iran 5 65 100 95 
 Yazdi Iran 25 40 100 95 
 Naqdi Iran 10 45 100 95 
Ali Larijani Iran 40 72 100 95 
 Tavakoli Iran 40 25 100 95 
Velayati Iran 45 15 100 95 
Sadeq Larijani Iran 40 70 100 95 
G.H. Elham Iran 35 60 100 95 
M. Ali-Ramin Iran 20 10 100 95 
Moj.Hashemi Iran 20 10 100 95 
Hassan Abassi Iran 20 10 100 95 
Mohsen Rezaei Iran 15 30 100 95 
Karroubi Iran 115 10 100 95 
 Mousavi Iran 115 27 100 95 
Ali Khatami Iran 95 29 100 95 
 Khorasani Iran 50 48 100 95 
Iranian Media Iran 25 25 100 95 
Bazaar Class Iran 110 40 100 95 
University Students Iran 175 30 100 95 
Jundollah Jundollah 150 100 2 95 
MEK MEK 150 100 5 95 
PJAK PJAK 150 100 2 95 
Royalists Royalists 125 100 2 95 
Obama U.S. 190 100 20 80 
Clinton U.S. 190 80 20 80 
CENTCOM U.S. 190 50 20 80 
CIA U.S. 190 50 20 80 
Biden U.S. 190 75 20 80 
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Congress U.S. 190 70 20 80 
AIPAC U.S. 190 60 20 90 
 Sistani  Sistani 75 100 12 75 
Israel Israel 190 100 7 90 
Egypt Egypt 145 100 3 85 
Russia Russia 25 100 10 70 
China China 25 100 11 70 
EU EU 185 100 10 70 
Saudi Saudi 75 100 5 90 
Turkey Turkey 130 100 10 90 
 
Inputs on Iran Collected on 6/27/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
 Khamenei Iran 25 100 100 95 
Rafsanjani Iran 75 50 100 95 
Ahmadinejad Iran 20 75 100 95 
Moj. Khamenei Iran 25 20 100 95 
 Jafari Iran 15 75 100 95 
 Taeb Iran 5 65 100 95 
 Yazdi Iran 25 40 100 95 
 Naqdi Iran 10 45 100 95 
Ali Larijani Iran 40 72 100 95 
 Tavakoli Iran 40 25 100 95 
Velayati Iran 45 15 100 95 
Sadeq Larijani Iran 40 70 100 95 
G.H. Elham Iran 35 60 100 95 
M. Ali-Ramin Iran 20 10 100 95 
Moj.Hashemi Iran 20 10 100 95 
Hassan Abassi Iran 20 10 100 95 
Mohsen Rezaei Iran 15 30 100 95 
Karroubi Iran 115 10 100 95 
 Mousavi Iran 115 27 100 95 
Ali Khatami Iran 95 29 100 95 
 Khorasani Iran 50 48 100 95 
Iranian Media Iran 25 25 100 95 
Bazaar Class Iran 110 40 100 95 
University Students Iran 175 30 100 95 
Jundollah 
Jundolla
h 150 100 2 95 
MEK Mek 150 100 5 95 
PJAK Pjak 150 100 2 95 
Royalists Royalists 125 100 2 95 
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Obama U.S. 190 100 20 80 
Clinton U.S. 190 80 20 80 
CENTCOM U.S. 190 50 20 80 
CIA U.S. 190 50 20 80 
Biden U.S. 190 75 20 80 
Congress U.S. 190 70 20 80 
AIPAC U.S. 190 60 20 90 
 Sistani  Sistani 75 100 12 75 
Israel Israel 190 100 7 90 
Egypt Egypt 145 100 3 85 
Russia Russia 25 100 10 70 
China China 25 100 11 70 
EU Eu 185 100 10 70 
Saudi Saudi 75 100 5 90 
Turkey Turkey 130 100 10 90 
 
Inputs on Libya Collected on 3/22/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS POSTION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Muamar Gaddafi Gaddafi Libya 100 100 100 99 
Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi Gaddafi Libya 100 20 100 95 
Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr Gaddafi Libya 100 45 100 95 
Mustafa Abdul Jalil Opposition 1 100 80 95 
Omar El-Hariri Opposition 1 90 80 95 
Abdul Fatah Younis Opposition 5 100 80 95 
Suleiman Mahmoud Opposition 1 75 80 95 
Khalifa Belqasim Haftar Opposition 1 30 80 95 
Mohammed Hawil Opposition 1 40 80 95 
Abdelhafiz Ghoka Opposition 1 80 80 95 
Abdul Raham Shalgam Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Ali Al Awjali Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Ibrahim Omar Al 
Dabashi Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Mahmoud Jebril Opposition 1 65 80 95 
Ali Tarhouni Opposition 1 15 80 95 
Ali al-Essawi Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Shokri Ghanem 
Libyan Oil 
Corp. 50 100 65 85 
Obama United States 10 100 50 75 
Biden United States 10 60 50 75 
Clinton United States 10 75 50 90 
General Ham United States 10 55 50 90 
Gates United States 10 70 50 85 
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Mullen United States 10 55 50 85 
Sarkozy France 10 100 35 95 
Fillon France 10 70 35 90 
Juppe France 10 65 35 90 
Cameron UK 10 100 25 75 
Hague UK 10 100 25 75 
NATO NATO 25 100 15 75 
Erdogan Turkey 45 100 10 70 
Gul Turkey 45 50 10 75 
Hu Jintao China  75 100 35 60 
Wen Jiabao China  75 65 35 60 
India India 75 100 10 65 
Mevedev Russia 75 100 30 65 
Putin Russia 75 80 30 65 
Tantawi Egypt  60 100 20 90 
Essam Sharaf Egypt  60 50 20 90 
Israel Israel 5 100 2 80 
Kuwait Kuwait 5 100 1 80 
Khamenei Iran 25 100 10 85 
Ahmadinejad Iran 25 75 10 85 
Syria Syria 75 100 1 90 
UAE UAE 15 100 1 75 
Brazil Brazil 75 100 2 75 
Saudi Saudi 65 100 1 90 
 
Inputs on Libya Collected on 5/18/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE 
GROUP-
INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Muamar Gaddafi Gaddafi Libya 200 100 50 99 
Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi Gaddafi Libya 180 20 50 95 
Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr Gaddafi Libya 200 45 50 95 
Mustafa Abdul Jalil Opposition 50 100 80 90 
Omar El-Hariri Opposition 50 90 80 90 
Abdul Fatah Younis Opposition 100 100 80 90 
Suleiman Mahmoud Opposition 100 75 80 85 
Khalifa Belqasim Haftar Opposition 100 30 80 85 
Mohammed Hawil Opposition 100 40 80 90 
Abdelhafiz Ghoka Opposition 75 80 80 75 
Abdul Raham Shalgam Opposition 50 10 80 74 
Ali Al Awjali Opposition 30 10 80 95 
Ibrahim Omar Al 
Dabashi Opposition 30 10 80 95 
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Mahmoud Jebril Opposition 20 65 80 95 
Ali Tarhouni Opposition 50 15 80 95 
Ali al-Essawi Opposition 50 10 80 95 
Shokri Ghanem 
Libyan Oil 
Corp. 75 100 65 70 
Obama United States 1 100 50 75 
Biden United States 1 60 50 75 
Clinton United States 1 75 50 90 
General Ham United States 1 55 50 90 
Gates United States 1 70 50 85 
Mullen United States 1 55 50 85 
Sarkozy France 1 100 35 95 
Fillon France 1 70 35 90 
Juppe France 1 65 35 90 
Cameron Uk 1 100 25 75 
Hague Uk 1 100 25 75 
NATO Nato 1 100 15 75 
Erdogan Turkey 50 100 10 70 
Gul Turkey 50 50 10 75 
Hu Jintao China  160 100 35 60 
Wen Jiabao China  160 65 35 60 
India India 75 100 10 65 
Mevedev Russia 160 100 30 65 
Putin Russia 160 80 30 65 
Tantawi Egypt  100 100 20 90 
Essam Sharaf Egypt  100 50 20 90 
Israel Israel 1 100 2 80 
Kuwait Kuwait 150 100 1 80 
Khamenei Iran 120 100 10 85 
Ahmadinejad Iran 120 75 10 85 
Syria Syria 150 100 1 90 
UAE Uae 150 100 1 75 
Brazil Brazil 75 100 2 75 
Saudi Saudi 175 100 1 90 
 
 
Inputs on Libya Collected on 8/27/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Mustafa Abdul Jalil Opposition 1 100 80 95 
Omar El-Hariri Opposition 1 90 80 95 
Abdul Fatah Younis Opposition 5 100 80 95 
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Suleiman Mahmoud Opposition 1 75 80 95 
Khalifa Belqasim Haftar Opposition 1 30 80 95 
Mohammed Hawil Opposition 1 40 80 95 
Abdelhafiz Ghoka Opposition 1 80 80 95 
Abdul Raham Shalgam Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Ali Al Awjali Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Ibrahim Omar Al 
Dabashi Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Mahmoud Jebril Opposition 1 65 80 95 
Ali Tarhouni Opposition 1 15 80 95 
Ali al-Essawi Opposition 1 10 80 95 
Shokri Ghanem 
Libyan Oil 
Corp. 50 100 65 95 
Obama United States 10 100 50 75 
Biden United States 10 60 50 75 
Clinton United States 10 75 50 90 
General Ham United States 10 55 50 90 
Gates United States 10 70 50 85 
Mullen United States 10 55 50 85 
Sarkozy France 10 100 35 95 
Fillon France 10 70 35 90 
Juppe France 10 65 35 90 
Cameron Uk 10 100 25 75 
Hague Uk 10 100 25 75 
NATO Nato 25 100 15 75 
Erdogan Turkey 45 100 10 70 
Gul Turkey 45 50 10 75 
Hu Jintao China  75 100 35 60 
Wen Jiabao China  75 65 35 60 
India India 75 100 10 65 
Mevedev Russia 75 100 30 65 
Putin Russia 75 80 30 65 
Tantawi Egypt  60 100 20 90 
Essam Sharaf Egypt  60 50 20 90 
Israel Israel 5 100 2 80 
Kuwait Kuwait 5 100 1 80 
Khamenei Iran 25 100 10 85 
Ahmadinejad Iran 25 75 10 85 
Syria Syria 75 100 1 90 
UAE Uae 15 100 1 75 
Brazil Brazil 75 100 2 75 
Saudi Saudi 65 100 1 90 
 
Bagherpour 193 
 
193 
 
Inputs on Syria Collected on 5/13/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITIONS INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Farouk Al-Shara VP Syria 30 30 100 60 
Najah al-Attar VP Syria 30 25 100 45 
Muslim Brotherhood  Syria 25 40 60 95 
Adel Safar PM Syria 30 30 100 75 
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib Mahmoud   Defense  
Minstry Syria 20 45 100 50 
Chief of Staff General Dawud Rajha Syria 20 40 100 50 
Syria Media Syria 20 30 100 40 
Bashar Al-Asad --President Syria 35 85 100 50 
Obama  U.S. 95 60 20 85 
Biden V.P. U.S. 95 50 20 85 
Clinton -- Sec State U.S. 90 50 20 85 
CENTCOM US. 95 20 20 85 
Netanyahu Israel 50 10 1 50 
Khamenei Iran 65 60 35 40 
Ahmadinejad Iran 65 60 40 30 
Medvedev Russia 35 50 30 60 
China China 30 50 30 50 
European Union EU 90 60 20 80 
NATO NATO 90 60 20 80 
Turkey Turkey 60 60 40 95 
Egypt Egypt 50 50 40 95 
Saudia Saudia 10 30 5 20 
 
Inputs on Syria Collected on 7/21/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Farouk Al-Shara 
VP Syria 25 20 100 95 
Najah al-Attar VP Syria 25 15 100 95 
Muslim 
Brotherhood  Syria 70 15 100 95 
Adel Safar PM Syria 20 25 100 95 
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib 
Mahmoud   
Defense  Minstry Syria 15 30 100 95 
Chief of Staff 
General Dawud 
Rajha Syria 10 25 100 95 
Syria Media Syria 20 20 100 95 
Ba_ath Party Syria 20 50 100 95 
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Kurds Syria 70 10 100 90 
Bashar Al-Asad –
President Syria 40 100 100 90 
Obama  
United 
States 95 100 15 80 
Biden V.P. 
United 
States 95 40 15 80 
Clinton -- Sec 
State 
United 
States 90 50 15 80 
Donilon 
United 
States 90 25 15 80 
Mullen 
United 
States 90 25 15 80 
CENTCOM 
United 
States 40 20 15 80 
Netanyahu Israel 20 100 4 85 
Khamenei Iran 15 100 45 75 
Ahmadinejad Iran 10 50 45 75 
Russia Russia 25 100 35 60 
China China 20 100 35 50 
European Union Eu 80 100 20 70 
Turkey Turkey 70 100 20 80 
Egypt Egypt 60 100 20 60 
Saudi Saudi 20 100 5 50 
Arab League 
Arab 
League 65 100 30 85 
Business Suni Syria 30 25 100 65 
UN UN 80 100 30 85 
 
Inputs on Syria Collected on 8/13/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Farouk Al-Shara VP Syria 25 20 100 95 
Najah al-Attar VP Syria 25 15 100 95 
Muslim Brotherhood  Syria 70 15 100 95 
Adel Safar PM Syria 20 25 100 95 
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib 
Mahmoud   Defense  
Minstry Syria 15 30 100 95 
Chief of Staff General 
Dawud Rajha Syria 10 25 100 95 
Syria Media Syria 20 20 100 95 
Ba_ath Party Syria 20 50 100 95 
Kurds Syria 70 10 100 90 
Bagherpour 195 
 
195 
 
Bashar Al-Asad --President Syria 40 100 100 90 
Obama  
United 
States 95 100 15 80 
Biden V.P. 
United 
States 95 40 15 80 
Clinton -- Sec State 
United 
States 90 50 15 80 
Donilon 
United 
States 90 25 15 80 
Mullen 
United 
States 90 25 15 80 
CENTCOM 
United 
States 40 20 15 80 
Netanyahu Israel 20 100 4 85 
Khamenei Iran 15 100 45 75 
Ahmadinejad Iran 10 50 45 75 
Russia Russia 25 100 35 60 
China China 20 100 35 50 
European Union Eu 80 100 20 70 
Turkey Turkey 70 100 20 80 
Egypt Egypt 60 100 20 60 
Saudi Saudi 20 100 5 50 
Arab League Arab League 65 100 30 85 
Business Suni Syria 30 25 100 65 
UN UN 80 100 30 85 
 
Inputs on Syria Collected on 11/9/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Farouk Al-Shara VP Syria 30 30 100 95 
Najah al-Attar VP Syria 30 25 100 95 
Muslim Brotherhood  Syria 65 35 100 95 
Adel Safar PM Syria 30 30 100 95 
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib Mahmoud   
Defense  Minstry Syria 20 45 100 95 
Chief of Staff General Dawud 
Rajha Syria 20 40 100 95 
Syria Media Syria 20 30 100 95 
Ba_ath Party Syria 20 50 100 95 
Kurds Syria 85 10 100 90 
Bashar Al-Asad --President Syria 20 100 100 90 
Obama  
United 
States 95 100 20 80 
Biden V.P. United 95 40 20 80 
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States 
Clinton -- Sec State 
United 
States 90 60 20 80 
Donilon 
United 
States 90 65 20 80 
Mullen 
United 
States 90 50 20 80 
CENTCOM 
United 
States 95 20 20 80 
Netanyahu Israel 25 100 4 85 
Khamenei Iran 20 100 35 75 
Ahmadinejad Iran 20 50 35 75 
Medvedev Russia 35 100 35 60 
China China 30 100 25 50 
European Union Eu 90 100 20 80 
Turkey Turkey 70 100 40 80 
Egypt Egypt 80 100 20 80 
Saudi Saudi 20 100 5 90 
 
 
Inputs on Yemen Collected on 4/22/2011 (Support for Saleh) 
STAKEHOLDER of YEMEN GROUP POSITIONS INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh Yemen 98 90 100 50 
Yahia Mohamed Abdallah Saleh Yemen 80 85 90 50 
Ahmed Ali  Saleh  Yemen 75 77 85 50 
Ali Mohasen Al Ahmar   Yemen 40 30 40 80 
Amar   Mohamed Abdallah Saleh  Yemen 85 85 80 50 
Yahya al-Raie  Yemen 35 60 40 50 
 Ali Mohammed Mujawar Yemen 50 30 35 50 
Hassan Zaid  Yemen 15 20 30 70 
Shiite Houthi  Yemen 20 15 20 70 
Southern Protests Yemen 5 10 10 65 
Yemeni Clerics  Yemen 90 80 90 65 
Hamed Al Ahmer  Yemen 30 50 40 60 
Sadek Abdallh Al Ahmar  Yemen 35 50 55 60 
Abdulaziz Jubari Yemen 30 30 15 90 
Yemen Army  Yemen 95 80 95 50 
Yemeni Youth   Yemen 10 20 25 90 
Yemen Media Yemen 40 30 50 55 
Obama  U.S. 25 50 100 100 
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Biden V.P. U.S. 20 45 85 100 
Clinton -- Sec State U.S. 23 40 90 100 
CENTCOM US. 20 35 50 90 
Netanyahu Israel 2 1 100 50 
Khamenei Iran 15 20 100 50 
Ahmadinejad Iran 15 20 95 50 
Medvedev Russia 10 20 100 50 
China China 20 20 100 50 
European Union EU 20 30 100 90 
NATO NATO 20 30 100 80 
Turkey Turkey 20 10 100 90 
Saudi Arabia Saudi 40 65 100 50 
Egypt Egypt 30 40 100 88 
Head of Arab League 
Arab 
League 10 20 100 85 
 
 
 
Inputs on Bahrain Collected on 11/7/2011 (Support for Al Khalifa Family) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
Al  Khalifa Family Bahrain 100 100 100 95 
Al Wifaq Shiite Opposition Bahrain 10 20 100 90 
Al Haq Shiite Opposition Bahrain 1 20 100 90 
Waad Opposition Party Bahrain 10 15 100 90 
Shura Council Bahrain 60 85 100 95 
South Asian Workers Bahrain 20 3 100 65 
Bahrain Business Community Bahrain 80 60 100 90 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi 
Arabia 100 80 80 95 
US Us 80 70 70 85 
Qatar Qatar 80 10 10 80 
Egypt Egypt 75 50 50 80 
Iran Iran 1 15 15 90 
Turkey Turkey 80 10 10 70 
Kuwait Kuwait 95 10 10 85 
UAE Uae 90 10 10 85 
Iraq Iraq 45 3 3 60 
EU Eu 75 10 10 70 
China China 60 5 5 60 
Russia Russia 60 3 3 60 
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Inputs on Saudi Collected on 10/26/2011 (Governance) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP POSITION INFLUENCE GROUP-INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE 
King Abdullah al-Saud Saudi 100 100 100 95 
House of Saud Saudi 100 20 100 95 
The Shura Saudi 90 25 100 85 
Saudi Intellectuals Saudi 50 10 100 80 
Saudi Youth Saudi 15 15 100 85 
Saudi Women Saudi 15 4 100 90 
Shiite Saudi 15 7 100 92 
Business Community Saudi 90 30 100 95 
President Obama 
United 
States 80 100 45 95 
Secretary Clinton 
United 
States 80 50 45 95 
SECDEF Podesta 
United 
States 80 60 45 95 
Tom Donilon 
United 
States 80 60 45 95 
US Oil Companies 
United 
States 80 75 45 95 
EU Eu 80 7 7 95 
China China 80 5 5 95 
India India 80 10 10 95 
Russia Russia 75 3 3 95 
Iran Iran 50 8 8 85 
Turkey Turkey 80 12 12 80 
Egypt Egypt 15 15 15 70 
Israel Israel 100 1 1 95 
Yemen Yemen 50 4 4 90 
Oman Oman 50 2 2 90 
UAE Uae 80 3 3 90 
Bahrain Bahrain 100 2 2 95 
Qatar Qatar 50 2 2 70 
Kuwait Kuwait 100 3 3 95 
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